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Preface
Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning

The Atlantic Alliance has a New Strategic Concept that will guide it into the
21st century. It was adopted at the Lisbon Summit (19–20 November 2010)
and it promises a renewed Alliance – a ‘NATO 3.0’ ready for new challenges,
new partnership, and renewed relevance and impact. This naturally calls for
thorough assessment, which is why we convened a conference shortly after the
Lisbon Summit to take stock of the New Strategic Concept and NATO more
broadly. The conference, Why NATO? Taking Stock of the Atlantic Alliance and
its New Strategic Concept, was held at the University of Southern Denmark on 29
November 2010. To bring the assessments presented at the conference to a wider
public we asked conference contributors and other NATO experts to provide
chapters for this book which is, to our best knowledge, the first comprehensive
assessment on this scale of the New Strategic Concept and its potential for Alliance
reform. Our goal in editing and publishing this volume has been to assess what
is new and what is old in the Strategic Concept and, quite simply, to stimulate
greater debate on NATO.
We owe debts of gratitude to many people. We would first of all like to thank the
many contributors who agreed to expedite this work through the busy month of
December to produce their written assessments. We realise how disruptive such
pleas for fast-track action can be, and we greatly appreciate the exemplary efforts
you have made. Next we would like to thank NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division
(PDD) who provided indispensable funding for the November 2010 conference.
In cooperation with PDD we utilised a variety of electronic platforms to convey
the program and contributions of the conference. The international relations
student organisation at the University of Southern Denmark – IntRpol – was
an ideal partner in this respect because they know these platforms much better
than we do and we are grateful for all their assistance. We would also like to thank
the Danish Social Science Research Council (FSE) for funding our 2008–2010
research project on NATO’s future (Whither the West?) which has stimulated
our thinking on these matters and has indirectly made this publication possible.
We are similarly indebted to DIIS – the Danish Institute of International Studies
– for cooperating with us in the context of the conference and for making this
publication possible in another instance of fast-track cooperation for which we
are very grateful. We would finally like to thank our respective families for their
5
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support and willingness to, as it turned out, let yet another high priority professional project wreck our private schedules.
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Introduction. Taking Stock of NATO’s New
Strategic Concept
Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning

On 19 November 2010 NATO formally agreed to adopt a New Strategic Concept.
After a long, tightly scheduled and generally speaking fairly transparent process the
NATO family endorsed an updated understanding of what the core purpose of the
Atlantic Alliance is at the Lisbon Summit. NATO’s basic text – the Washington
Treaty of 1949 – was, as it were, once again re-interpreted within a speciﬁc geopolitical context to ﬁt an ever-changing strategic landscape. Or, put diﬀerently, with the
adoption of the New Strategic Concept NATO sought to bring its basic interests and
strategic thinking into line with the security environment as it has evolved since 1999
when the Alliance adopted its last Strategic Concept. Launched to great fanfare and
amidst many high expectations this key text entitled ‘Active Engagement, Modern
Defence’ is projected to confer a new strategic direction on NATO and to inform
the world about why the Atlantic Alliance is still vital and vigorous.
As could be expected, the New Strategic Concept is marked by both continuity and
change. Many of the basic themes characterising earlier Strategic Concepts are clearly
present in the document: Article 5 – the Alliance’s so-called ‘musketeer clause’ – is
once more highlighted as the bedrock of transatlantic security cooperation. Deterrence, in the shape of both nuclear and conventional capabilities, is yet again portrayed
as ‘a core element of [NATO’s] overall strategy’ and, in line with the 1999 Strategic
Concept, the new text puts great emphasis on NATO’s role in the business of crisis
management. The section laying out the Alliance’s Core Tasks and Principles states
that “NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of… political and military tools
to help manage developing crisis”. Related to this is the Strategic Concept’s reaﬃrmation of NATO’s focus on partnership, cooperation and dialogue, what the Alliance
of 2010 has dubbed ‘cooperative security’.
Nevertheless, the 2010 Strategic Concept diﬀers in signiﬁcant ways from its predecessors. Perhaps most importantly, the document conveys a collective intention
to push NATO further in the direction of global engagement. NATO is becoming
more global and also more political and concomitantly it is becoming less conﬁned
by regional and military considerations. Although the text does make it clear that
the supreme task of the Alliance concerns the defence of NATO territory and Allied
populations, which might seem a reincarnation of ‘regional NATO’, the Strategic
7
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Concept contains far fewer geographical limitations to Allied activities than did
both the 1999 and the 1991 Concepts; the predominant threats it singles out are
unconventional and transnational or global. Political consultations with a wide
range of actors and partners now ﬁgure prominently as a core activity. This is not
an alliance focused on Europe or the Euro-Atlantic area; nor is it a global alliance
because it remains Atlantic and invokes global threats and issues in relation to its
own security; it is rather an Atlantic alliance focused on the globe. Finally, it is an
alliance cognisant of public diplomacy and of the vital role played by strategic narratives: hence the short and relatively lucid Strategic Concept and the diplomatic
fanfare surrounding its publication.
This introduction will do three things. It will ﬁrst provide some background about
what the Strategic Concept is to NATO and about what has led up to the 2010
Strategic Concept. It will then oﬀer a quick guide to the New Strategic Concept.
The Concept is reprinted in full at the back of this book and our quick guide will
therefore conﬁne itself to emphasising the ways in which ‘global’ and ‘political’ NATO
have gained in prominence. Lastly, the introduction will connect these issues to the
set of chapters that follow.

What is NATO’s Strategic Concept? 1
The Strategic Concept is the Alliance’s operational and dynamic view of its founding treaty. The Washington Treaty of 1949 is a generic document that lays out the
core values (democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and free institutions)
that the Alliance will ‘safeguard’ in a manner consistent with the United Nations
Charter. The Treaty does not in any way deﬁne threats or particularly important
geographical zones of interest. Instead, Article 4 adopts a global perspective in so
far as “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them,
the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties
is threatened.” This global outlook is balanced by Article 6, which deﬁnes the
geographical area – essentially territory and forces in “the Mediterranean Sea or
the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer” – that is covered by the
collective defence clause in Article 5.
Where the Washington Treaty thus leaves open the balance between global and regional tasks, the Strategic Concept must speciﬁcally interpret concrete geopolitical
circumstances. What are the threats, and what are their military implications? These
are the two basic and essential questions that the Strategic Concept must answer.
8
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Since the inception of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 NATO has produced six bona
ﬁde Strategic Concepts.2 The decision-making procedures leading to the ﬁnal approval
of these landmark documents have varied a great deal. In some cases, the process was
protracted and complicated such as the events that led up to the adoption of the 1957
Concept, MC 14/2, while in other instances, such as in 1952 with MC 3/5, the process was swift and straightforward. Moreover, while all Strategic Concepts have been
approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), there is no agreed or authoritative
template for writing a Strategic Concept. Sometimes, as in 1968, the change in NATO’s
overall strategy has been the product of American pressure; in other cases there has
been no easily identiﬁable member state or body taking the initiative.3
NATO’s ﬁrst ‘Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area’ dates
back to October 1949. It aimed to ensure “unity of thought and purpose insofar as
the objectives of the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area are concerned”.4 While
this ‘unity of thought and purpose’ has remained an enduring ambition from 1949
to the present and beyond, we need to distinguish between the Strategic Concepts of
the Cold War and those of the post Cold War eras. The Cold War Strategic Concepts
were explicit in almost every way that the post Cold War documents cannot be. The
Cold War Concepts addressed an easily identiﬁable adversary, the Soviet Union, and
set out to deﬁne guidelines for the Alliance’s military defence. It divided the Alliance
into geographical regions and developed guidelines for each of them. Once this was
done NATO’s military authorities – the NATO machine – went to work to implement the Concept and to provide for military defence.
The Strategic Concepts of the Atlantic Alliance have always served more than just
one purpose. Today, we argue, the document has at least three major functions: two
internal and one external. One of its internal functions is to codify past decisions and
practices and thus solidify the Alliance’s foundation. As one senior NATO oﬃcial
put it, codiﬁcation is ‘akin to doing the vacuum cleaning’: a new Strategic Concept
summarises and formalises the string of ministerial communiqués and lesser decisions
that have emerged since the preceding Strategic Concept.5 Every ministerial communiqué is in fact a miniature Strategic Concept, the oﬃcial argued, and from time
to time real world events will drive NATO so far down new paths that it becomes
necessary to assemble all these miniatures and combine them into one overarching
document. The exercise is meant to provide coherence to a record of decisions and
engagements that may not always be coherent at ﬁrst sight. This points us towards
the other internal function, namely that of providing new strategic direction – of
laying down the foundations for future coherence.
9
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Strategic direction was a crucial purpose of the Cold War strategic concepts, of course,
and it remains essential, albeit in a new context of public diplomacy and codiﬁcation.
It is in fact diﬃcult to disentangle these functions. Strategic direction concerns most
fundamentally the basic values of the Washington Treaty and their defence in global
and regional contexts, which is also where this section began. Basically, the Allies
must provide strategic direction by deﬁning the balance between regional and global
engagements, by identifying the types of threats the Alliance is likely to encounter
and what it can do about them. In providing answers to these questions, and thus
providing strategic direction, the Alliance inevitably conducts public diplomacy.
Moreover, to move the world, the Alliance needs a place to stand, and so strategic
direction begins where codiﬁcation ends.
As touched upon above, the Strategic Concept has taken on a new and externallyoriented function since the end of the Cold War – that of public diplomacy. Evidently
NATO’s post Cold War Concepts have been more ambiguous than their predecessors
and of course part of the reason for this has to do with the new security environment,
which is marked by risks that are diﬃcult to predict: it is simply no longer possible
to plan for a single threat in a single theatre. Another reason, however, behind the
decision to publish these Concepts has been as one element of NATO’s eﬀorts to
communicate itself as a focused and indispensable Alliance to wider national audiences, i.e. as a part of NATO selling its product. Post Cold War Strategic Concepts
must inform the world what NATO is about, now that its Cold War adversary has
gone it must mobilise support at home and prepare the Alliance for engagements
that cannot be predicted but which will surely be demanding. In short, the Strategic
Concept must convey purpose.
The Strategic Concept adopted by NATO in November 2010 is the Alliance’s third
post Cold War Strategic Concept, although in some ways it is number three and a half.
NATO’s ﬁrst such concept was published at the Rome Summit in November 1991. This
was then updated and revised in time for the Washington Summit – and the Alliance’s
ﬁftieth anniversary – in April 1999. This, the second post Cold War Concept, stood
until the Lisbon Summit. However, by 2004–2005, following the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001 and NATO’s growing engagement in Afghanistan, the issue of
whether the second Concept was in need of revision or maybe even replacement was
being raised. Given the lack of political agreement within the Alliance, symbolised,
of course, in the disputes over the Iraq war, a decision was made to upgrade only that
part of the Strategic Concept that dealt with military implications. The result was
the approval of the so-called Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) at the Riga
10
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Summit in November 2006. The post Cold War track record thus consists of three
New Strategic Concepts and one Comprehensive Political Guidance.
‘The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept’ of November 1991 took note of the widening
deﬁnition of security and of a transition from threats to risks: “In contrast with the
predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multifaceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess”.6 There was little to codify in terms of post Cold War behaviour, given the pace
of events and the short time that had passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall (the
Soviet Union still existed in November 1991), but the 1991 Strategic Concept does
explicitly make reference to the June 1990 London Declaration on a Transformed
Alliance that promised a range of changes in order to provide for Alliance continuity.7
The Strategic Concept then entered into the combined domain of strategic direction
and public diplomacy by outlining four fundamental security tasks:8
• “To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe”, which was another way of keeping the United States engaged
or ‘in’ Europe
• “To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic
forum for Allied consultations on any issues that aﬀect their vital interests”
• “To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any
NATO member state”, which related to Articles 5 and 6
• “To preserve the strategic balance within Europe” – a reference to the residual
Soviet power in Europe.
Defence guidelines in this Strategic Concept essentially foresaw a change from a
‘comprehensive, in-place, linear defensive posture’ to a reduced and more ﬂexible
posture consisting of a “graduated triad of immediate and rapid reaction forces, main
defence forces and augmentation forces”.
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept of April 1999 was a revised version of the 1991
Concept, which is why the word ‘new’ was removed from the title. The nature of
the alteration can best be gauged in the ‘fundamental security tasks’. The ﬁrst three
tasks remained, although they were renamed – Security, Consultation, and Deterrence and Defence, respectively – and the fourth task was revised. It is perhaps not
surprising that NATO in 1998–99 felt no need to be fundamentally concerned
about Europe’s ‘strategic balance’, but the question that arose was what to put in
its stead. NATO was divided between global and regional perspectives and ended
11
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in a compromise position which is visible in two respects: ﬁrstly, emphasis was
placed on ‘the Euro-Atlantic region,’ which includes more than NATO territory
but is not a global NATO and, secondly, the fourth fundamental security task did
not follow straight on from the three ﬁrst tasks but was introduced with a single
line eﬀectively separating it:9
•
•
•
•

Security
Consultation
Deterrence and Defence
And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:
◆ Crisis management on a case-by-case basis and by consensus
◆ Partnership, cooperation, and dialogue in the Euro-Atlantic area

This subtle hierarchy of fundamental tasks had to do with the fact that crisis management related to Article 7 of the Washington Treaty and the role of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) in providing for general peace and stability. As
in 1948–49, NATO in 1998–99 was not about to deposit its decision making at the
UNSC. However, invoking the council was good public diplomacy – and a ﬁtting
response to the crisis in which NATO found itself as the summit took place in the
midst of the Kosovo bombing campaign.
If we are to pinpoint the origins of the New Strategic Concept that was adopted in
November 2010 we must step back to November 2006 and the Riga Summit when
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheﬀer began to use his powers more assertively
to deﬁne a new agenda. Noting a growing political demand for a New Concept, he
said, “So looking to 2008 – and even beyond to our 60th anniversary in 2009 – I
predict that the idea will gather momentum to draft a new, basic document outlining
NATO’s grand strategy”.10 Various background interviews indicate that another key
factor in moving the agenda of a New Strategic Concept forward was a loose coalition of transformation-minded nations – those most willing to invest in transformed
forces and NATO reform.11 It is probably no stretch of the imagination to argue that
the majority of the transformation-minded nations were those which have been most
engaged on the ground in southern and eastern Afghanistan.
A tentative agreement had thus emerged by the time of the Bucharest Summit in
April 2008 when the Heads of State and Government tasked the NAC to prepare a
so-called Declaration on Alliance Security (DAS) for adoption at the StrasbourgKehl Summit in April 2009.12 This short and somewhat vague document, which
12
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was duly presented and approved at NATO’s sixtieth anniversary summit, was the
precursor to the New Strategic Concept. The DAS predominantly deals with global
issues but it began where NATO texts normally begin – with Article 5 and Alliance
enlargement. What this combination implied in terms of priorities and outlook was
to be deﬁned in the course of the next year and a half.
The summit had decided to delegate Strategic Concept matters for a little while to a
group of experts, whose work was formally kicked oﬀ at a major Brussels conference
in July. The Alliance had asked its Secretary General to convene and lead this group,
which is why outgoing Jaap de Hoop Scheﬀer and incoming Anders Fogh Rasmussen
were both present at the Brussels conference. Also present was former US Secretary of
State, Madeleine Albright, who was picked to chair the Group of Experts. The group
was asked to run two distinct phases of ‘reﬂection’ and ‘consultation’ – whereby the
NATO community of observers, experts and oﬃcials engaged in debate, after which
the Group’s tentative conclusions were made the object of consultations with Allied
governments and parliaments. In May 2010 the Group of Experts ﬁnalised its work
with a strategic concept report on the Alliance’s future.13 The Group of Experts
combined its broad evaluation of the security environment with a dissection of key
problems and strategic options, identifying points of convergence with potential to
become oﬃcial NATO policy.
The process then entered its third and concluding phase of ‘drafting and ﬁnal negotiations’. At this stage Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen came to play
an unusually inﬂuential and central role in the context of the NATO historical
record.14 In the past, Secretary Generals had merely assisted Allied governments
who took the direct control of negotiations – with the permanent representations
at NATO Headquarters drafting the document and national oﬃcials ﬂying in for
NAC meetings to solve sticky issues, of which there were always, predictably, many.
Secretary General Rasmussen had a diﬀerent mandate, which he set out to exploit.
Having followed the Albright group’s work closely, the Secretary General himself
drafted the ﬁrst version of the Strategic Concept that was to serve as the basis for
the ﬁnal negotiations in the NAC. Expectations were that these negotiations would
be like those of the past: drawn out and highly charged. There were some dramas
to be sure, particularly in relation to nuclear deterrence versus nuclear disarmament, a debate inspired by President Obama’s ‘nuclear zero’ vision and one which
pitched France against Germany, with Belgium and Norway seconding the latter.
Other issues were diﬃcult as well, notably the deﬁnition of new threats – from
terrorism to cyber war – and the framing of the critical point at which they might
13
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become Article 5 threats. Partnerships and their implications for NATO decision
making, which might conceivably open up considerably, was another sore point.
But the drama never erupted into acrimony. The process, it turned out, had done
its job. Most big issues had been dealt with by the time of the run-up to the Lisbon
Summit and it was just too diﬃcult for any one ally to really question the Fogh
Rasmussen draft, which was presented to the Allies on 17 September 2010. Within
a few weeks of this presentation NATO oﬃcials could therefore argue that ‘98%
was there’.15

NATO’s New Strategic Concept
The New Strategic Concept is in many respects an ambitious document. It delineates a comprehensive framework for transformation and introduces a wide-ranging
number of initiatives tailored to set oﬀ the development of new political, military and
civilian instruments. As such – and very much in line with the agenda of Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen – the New Concept is an activist and progressive
document. Although it continues to codify past decisions and provide coherence to
sometimes-disparate activities like the other strategic concepts, the primary function
of ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’ is that of strategic direction and this is new.
Moreover, the document is ambitious in terms of strategic communication. This is
also new. The 1991 and 1999 Concepts were lengthy and anodyne. In 1999 the Allies
saw this and tried to rescue NATO public diplomacy by attaching a short and crisp
‘Washington Declaration’ to the Strategic Concept. It was an odd manoeuvre that
NATO wisely eschewed in 2010.
We noted in the introduction that with the New Strategic Concept NATO is becoming more political and global. The Concept aﬃrms Article 5 but globalises the thinking behind it: NATO must, as always, ‘protect and defend’ but now against threats
such as terrorism, weapons proliferation and cyber wars that know no conventional
boundaries. The shift is perhaps most noticeable in the document’s presentation of
NATO’s ‘three essential core tasks’. In contrast to the 1991 and the 1999 Concepts,
the 2010 Strategic Concept lists ‘crisis management’ and ‘cooperative security’ as tasks
almost on par with collective defence. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the
defence of NATO territory are still given precedence over less regionally anchored
activities but crisis management and cooperative security are not, as they were in the
1999 Concept, listed as second order tasks. In 2010 they are registered on a par with
collective defence as essential core tasks that the Alliance ‘must and will’ continue
fulﬁlling eﬀectively:
14
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• Collective defence: NATO members will always assist each other against attack,
in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
• Crisis management: NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military
capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises
• Cooperative security: The Alliance is aﬀected by, and can aﬀect political and security
developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance
international security, through partnership
This subtle change in the hierarchy of tasks may appear trivial but it is not. It is one
clear sign of a more global and political Atlantic Alliance. Other signs are found
within each of the sections dealing with these ‘essential core tasks’.
The section outlining the Alliance’s approach to collective defence stresses that
NATO must not only “deter and defend against any threat of aggression” – as
also noted in the 1991 and 1999 Concepts – but also provide collective defence
against “emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security
of individual allies or the Alliance as a whole”. Collective defence thus applies to
the whole gamut of security challenges that are laid out in an assessment of the
security environment – a section that follows the introduction to the Strategic
Concept and precedes a treatment of the three core tasks. “The conventional
threat cannot be ignored”, this section begins. However, in a tour de force, it then
launches into a delineation of unconventional threats – beginning with nuclear
weapons and proliferation and branching into terrorism, instability, trafficking,
cyber attacks, and threats to vital channels of communication, transportation,
and transit. This importance given to ‘emerging security challenges’ is reflected
in the brand new Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD), based at
NATO headquarters.16 The collective defence section of the Strategic Concept
goes through some elaborate motions to give satisfaction to proponents of both
nuclear deterrence and of nuclear disarmament, claiming that “the circumstances
in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely
remote” but also that “as long as nuclear weapons exist NATO will remain a
nuclear alliance” and “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance is
provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance.”17 Otherwise the section
serves as a kind of planning guidance regarding different operations that NATO
must be able to engage in and the kind of capacities it therefore needs. In all this
there is only one single reference to geography and it comes in the context of
missile defence, where cooperation with Russia and Euro-Atlantic partners is
noted as desirable.
15
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Improving NATO’s ability to cope with new and unpredictable security challenges
beyond NATO borders is the leitmotif of the section dealing with ‘security through
crisis management’. Drawing on the lessons learned in Afghanistan and the Western
Balkans the New Concept launches several new initiatives all crafted to advance
Allied contributions to a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach.
NATO must engage actively with other international actors to maximise operational
coherence and eﬀectiveness. A number of commitments follow: the Alliance must
improve its ability to ‘monitor and analyse’ the international environment; it must
“form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability”; “develop the
capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones”; “identify and train civilian
specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment”, and it must
‘broaden and intensify’ political consultations in all phases of a crisis. There are no
references to geography in this section. Out-of-area is no longer applicable because
there is simply no mention of privileged in-areas and less privileged out-of-areas.
Moreover, all these measures are designed to strengthen the Alliance’s operational
performance, which will make the Alliance a critical partner for any security-related
organisation – from the United Nations on. Finally, these other organisations will
not only encounter an Alliance with a better-equipped toolbox but also an improved
brain – insofar as NATO’s ability to monitor, analyse and consult will be improved.
NATO’s new ESCD division will form part of this cerebral improvement, but it
seems inevitable that the policy unit inside the Secretary General’s private oﬃce
now must be strengthened and tied into a new practice of political consultations
anchored in the NAC.
The Strategic Concept’s third and last section on ‘international security through cooperation’ toes the line established in the 1990s. Most parts merely codify established
principles. The section does contain a more ambitious wording on the Alliance’s
willingness to “create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons” than did
the 1999 document18 – given the aforementioned Obama ‘nuclear zero’ vision and the
need to prop up the nuclear disarmament camp within the Alliance. There is strong
encouragement of partnership with Russia, the United Nations and the European
Union among others, and it is possible that the vague language on continued NATO
enlargement is a nod in Russia’s direction, but the language of these sections mostly
restates past priorities. In terms of principle and vision, not much is new here. This
is no guarantee, however, that implementation will be easy.
The ﬁnal section is noteworthy because it addresses the kind of organisation that NATO
needs to be if it is to fulﬁl all of its ambitions, namely a reform-minded organisation
16
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attuned to cost-eﬀectiveness and ongoing transformation. The ﬁnancial crisis has left
its mark. Already in the preface, the Allies are reminded to stay committed to reforms
so that “taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence”. Neither
the 1991 nor the 1999 Concept made references to taxes or taxpayers. Eﬀectiveness
and streamlined commitment are also themes that run through the sections on the
‘essential core tasks’. These sections are followed by a short section on ‘Reform and
Transformation’. This commits the Allies to maximise the deployability of their
forces, ensure coherence in defence planning, develop capabilities jointly and engage
in continual reform; all in order to use resources “in the most eﬃcient and eﬀective
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way possible”.19 Put diﬀerently, it commits the Alliance to intelligent cost savings – to
cut fat and not muscle, as the Secretary General admonished in the summit’s run-up
– which is, in fact, a hard thing to do. Individual allies must cut excessive national
infrastructure and revise political taboos. The Alliance as a whole must come together
to focus on operational impact, not the distribution of national beneﬁts. We will gain
a ﬁrst view of the state of aﬀairs in June 2011 when the Alliance must begin to name
those military headquarters that it will cut within the command structure (NCS).
It put NCS rationalisation on the Lisbon agenda but did not name names, partly
because the Lisbon JFC HQ is in the line of ﬁre and the Allies could not aﬀord to
be seen to be aﬀronting their host country, and partly because it needs more time
to prepare brutal decisions. For the Alliance will indeed have to reach some brutal
decisions if it is to meet its Strategic Concept commitment.

So What is ‘NATO 3.0’ Really?
This outline of the Strategic Concept has located the greater political and global
ambition of the Atlantic Alliance. What remains are a number of questions relating
to the coherence and wider potential of the Strategic Concept and indeed NATO
ambition. Did NATO successfully manage to navigate the past and the present; did it
successfully balance the globalisers and the regionalisers amongst its membership; did
it ﬁnd the kind of wording in respect to key challenges that will provide for strategic
direction and did it craft a political message that will assuage former rivals, assure
current partners, and inspire conﬁdence in NATO publics?
The chapters in this book provide answers. There is no one answer to these questions,
of course, and our task as editors has therefore been to organise the chapters into
sections that illuminate key issues and stimulate debate.
We begin with a section of ‘bird’s eye’ views of the Strategic Concept and with two
chapters that provide crosscutting and holistic assessments. The intention is that
the reader can refer back to these two chapters and perhaps the overview provided
in this introduction to recall the main contours and controversies of the Strategic
Concept. We are fortunate to have two excellent analysts with great NATO insight
as contributors to this section. One is Jamie Shea, the other is Klaus Wittmann; both
practitioners with direct experience in NATO matters of strategic foresight and planning. In chapter one Jamie Shea argues that what is new about the Strategic Concept
is the wider focus on new threats, the greater connectivity to other organisations, and
the need to engage earlier in crisis prevention. Yet he also takes great care to anchor
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such progressions in NATO’s past. To meet the new security environment NATO
must build on its own history and rediscover practices that it once had but which have
withered. In chapter 2 Klaus Wittmann takes note of many contributions but also
some problems that he believes were insuﬃciently dealt with in 2010. To Wittmann,
partnerships, disarmament and crisis prevention are works in progress and reﬂective
of a fragile consensus within the Alliance. This raises the question of whether there
is too much ‘old NATO’ and too little ‘new thinking’ in the Alliance.
Section 2, Dynamic Power, Elusive Threats and Alliance Turbulence, addresses the
traditional equation between power and threats on the one hand and Alliance cohesion on the other. Adrian Hyde-Price (chapter 3) ﬁrst places NATO within broad
geopolitical trends to dissect the New Strategic Concept and the kind of globally
ambitious but yet moderately able Alliance that he perceives. Among these trends are
the ‘unipolar’ position of the United States, the rise of new powers outside Europe
and the ﬁnancial crisis – all of which are driving Europeans outside their region, but
with a lighter purse at the same time. One of the critical outside powers is Russia
and Karsten Jakob Møller (chapter 4) warns us that NATO–Russia relations are
best understood in a historical perspective. The two partners may claim to make
diplomatic advances but concrete decisions are few and the potential for disruption
is high. Clear threats tend to make for Alliance cohesion, Berit Børgensen notes in
chapter 5, but not in the case of terrorism. Following a brief moment of unison in
2001–2003, terrorism has tended to raise questions that divide the Allies. Many of
the policies that NATO deﬁned in 2001–2003 to ‘transform’ itself – from new partnerships to new missions – therefore relate to a core that is no longer there. NATO
thus has policies in search of a cause.
Section 3 looks beyond the traditional equation of power and Alliance cohesion to
the dynamics of the cooperative security that NATO enthusiastically pursues. Niels
Henrik Hedegaard reminds us in chapter 6 that NATO’s cooperative ambitions have
a long history and are designed precisely to engender cooperation with, in particular,
the UN and the EU. NATO is learning from the Afghan mission and it is working to
create the concrete civil–military capacities that will make an operational impact and,
moreover, it has no desire to tread into the domains of other organisations, Hedegaard
writes. Cooperative security nonetheless runs into a host of critical observations,
beginning with Peter Viggo Jakobsen’s dissection of the capacity issue. In chapter 7
he argues that the NATO approach is too little and, from the perspective of ongoing operations, too late. NATO needs to come up with a more robust organisational
design if the civil–military ambition is to work, he argues. NATO robustness is also
19
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a theme in Henrik Lindbo Larsen’s treatment of NATO’s partnership policy and
the troubles it encounters in NATO’s near abroad – in Eastern Europe. NATO has
lost out in recent years, Henrik Larsen concludes in chapter 8, and NATO must go
further in incorporating into its cooperative security agenda a geopolitical dimension
that can better align ambition and reality. The NATO robustness that these critical
observers call for typically puts other organisations on their guard. Mark Webber
probably speaks on behalf of many in the UN when, in chapter 9, he urges NATO
to more visibly embrace the agenda of ‘human security’ that has found its way into
the UN system. If NATO does so, it would align with the UN and its increased
organisational capacity would provoke no anxiety. If NATO does not, however,
anxiety will probably follow. Sven Biscop looks at NATO from an EU perspective
in chapter 10 and ﬁnds little raison d’être behind NATO’s eﬀorts. He argues that
NATO should leave the crisis management business to the EU and open the door
to a supposedly more productive EU–US relationship for a variety of reasons that
are set out in the chapter.
Following these political designs and controversies, section 3 addresses military
implications of the New Strategic Concept and the ﬁt between NATO blueprints
and operational reality. Strategic Concepts traditionally guide military planners but
this New Concept is short, highly political and mentions Afghanistan in only one
instance (as a source of the Comprehensive Approach). In chapter 11 Theo Farrell
addresses this operational deﬁcit in the Strategic Concept. The Afghan campaign
reﬂects not only a challenge we know well by now, namely that of state building
and crisis management, but also an evolving form of warfare that demands foresight
and adaptability from intervening forces. NATO has become operationally more
proﬁcient, especially in the ﬁeld of counterinsurgency warfare, but is notably passive
strategically. NATO needs to get better at connecting politics and war, Farrell concludes. It is therefore interesting to engage with chapter 12 and Paal Sigurd Hilde’s
dissection of Command Structure reform inside NATO. Not normally a topic with
great public appeal, Command Structure reform ought to attract wider attention
because it reﬂects how NATO, some years ago, decided to focus solely on the type
of expeditionary warfare we see in Afghanistan but now also wants to build in the
kind of regional defence concern that allies in proximity to Russia are clamouring
for. The contrast between Afghan lessons, strategic ambitions and organisational
reform certainly gives food for thought. In chapter 13 Thierry Legendre adds more
to our plate, asking us to keep an eye on the big political and ﬁnancial issues when
addressing military change. NATO capacities depend on big changes on the European
scene such as defence reform in Germany or Franco-British initiatives, just as NATO’s
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relevance to the United States increasingly depends on a working relationship between NATO and the EU. In short, much work remains to be done. We ﬁnish with
two contrasting views. Christopher Schnaubelt’s assessment in chapter 14 oﬀers a
downbeat view of the Strategic Concept’s ability to raise NATO eﬀorts to the level
where the big challenges can be successfully dealt with. Militarily speaking, NATO
reform will continue along conceptual tracks that are well known and are captured
under the header of expeditionary operations – but in a fashion that will do little to
ameliorate the underlying burden sharing problem that bedevils the Alliance. Trine
Flockhart oﬀers a diﬀerent, more upbeat assessment in chapter 15, as she engages
the advances that NATO has, after all, made in relation to issues of nuclear doctrine,
disarmament and missile defence. It is a large and complex package of politically
charged issues, which accounts for inertia in some respects, but NATO is moving and
it is not unlikely, Flockhart tells us, that NATO will continue moving and become
an engine of improved security in areas of hard security.
In a concluding chapter (chapter 16) Karl-Heinz Kamp takes stock of the Strategic
Concept and enumerates along with its many advances a number of important and
unresolved problems relating to Russia’s status, nuclear disarmament, and new policies
on the issues of proliferation, partnership and cyber defence. He also reminds us to
read the Lisbon Summit Declaration in parallel with the Strategic Concept: the latter
is short and visionary, the former contains all the work (‘tasking’, in NATO-speak)
that now needs to be done. The Strategic Concept is a beginning, Kamp therefore
concludes, and we should judge NATO by its ability to implement the work it has
deﬁned for itself.
We, the editors, will not write a separate conclusion to the book. We have had the
opportunity in this introduction to outline what we see as the main driver behind the
New Strategic Concept – the ambition to make NATO more global and political,
less regional and military. Likewise, we have been able to allude to a number of challenges. The chapters raise many excellent questions and oﬀer much food for thought.
We have sought to advance thinking on NATO issues by organising the chapters
into sections that, in eﬀect, ask the reader to identify his or her own position in the
debate: between the past and the present (section 1), between power and diplomacy
(section 2), between cooperation and conﬂict (section 3), between military change
and continuity (section 4), and between vision and implementation (conclusion).
By way of conclusion we encourage ongoing debate on NATO. This is a debate
which really began during the Second World War when Theodore Roosevelt and
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Winston Churchill crafted a vision of international peace with the Atlantic Charter
and sought transatlantic cooperation to counter, as Churchill would later say, the
‘two great dangers’ which menaced: namely war and tyranny. Some might venture
that not much has changed whereas others might object that everything has changed.
One sure observation seems to be that NATO is at the crossroads of a great debate
on change and continuity in international aﬀairs.
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PART 1
NATO’s New Strategic Concept:
Bird’s Eye Perspectives
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1. What does a New Strategic Concept do for NATO?
Jamie Shea1, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges,
NATO.

Strategic concepts are usually diﬃcult exercises for institutions. If they result in too
much reaﬃrmation of the status quo they can be seen as an expensive waste of time
and eﬀort. If they produce too much innovation or new directions, the institution’s
relevance can be questioned. Is it looking for a new role because its traditional tasks
are now redundant? So the most successful strategic concepts tend to be those that
reaﬃrm and renew at the same time. In this way an institution can remind its public
(and often its own member governments as well) of all the reasons why it needs to
continue to exist, while also initiating the necessary changes to keep the institution
relevant in ten or twenty years time. But it can do this in a gradualist way that allows
the institution time to adapt and implement the internal reforms and structural
changes without which new policies cannot be carried out.
The Strategic Concept that NATO adopted at its Lisbon Summit in November
2010 reﬂects this balance between old and new and this gradualist and evolutionary
approach, even though Alliance oﬃcials often speak in more radical terms such as
‘transformation’ or ‘NATO 3.0’, which are better at grabbing attention. Although the
Concept itself is a radical departure from the previous 1991 and 1999 versions, in
being short and written in clear, non-diplo-speak language, the contents themselves
will be familiar to NATO watchers. The core functions and tasks remain largely the
same. Article 5 collective defence is still NATO’s fundamental purpose. This must
still be maintained through deterrence based on a mix of nuclear and conventional
weapons, even though missile defence has now been added to this mix as the third leg
of a new triad of capabilities. NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear
weapons exist. Even if the Alliance endorses the ultimate vision of a nuclear free world,
it is for others, especially the aspirant proliferators, to make the ﬁrst move as NATO
has already eliminated ninety per cent of its nuclear arsenal in Europe since the end
of the Cold War. Moreover in an environment with multiple challenges, there is still
the same, very traditional, requirement to maintain robust defence budgets and to
invest in modernised expeditionary forces for the full range of NATO missions – even
if the Strategic Concept makes no reference to the 2% of GDP benchmark or to an
explicit level of ambition. Other hardy perennials of NATO concepts, communiqués,
declarations and speeches over past decades are also reiterated. The call for solidarity,
the importance of the transatlantic link, the appeal to all Allies to engage fully and
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openly in consultations on security issues of common interest. And, last but not least,
the relationship of NATO to the UN Charter (which is its basis in international law)
as well as to the prerogatives of the UN Security Council.
There is of course nothing amiss in reaﬃrming these core values and principles of
the Alliance. Indeed given that they have been part of NATO’s existential DNA for
over six decades, it would not be only NATO’s future but it’s very raison d’être which
would be in doubt were either North Americans or Europeans now to feel that these
values today are less important. This said, to reiterate is also a way of repledging,
especially in areas such as solidarity or consultations, which can never be taken for
granted and where diﬀerent allies have diﬀerent expectations depending on which
challenges they see as the most threatening to their national security. In this context
some aspects of NATO’s New Strategic Concept can be viewed as much as an attempt to revive things that NATO did more frequently in the past as an attempt to
introduce wholly new things onto the Alliance’s agenda. Take, for instance, the focus
on arms control and using NATO as a forum to coordinate the views and positions
of allies on the major arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations.
Arguably NATO did this often and well during the Cold War with high level groups
such as the Special Consultative Group and the High Level Task Force, albeit with
the incentive of the US–Soviet talks on strategic, intermediate and tactical nuclear
weapons and conventional troop and equipment numbers which were key to Allied
security in Europe. This is a good habit that was lost somewhat after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. NATO was less successful in applying the principle of coordination to
the more global negotiations such as the NPT regime, the Fissile Material Cut-oﬀ
Treaty or new forms of conventional arms control. So arms control is a habit to be
relearned rather than discovered.
A similar case can be made for transatlantic consultations and NATO’s political role,
which are central to the New Strategic Concept. This author can well remember
discussions in the North Atlantic Council on the Middle East, Asia or Africa twenty
years ago when virtually all international security crises were on NATO’s consultative agenda, even if there was no presumption of Alliance action. In recent years the
focus on NATO’s military operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan or oﬀ the Horn
of Africa have narrowed NATO’s political horizons – and consultations – to the immediate regions where NATO has troops on the ground. Consultation and action
have become mutually dependent with political attention even following a military
deployment, as in the case of Afghanistan. So again it can be argued that NATO needs
not to invent but merely revive the practice of broad consultation and exchange of
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analyses and information that it carried out successfully in the past – admittedly in
a pre-1989 age when its agenda was less crowded than today.
In sum, a historian of the NATO of the 1960s or 1970s who reads the 2010 Strategic Concept will probably be struck as much by the continuity as the change. The
ﬁrst elements of NATO’s post Cold War transformation, which emerged in the
mid-1990s, still largely dominate the New Concept: for instance, the emphasis on
crisis management and out-of-area stabilisation operations. The Concept does not
abandon these, despite the diﬃcult times NATO has had in Afghanistan in transitioning from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency. Rather the focus is on learning
the lessons in order to do these operations better in the future, especially in terms of
developing the ‘comprehensive approach’ which will better coordinate and integrate
the eﬀorts of all the international actors. Another new emphasis is on developing
NATO’s role in training, as the experience with the Afghan security forces and
the Kosovo Security Force has clearly demonstrated that training – started earlier
and done better – will be the only viable exit strategy for the Alliance’s overseas
deployments. Another familiar policy concerns partnerships. The Partnership for
Peace has been arguably NATO’s greatest if often unsung success story since the end
of the Cold War. Today the Alliance has over 20 partners in ISAF in Afghanistan,
constituting 15% of its overall force, and new forums, such as the Mediterranean
Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Global Partners, have sprung up
alongside the older Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Unsurprisingly the New
Strategic Concept salutes this success story and calls for these multiple and often
very diﬀerent partnerships to be developed further. But it does not create a new
institution, or a single global partnership, or a new category of partner akin to an
associate member or the like. This deﬁnitional work will be left to a new Partnership Concept to be developed after the summit. A third aspect of continuity is
in the Open Door for further NATO enlargement. Notwithstanding widespread
enlargement fatigue in Europe and the fall-out from the Russia–Georgia conﬂict
in 2008, the Strategic Concept boldly reaﬃrms that NATO will accept further
members in the future. However it does not give timelines.
Again there is nothing wrong in reaﬃrming well-established policies where they
have demonstrated their eﬀectiveness, where they remain obviously relevant to 21st
century security and, last but not least, where NATO has shown its niche value.
NATO is right to state that notwithstanding the current unpopularity of Afghanistan, it will most probably be involved in further operations in the future. For every
‘war of choice’ there is a ‘war of necessity’ and NATO has to get the formula right,
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given the sacriﬁces – human and ﬁnancial – involved. Similarly, partners these days
are as essential to NATO as NATO is to its partners. They provide troops, bases,
overﬂights, intelligence and expertise that are all the more useful as NATO ventures
beyond Europe to areas such as Afghanistan where it has little prior knowledge. So
clearly it would be foolhardy for the Alliance not to want to nurture and expand
this invaluable partnership network reaching out to the new global actors, such as
China and India. Finally, given the role played by NATO enlargement in stabilising
Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, it would be counterproductive to walk
away from the Open Door and lose thereby an invaluable source of leverage over the
reforms and policies of potential candidate countries.
What then is really new about NATO’s New Strategic Concept? In the midst of so
much continuity and reaﬃrmation, there are three areas of innovation that stand out.
Whether they will transform NATO as fundamentally or as durably as the innovations of the Brussels Summit of 1994 or the Prague Summit of 2002 is something
that only time will tell.
The ﬁrst innovation lies in the new security challenges. NATO is to become more
involved in dealing with cyber attacks, energy security, proliferation and terrorism.
However, only the emphasis on cyber is really new, the other topics having already
been on NATO’s agenda for some time. However, it is not originality that counts
but seriousness. Will the Alliance now devote the resources, expertise and high-level
political attention to be a serious player in these areas, alongside other relevant players
such as the EU, UN, IAEA or Interpol? How can NATO complement, coordinate
and enhance the already considerable national eﬀorts in these areas? Will NATO
ﬁnd the time and space to address these challenges in a meaningful way when it
is fully preoccupied with its military missions, particularly Afghanistan and the
process of transition to Afghan responsibility? These are all important questions
but NATO cannot aﬀord not be a major player on these issues. Terrorism in all
its dimensions beyond Afghanistan, energy cut-oﬀs, mounting cyber attacks, and
proliferation are, after all, what our publics are most preoccupied with these days.
They will not see NATO as key to their security protection if the Alliance does not
progressively demonstrate its added value in responding to these already emerged
challenges. The establishment by NATO of an entirely new division to tackle these
issues is a good start.
The second innovation lies in the area of connectivity. Is this in fact an innovation
or just the recognition of an international reality? When it wrote its last Strategic
28

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

Concept in 1999 NATO could just about fulﬁl its key security tasks with its own
members and capabilities. Partners were useful but not essential. Today the reality is
diﬀerent. NATO and its military instruments remain crucial to a whole spectrum of
security missions but the Alliance cannot succeed alone. In the past it needed only to
leverage the commitment and contributions of its own members. Now it is even more
urgent to leverage the commitment and contributions of others, such as the EU, the
UN, regional organisations or the NGO community. The New Strategic Concept
recognises this reality by agreeing to equip NATO with a number of civilian planners
who can reach out to the civilian agencies and actors and try to involve them as early
as possible in joint civil–military planning. In the future NATO’s eﬀectiveness will
be directly proportionate to its contact address book and its ability to be accepted by
the other leading institutions as a natural and permanent interlocutor. But sometimes
NATO seems keener on this connectivity than the others. How can a two-way street
be instituted? In particular the most important relationship – that between NATO
and the EU – remains obstructed by issues related to the participation of Turkey and
Cyprus despite the eﬀorts of both institutions to lift the obstacles.
Third, and ﬁnally, crisis prevention. The lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan is that
interventions which last longer than the First and Second World Wars combined
are no longer feasible for cash-strapped western governments with ballooning ﬁscal
deﬁcits. As prevention is always better than cure, NATO will need to be more agile
in anticipating and heading oﬀ potential crises before they reach the stage where only
prolonged, messy and expensive interventions remain as an option. For an institution used to leaving crisis prevention, or crisis management in its early stages, largely
to other institutions (such as the EU or UN) or to its own member states, eﬀective
crisis prevention will involve something of a culture change. Allies will need to share
more and better intelligence earlier; the NATO civilian and military staﬀs will need
to prepare early warning analyses and options papers, and the NATO member states
will need to be prepared to consult quickly – without being over-sensitive to the
image vis-à-vis the outside world that such consultations may convey. For nothing
will ever be achieved if all possible objections must ﬁrst be overcome. Partners, who
may be aﬀected or whose interests may be aﬀected, could also be brought into these
consultations.
In conclusion, the most innovative aspect of the New Strategic Concept may well
be in the way it was conducted. A consultation process lasted for nearly a year, led
by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and a group of outside experts.
They conducted several seminars and visited all NATO capitals as well as Moscow,
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talking to innumerable security policy experts, political leaders and civil society representatives. The fact that the Allies also used this public outreach process to debate
the key ideas among themselves undoubtedly helped them to understand each other’s
positions better and to draw closer. Thus the consultation process was not only a
useful reality check for the Alliance, in terms of meeting outside expectations, but
also enabled the Allies to identify the crucial balances in the actual Strategic Concept text: between Article 5 collective defence and out-of-area operations; between
nuclear deterrence and the need for arms control; between reassurance for NATO’s
new member states and a new quality of engagement with Russia built around missile defence cooperation; and between what NATO can do itself and what it needs
to do in partnership with others. This process of public outreach not only helped to
make the contents of the New Strategic Concept more acceptable and accessible to
NATO’s own stakeholders in government, parliaments and the wider strategic community; it also produced a better thought through and more intellectually coherent
product than would normally be the case. Moreover the fact that such a thorough,
prolonged and transparent analysis of NATO ‘warts and all’ should conclude that
there is much that is good and right about the Alliance (evolution, not revolution)
is a testament not only to NATO’s present leadership but to those NATO leaders
who have gone before.

Note
1

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
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2. An Alliance for the 21st Century? Reviewing NATO’s
New Strategic Concept
Klaus Wittmann

Self-ascertainment of the 60-year-old North Atlantic Alliance; a modern deﬁnition
of NATO’s purpose, character and role in the 21st century; recommitment and reassurance of all Allies; answers to today’s and tomorrow’s security challenges; concrete
goals for continuous reform and the rallying of public support: NATO’s New Strategic
Concept, agreed by the November 2010 summit at Lisbon, has many functions to
fulﬁl. How well does it succeed?

Needed: a new mission statement
The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, NATO’s founding document, ﬁnds its concretisation in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, which is constantly reviewed and periodically
updated. The Treaty itself, with its commitment to international peace, security and
justice, remains valid to the freedom, common heritage and civilization of its peoples
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. It is
still relevant to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Washington Treaty’s main provisions also endure:
consultation (Article 4), mutual assistance in the case of armed attack (Article 5)
and openness for new members (Article 10).
The ﬁrst Strategic Concept was issued in 1991 after the end of the Cold War and
revised in 1999. It stood outdated for quite some time, since it was agreed before the
terror attacks of September 2001, NATO’s Afghanistan mission, the Iraq war and
the Russo-Georgian conﬂict, but also prior to the growing awareness of globalised
security challenges for which there are no military solutions. So the question that
was posed was whether NATO, which had been so successful in protecting Western Europe during the East–West conﬂict, in helping to stabilise the developing
‘Europe whole and free’ and in pacifying the Western Balkans, would develop into
an Alliance for the 21st century, and what that would require.
However, at NATO Headquarters and in member capitals there was, for some years,
great reluctance to set about a revision of the 1999 document; some feared a ‘very
divisive process’. The proponents of a new Strategic Concept countered this apprehension with the suggestion that the Allies were so divided on several central issues that
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a ‘uniting eﬀort’ was urgently needed1 and that in order to document its continuing
relevance in the diﬀuse security environment of the 21st century NATO was in need
of a new and convincing mission statement.

A public and participatory process
That is what NATO ﬁnally embarked on during its 60th anniversary summit meeting at Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009, when its Heads of State and Government
commissioned a new Strategic Concept. The new Secretary General, Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, chose a procedure drastically diﬀerent from the way in which the last
two Strategic Concepts had been developed – namely through a process of year-long
negotiations among the member nations over numerous drafts, outside the gaze of
the broader public, which resulted in texts fraught with diplomatic formulae, compromise language and ‘constructive ambiguities’.
This time particular diﬃculties had to be taken into account: ﬁrst, NATO’s engagement
in an ever more problematic mission in Afghanistan, where it has been left with the
bulk of the tasks the international community has taken on. Second, the unwillingness
of ‘post heroic’ societies, exacerbated by the ﬁnancial and economic crisis, to sacriﬁce
for security. Third, the disunity among NATO members about fundamental matters
regarding its character, role, tasks and policy. Fourth, the impression that solidarity
among allies was weakening. Fifth, with an Alliance membership now much more
diverse, quite divergent threat perceptions among allies and, ﬁnally, NATO’s image
– particularly in the Muslim world – of being an instrument of often problematic
US policy or – in the perception of its own populations and media – of being a relic
of the Cold War.
Since the questions of NATO’s continued relevance and its public support were so
crucial the preparation of the New Strategic Concept was launched by the Secretary
General adopting an ‘inclusive and participatory approach’ in an ‘interactive dialogue
with the broader public’. A group of twelve experts was formed under the chairmanship of former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, which in mid-May 2010
presented its Report after a dense series of seminars and consultations. The document ‘NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement’ reﬂected agreement
among the group members. This did not yet mean consensus among the 28 NATO
governments and it can be argued that work on a draft cannot create consensus on
controversial issues, but that, rather, the Concept should reﬂect the consensus built,
or restored, in political consultations.
32

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

It must be recognised, however, that the Albright Group did a good job in ‘loosening
the ground’ as it were, in preparing consensus, fuelling public debate and interest in
NATO, getting the strategic community involved, providing transparency as well
as inducing member states to clarify their positions and ‘show the colour of their
cards’. And the Secretary General was probably right in keeping control of the draft
developed by him and his closest collaborators, while taking on board comments
from the nations and consulting discreetly about contentious aspects, thus avoiding
negotiations proper, square brackets, involvement of several layers of the NATO
bureaucracy, and many iterations of an ever more diluted text.
The New Strategic Concept was agreed at NATO’s Lisbon Summit by Heads of
State and Government on 19 November 2010 under the title ‘Active Engagement,
Modern Defence’. True, the eleven-page document, half the size of its predecessor,
papers over some of the persisting divisions. But on the whole it is a credit to the
Secretary General’s procedure and political energy. Analysts had always said that the
process would be as important as the result: as signiﬁcant as the outcome might be
the fact that in the course of this work NATO member nations had to reﬂect about
their own security policies, interests, priorities and the demands of Alliance solidarity. This resulted in many non-papers laying out national priorities, many of which
the ﬁnal draft has accommodated where appropriate. In sum, the New Strategic
Concept is a good achievement in that it rallies the Allies behind NATO’s purpose,
recommitting them to it and to Alliance solidarity. How solid that is will be discussed
later in this chapter.

Ambitious content
The content of the document revolves around three core tasks: ‘defence and deterrence’, ‘security through crisis management’ and ‘promoting international security
through cooperation’. They are introduced by a statement of enduring principles:
that NATO’s purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members
and that its character is one of being a unique community of values. The primary
responsibility of the UN Security Council is aﬃrmed, as is the critical importance of
the political and military transatlantic link between Europe and North America. All
of this is intended to ensure that ‘the Alliance remains an unparalleled community
of freedom, peace, security and shared values’.
With regard to collective defence, the central character of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (mutual assistance in the case of armed attack) is restated unequivocally,
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a commitment that ‘remains ﬁrm and binding’. This was important in the light of
concerns expressed particularly by new allies who feared that this commitment
could be diluted or taken less seriously by NATO members who, ‘surrounded by
friends and allies’, might put out-of-area operations and harmony with Russia ﬁrst.
In drawn-out discussions, reassurance of all NATO member states came to be seen
as a precondition for everything else NATO does.2 So it is signiﬁcant that the Strategic Concept pledges to ‘carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency
planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range
of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible
assurance and reinforcement for all Allies’.
Not focusing this task too exclusively on NATO members’ territorial defence (‘The
Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO
territory is low’), the relevant section unfolds the array of security challenges of
the present and the foreseeable future, including proliferation of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, cyber attacks, international terrorism,
threats to critical energy infrastructure, and emerging technologies. These are all seen
as areas for Alliance solidarity, without implying that they can be countered mainly
with military means or necessarily fall under Article 5. So the threat assessment is
very broad, the security challenges are seen as diﬀuse, volatile and unpredictable, and
possible NATO action will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The reference
to climate change, whose long-term consequences can have heavy implications for
global security, is remarkably vague, though.
The New Strategic Concept does not prioritise between defence and crisis management tasks. Recognising that crises and conﬂicts beyond NATO’s borders can
impact Alliance security, it declares prevention and management of crises as well as
stabilisation of post-conﬂict situations and support of reconstruction as necessary
NATO engagements. Monitoring and analysing the international environment as a
contribution to prevention is part of this, and it leads to the need to broaden and
intensify political consultations among allies and with partners to deal ‘with all
stages of a crisis’.
However, the statement that “NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities” is a tall order, given the current Afghanistan experience. The one
explicit lesson drawn from Afghanistan is that there is a need for a comprehensive
political, civilian and military approach. In order to foster this, it was decided after
controversial debates that NATO will create “an appropriate but modest civilian
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management capability” as an ‘interface’ with civilian partners. Rightly, the training
of local security forces is highlighted.
Characteristically, the elaboration of the third core task, ‘promoting international
security through cooperation’, starts with arms control, but its commitment to “create
the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons” is limited to the goals of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Further reduction of nuclear weapons is linked
to concomitant steps by Russia. On conventional arms control, the statement (“to
strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe”) is rather bland and
does not present the necessary novel ideas.
Partnerships (including, oddly, also cooperation with other institutions such as the
UN and the EU) are emphasised, building on the existing formats (Partnership for
Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Ukraine, Georgia)
and seeking to enhance them.
Regarding other security-relevant institutions, only the United Nations (with the
intent to give life to the 2008 UN–NATO Declaration) and the European Union
are mentioned. Some space is devoted to the relationship with the latter, but for as
long as that cooperation is blocked for political reasons, these statements remain
largely declaratory.
The Lisbon Summit was widely interpreted as a breakthrough in NATO’s cooperation
with Russia and as a contribution “to creating a common space of peace, stability and
security”. A ‘strategic partnership’ is sought with the expectation of reciprocity from
Russia. Convinced that “the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined”, NATO
proposes the enhancement of political consultations and practical cooperation in
areas of shared interest, such as missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics
and counter-piracy as well as using the full potential of the NATO–Russia Council
for dialogue and joint action. A cautious agreement to ‘exploring’ missile defence
cooperation by the Russian President who came to Lisbon was also seen as an important advance in this regard. In turn, NATO did not overly emphasise its Open
Door policy, limiting itself in the Strategic Concept to conventional statements of
principle.
Finally, on ‘reform and transformation’, the Concept limits itself to stating intentions
seen before: suﬃcient resources, deployability and sustainability of forces, coherent
defence planning, interoperability, commonality of capabilities, standards, structures
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and funding. Continual reform “to streamline structures, improve working methods
and maximise eﬃciency” is pledged, once again.

A courageous document
The New Strategic Concept is a courageous document because it contrasts with the
zeitgeist in several regards: ﬁrst, in spite of the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world
it emphasises the need for nuclear deterrence as long as such weapons exist. Second,
although many global security challenges are not of a predominantly military nature,
NATO enlarges its ambition as a security provider. Third, while it remains a regional
organisation, it avoids an insular, euro-centric perspective and looks towards the
global horizon. Fourth, in spite of recent problems with the enlargement process
and Russian indignation about it, the Alliance maintains its Open Door policy for
European countries ﬁt for accession and able to make their contribution to European
security; and, ﬁnally, without antagonising Russia, it takes the concerns of Central
and Eastern European allies seriously.
The development of the New Strategic Concept ran counter to the general rule that
such basic documents are neither particularly visionary nor forward-looking. Rather,
they tend to codify previous decisions: theory follows events, concepts come after
reality, as was the case with the 1999 Strategic Concept. The 1991 document was
another exception because of the revolutionarily novel situation. It is to the credit
of the Expert Group and the Secretary General that the Lisbon Strategic Concept
is impressively programmatic and future-oriented.

Not all that shines is gold
A number of small but not unimportant ﬂaws should have been avoided. The extension
of the term ‘partnership’ to include cooperation with international organisations (e.g. the
UN and the EU) dilutes and devalues NATO’s successful concept of ‘Partnership’ (with
a capital P). Also, at a time when conﬂict prevention appears ever more important, it is
diﬃcult to understand why the Strategic Concept makes no mention of the OSCE, let
alone the African Union. Furthermore, although the staunch stand on nuclear weapons
is commendable, NATO’s characterisation as a ‘nuclear alliance’ goes somewhat over the
top and might prove counterproductive. In addition, the document is weak on lessons
from Afghanistan – lessons pertaining to the larger international community – which
leaves many responsibilities to NATO, and internal lessons regarding command and
control, coordination, multinationality, national caveats etc unaddressed. Finally, since
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NATO’s much broader involvement with global security challenges proclaimed by
the Strategic Concept will have to happen through a rigorous activation of Article 4
(consultation) of the Washington Treaty, it would have been logical to add ‘consultation’ as a fourth ‘essential core task’ to the triad proclaimed (collective defence, crisis
management and cooperative security).
Moreover, it must be stated that the elegant text conceals that there is no really solid
unity on a number of issues: namely whether NATO is a regional or a global organisation, predominantly political or military, how it must balance collective defence
and expeditionary orientation, how it must assess certain security challenges and
their emphasis in the view of individual allies, the NATO–EU relationship and its
political ‘blockage’, the UN mandate issue, the approach to Russia, nuclear weapons
policy etc. In some of these areas, the verbal consensus may quickly collapse in light
of concrete tasks, requirements and challenges.
On NATO’s reach and character, one would like to be able to read from the Strategic Concept that NATO continues to regard itself as a regional organisation, but
one with a global perspective, which brings emphasis to consultation among allies
as envisaged in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. And the perennial debate on
whether NATO is a military or a political organisation should at last be put to rest.
It is a politico-military security organisation that puts its unique capabilities at the
service of international security. These capabilities are its military forces, the integrated command structure, common defence and force planning, its experience in
multinational military cooperation and its expertise in training. But to regard it as
the ‘hub’ of the international system would be counter-productive, and its place in
that system appears to require better explanation.

The real task: implementation
The New Strategic Concept will be only as good as its implementation. In the
Lisbon Summit Declaration this is recognised with many quite urgent taskings to
Foreign and Defence Ministers as well as to the Permanent Council. So the Strategic
Concept must be read alongside the Summit Declaration and, for that matter, the
NATO–Russia Council Joint Statement.
By way of an example, successful implementation of the principles and intentions is
crucial in the following ﬁelds, and in some respects also requires more conceptual
work. Regarding the ﬁrst core task, deterrence and defence, deﬁnition is needed of
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the added value that NATO can oﬀer in combating the ‘new’ security challenges of
terrorism, cyber threats, energy security, piracy, organised crime and traﬃcking in
human beings. It is no secret that there continues to be great variance among allies
concerning NATO’s role and the function of the military in these ﬁelds. With regard
to the ‘assurance of all Allies’, it remains to be seen to what extent preparatory measures and contingency planning will be implemented, and how visible (and thereby
eﬀective) they will be. Wikileaks’ publication of documents regarding contingency
planning for the defence of Poland and the Baltic countries has already sparked protest
from Russia’s Ambassador at NATO.
This is one of the aspects where the relationship with Russia appears fragile. The interpretation of the NATO–Russia Summit in Lisbon is derived from the ‘breakthrough’
on missile defence (but the agreement ‘to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation’
sounds rather cautious), on plans for concrete cooperation in various practical ﬁelds
including a ‘Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges’, and on a very
positive statement of intent about further use of the NATO–Russia Council.
Is that suﬃcient and sustainable? This author has thought for a long time that the term
‘reset’ of relations with Russia is a bad metaphor. It is not only a new start that is needed,
but also an improved ‘programme’. That would include, on the Alliance’s side, the
explicit acknowledgement of NATO’s share of responsibility for the worsening of the
relationship with Russia: it failed to understand Russian political psychology and fear
of marginalisation, it orchestrated the last enlargement push poorly, paid no attention
to Russian proposals for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, failed to present the missile
defence issue as a truly common cause and has not contributed suﬃciently to making
optimal use of the NRC, particularly when it was most needed in the Georgia crisis.
In turn, Russia should cease to see NATO as a ‘danger’ or even a ‘threat’, and not aim
to constrain or split it but rather to share the same values, respect the principles of
the Charter of Paris, overcome old geopolitical and geostrategic categories, abandon
Cold War clichés about NATO, give up the idea of a ‘special sphere of inﬂuence’,
not instrumentalise ‘Russians abroad’, renounce revisionism and fully support the
sovereignty and independence of its neighbours and contribute itself to their ‘reassurance’, fully embrace cooperative (as opposed to confrontational) security, follow
up ﬁrst positive steps in its ‘history policy’ vis-à-vis Poland (and, in future, also others), and realise that Russia can only ‘isolate itself ’. Together NATO and Russia must
overcome zero-sum thinking in security policy, where one side can allegedly only gain
at the expense of the other. In turn, a substantial NATO response to the Medvedev
38

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

proposals is overdue, given the awareness that Russia’s place in the European security
order is still insuﬃciently deﬁned.
On nuclear weapons policy, it is clear that the remit contained in the Summit Declaration to ‘review NATO’s overall posture’ points to the need for a fundamental debate
about the role of nuclear weapons, about extended deterrence and forward stationing,
about the shift from ‘deterrence by punishment’ to ‘deterrence by denial’ (of options),
and about the future of ‘nuclear sharing’. The task for NATO and its member governments remains to reconcile public expectations for ‘global zero’ with the explanation of
deterrence requirements in the (presumably very long) transition period. Conspicuously,
the debate about a nuclear free world has until now been a Western soliloquy.
Conventional arms control is given importance in the Strategic Concept including,
in the Summit Declaration, a revival of the High Level Task Force (HLTF) that accompanied the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations in the nineties. But
there are no new ideas and “work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime
in Europe” is not enough. The CFE Treaty, suspended by Russia, is all but dead and
its conﬁdence-building instruments of veriﬁcation and transparency are corroding.
Therefore a new departure in conventional arms control is required, which means
broad talks among all European states, most prominently including Russia, about
conventional military forces, their potential linkage to tactical nuclear weapons, threat
perceptions, doctrines, force levels, weapon holdings – talks leading to negotiations
about numerical limitations, regional constraints and transparency measures. Such
a new approach would enhance conﬁdence in the strictly defensive orientation of
military postures, would advance cooperative security among the nations of Europe,
and might support nuclear disarmament and missile defence cooperation.
Since the new security challenges are not amenable to mainly military responses
NATO is not the sole actor and Alliance solidarity in this ﬁeld does not automatically
invoke Article 5; the ‘broadened and intensiﬁed’ consultation pledged by the Strategic
Concept is of the essence. But is it realised that this will mean a genuine cultural shift
in NATO? Until now many obvious security issues have never reached the Council
table; not least for fear that disagreements would be interpreted as an internal crisis.
Also, to bring about a qualitative improvement in consultation a much-improved
analysis and assessment capacity is needed at NATO HQ. This appears to have been
recognised through the establishment in the International Staﬀ of a new ‘Emerging
Security Challenges’ division. However, the extent to which it will produce valid
political-military analysis or deal with all relevant issues (including the long-term
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implications of climate change), and whether or not it will contribute to substantially
broadening the Council agenda remains to be seen.
The task of developing “a more eﬃcient and ﬂexible partnership policy” is a massive
one and it should involve a review of the basic Partnership for Peace document. One
goal must be to strengthen the consultation clause for cases where Partners see menaces
to their security. It is an open question whether NATO will achieve an improvement
in the operation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which played no
role whatsoever in the months prior to the outbreak of the war between Russia and
Georgia in August 2008. Regarding the further development of ‘global’ partnerships
with likeminded countries or those contributing to the Afghanistan mission, utmost
transparency is required towards powers like India and China.
As noted above, it is striking that in a period when crisis prevention is gaining ever
more signiﬁcance, the Strategic Concept makes no mention of the OSCE. True, its
Astana Summit was no success, but the need remains to strengthen the potential and
the instruments of that organisation and to join forces with the OSCE’s emphasis
on ‘soft security’ such as human rights, conﬁdence-building and early warning, all
Allies being also OSCE members, and to jointly strive for better crisis management
and prevention of violent conﬂict. Also the African Union, an embodiment of the
approach by Africa’s nations to take ownership of African problems, deserves all possible support from NATO, not only in concrete operations but also in being given
access to the wealth of NATO experience in ﬁelds such as consultation, civil–military
cooperation, education and training, security sector reform, force planning, arms
control and conﬁdence-building.
However, much space is devoted to the European Union with its Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) as an important complement to NATO that enables European
countries to take responsibility for security and stability on their continent and at its
periphery. But statements about strengthened strategic partnership, enhanced practical cooperation, broadened political consultation, and fuller cooperation in capability
development will ring hollow for as long the cooperation is still blocked by individual
allies. Success of the new eﬀort by the Secretary General and the High Representative,
to be reported to Ministers in April, is indeed pivotal for any progress.
Finally, cooperation with the UN, close to satisfactory on the ground in foreign missions, nevertheless requires the enhancement of consultation at the political–strategic
level. The UN–NATO Declaration, concluded in 2008, needs to be enlivened. Liaison
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procedures and eﬀective consulting practices are necessary. The UN’s Peacebuilding
Commission should be a venue for institutional cooperation. It remains to be seen
how quickly these good intentions will overcome the prevailing mistrust at the East
River towards NATO.
More than any further conceptualisation, the Comprehensive Approach requires
convincing persuasion and better implementation. There is acknowledgement that
missions like the one in Afghanistan cannot reach their goals by military eﬀort alone
and demand, in addition to their continued joint, inter-agency and multinational
character, close and synergetic cooperation with International Organisations (IOs) and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This is not about hierarchy; NATO should
not aspire to a dominant position, not want to coordinate others but to coordinate
with them. Self-evident as the concept is, greater eﬀorts are needed to make it work
as a truly integrated civilian–military eﬀort, overcoming national and institutional
interests and bias. Improvement of NATO’s interaction with NGOs is crucial. It
will mean the meeting of diﬀerent, often opposing, institutional ‘cultures’, where the
military wishes to take control, whilst the NGOs seek to preserve their independence
and impartiality as critical to their success. Further eﬀorts are needed towards better
mutual understanding through dialogue as well as joint planning and training.
With regard to the development of NATO’s military capabilities, the Strategic Concept,
the Summit Declaration and the ‘Lisbon Capability Goals’ do not contain more than
the obvious goals (usability, deployability, sustainability etc.), well known from the
1999 Defence Capability Initiative (DCI), the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment
(PCC) or the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) of 2006. They all yielded very
limited results and with the ﬁnancial and economic crisis and the resulting drastic cuts
in many national defence budgets, it is diﬃcult to see how the gulf between ambitions
and means will be bridged better than hitherto. Much more joint development of
military capabilities and multinational, cost-eﬀective approaches are needed.
Also in the ﬁeld of missile defence, apart from the foreseeable resurgence of disagreements among allies and Russia’s mistrust, the cost may be a factor that will hamper the
swift implementation of an important improvement of NATO’s defence capability.
For NATO’s internal reform, the Strategic Concept and the Summit Declaration give
the Secretary General a broad mandate and great authority “to streamline structures,
improve working methods and maximise eﬃciency”. Implementation will again be
the crucial test of NATO’s ‘continual reform’ and it is revealing that the Declara41
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tion (in the context of Command Structure and Agencies Reform) twice refers to
outstanding decisions about the ‘geographic footprint’, which means nothing other
than the strong interest of individual nations to retain NATO commands, installations or institutions on their soil.
There are many more ﬁelds in which one will observe with interest the pace and scale
of the New Strategic Concept’s implementation (or where, as noted before, further
conceptual work is desirable). Beyond those mentioned here, these include: lessons
from operations and guidelines for further NATO operations, the appropriateness of
NATO’s Level of Ambitions, counter-insurgency in a NATO context, the development of the NATO Response Force (NRF) assessment and further development of
multinationality, training assistance and NATO’s contribution to DDR and SSR,
NATO’s contribution to non-proliferation, and public diplomacy.
Also, there are ﬁelds for particular study and formulation of common Alliance positions,
such as developments in international law regarding defence in the light of potentially
apocalyptic attacks with no pre-warning; ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in cases of genocide
and massive human rights violations, problems of ‘humanitarian intervention’, implications of ‘failed states’, and the further development of a credible deterrence doctrine in
a multipolar world with a multitude of state and non-state actors.

Conclusion
Notwithstanding this critical look at what it means and implies in practice, the
Alliance’s New Strategic Concept does make a good case for NATO’s relevance in
the 21st century, and after the amazing post Cold War adaptation of the Alliance it
marks another signiﬁcant transformational step – programmatically. Now Allies
must aﬀord the political will and provide the resources for implementing what they
have courageously proclaimed.
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3. NATO’s Political Transformation and International
Order
Adrian Hyde-Price

The Lisbon Summit (19–20 November 2010) marks another waypoint in NATO’s
evolution from an alliance focused on East–West deterrence and defence to one
re-tooled to address the challenges of a more ﬂuid and uncertain international
environment. Like previous summits in Prague, Washington and Strasbourg, it
sought to answer the question posed by the end of Cold War bipolarity: what is the
purpose and function of an Alliance designed, in the oft-quoted words of its ﬁrst
Secretary General, Lord ‘Pug’ Ismay, “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in,
and the Germans down”. This paper focuses on the impact of the changing international political order on NATO, and the political challenges facing the Alliance
as it seeks to make itself relevant to this new global power conﬁguration. The most
signiﬁcant international trend aﬀecting NATO is the shifting global constellation of
power, which is creating a more complex and uncertain global political order. This
is reﬂected in the ‘reset’ with Russia, the growing saliency of new global security
concerns, the importance attached to ‘partnerships’ and the security challenges
emanating from the ‘greater Middle East’. The complexities of the international
environment are, in turn, exacerbating the political problems of consensus building
within the Alliance, which is highly sensitive to domestic political and economic
developments within member states. These domestic and international problems
are placing growing pressure on the transatlantic relationship, within which the
NATO Alliance is embedded.

NATO’s post Cold War evolution
Since the early 1990s NATO has adopted a multiplicity of new tasks and missions,
from disaster relief to peace support operations and, more recently, counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism. This broadened agenda has, however, deepened
the underlying ambiguity about the strategic rationale of the Alliance, and made
consensus building and eﬀective decision-making more diﬃcult. “The more complex strategic landscape in which NATO operates”, Charles Kupchan has noted,
“has diluted the solidarity that NATO enjoyed during the Cold War. Like it or
not, NATO is growing more unwieldy and a consensus approach more elusive”.
His solution is for the Alliance to adopt “a more ﬂexible approach to decision
making on most other issues apart from questions of war and peace” – a proposal
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that would facilitate ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’, but further erode Alliance
cohesion and political solidarity.
The recent summit in Lisbon (19–20 November 2010) was a further step forward
in deﬁning NATO’s place in the changing international order of the twenty-ﬁrst
century. It provided an opportunity for the twenty-eight member states to hammer
out a consensus on their most pressing strategic concerns and their future role and
proﬁle in a changing international system. The most important manifestation of this
was the New Strategic Concept, which sought to identify the challenges facing NATO
and to specify the broad political and strategic response to them. In the Cold War,
Strategic Concepts were classiﬁed documents dealing with military strategy. Since
the end of the Cold War they have become instruments of public diplomacy, their
purpose being to deﬁne a legitimate and politically acceptable role for NATO.
In order to evaluate the signiﬁcance of the Lisbon Summit and its New Strategic Concept, it is helpful to situate Lisbon in its political and strategic context, and to view it
in relation to previous ‘landmark’ summits. All Alliance summits are ‘children of their
time’, reﬂecting the contemporary Zeitgeist and prevailing political mood. NATO itself
has undergone some major changes since the end of the Cold War. The 1991 Strategic
Concept addressed the end of the Cold War, and signalled a switch from what the
NATO Public Aﬀairs Division likes to term version 1.0 to version 2.0 (using the language
of software programmes). The Washington Summit of 1999, when the last Strategic
Concept was adopted, took place in the context of the Kosovo war and NATO’s ﬁrst
round of enlargement into East Central Europe, and marked a high point of the EuroAtlantic’s ability to re-order the post communist East through the dual enlargement
process (NATO and the EU) and humanitarian military intervention.
The Prague Summit of 2002 signalled the switch from NATO version 2.0 to version
3.0.1 Taking place in the wake of 9/11 and in the context of the unfolding ‘war on
terror’, it signalled a switch from concerns about ‘saving strangers’ and re-ordering
Europe to collective defence and expeditionary warfare far from the heartlands of
the Euro-Atlantic region (‘defending Europe on the Hindu Kush’). Prague was also
billed as the ‘transformation summit’ that sought to re-tool NATO for the demands
of power projection and joint expeditionary operations.
The changing global power constellation
The Lisbon Summit and the New Strategic Concept, ‘Active Engagement, Modern
Defence’, were coloured by two key international developments: the shifting global
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balance of power and the global recession. These two factors provide the key to understanding many of the political and strategic decisions reached in Lisbon, and are
crucial in deﬁning the structural context within which the Alliance now operates.
In the 1990s NATO operated in the context of the apparent triumph of Western
values, ideas and institutions. ‘History’ had ended, and democracy and free market
capitalism had no ideological contenders: post communist Central and Eastern
Europe could be reshaped by NATO and the EU, and the Alliance could focus on
enlargement and ‘saving strangers’. In the following decade the mood darkened but
there was still a lingering belief that the American ‘unipolar era’ had dawned and that
capitalism was stimulating a new phase of economic growth and rising prosperity.
Lisbon signals the demise of these comforting illusions. The international system is
experiencing a power transition from a unipolar to a multipolar order, characterised
not so much by the ‘decline of the West’ but the ‘rise of the Rest’. With the emergence
of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), established patterns of
international diplomacy are being upturned, and the existing institutions of global
governance are increasingly weak and ineﬀective. A ‘post-American world’ is emerging, as Fareed Zakaria has argued, “one deﬁned and directed from many places and
by many people”.2 This power transition is now taking place against the background
of the global recession that began in 2008, and which is creating a harsher and more
competitive economic environment. This in turn is making international cooperation
and global governance harder to achieve, as many states focus on their own interests
and priorities.
The rise of the BRICs and the shifting global balance of power marks a further
disintegration of the European/transatlantic dominium that shaped international
society from the seventeenth century onwards, and which reached its apogee in the
Western-designed and US-led international order forged in the late 1940s. In his
Strasbourg speech of April 2009, President Obama noted that the world is now more
complex than in the past, and that the days of Pax America or Pax Britannica have
ended. “If there’s just Roosevelt and Churchill sitting in a room with a brandy, that’s
an easy negotiation”, he noted. “But that’s not the world we live in, and it shouldn’t
be the world that we live in”.
The shifting tectonic plates of the global power balance have had ﬁve major impacts on the Lisbon Summit and the New Strategic Concept. These are the reset
with Russia, security threats beyond NATO’s borders, relations with the Mediter47

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

ranean and the Gulf States, NATO’s modest global ambitions and the emphasis
on partnerships:
1. The ‘reset’ with Russia
One of the primary achievements of the Lisbon Summit and a key manifestation of
the changing constellation of global power relations was the forging of a new, more
cooperative, relationship with the Russian Federation. In the 1990s a weakened
Russia could do little to resist NATO’s eastern enlargement and its military intervention in Kosovo. From Moscow’s perspective a newly enlarged NATO was engaging
in oﬀensive military operations to restructure the international order to its design.
The unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration only reinforced this image,
with the unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty; NMD and bases in Poland and
the Czech republic; the acquisition of new military bases in Central Asia, and the
courting of Georgia and Ukraine as future NATO members. Since 2000, however,
Russia’s strength has revived and a more conﬁdent Moscow has not hesitated to use
energy as a tool for political leverage. More potently, the August 2008 Georgian war
signalled that Russia was back as a great power, willing and able to use military power
to defend its geopolitical interests.
After a brief cooling of relations with Russia after the Georgian war, the Obama
administration has ‘reset’ relations with Moscow, focusing primarily on practical cooperation in arms control agreements (the new Start Treaty and the CFE
re-negotiation). The Lisbon Summit was the occasion for re-setting the Russia–NATO relationship, based on three tangible areas of cooperation: first,
revamping the NATO–Russia Council, which has long been regarded as an ineffective talking-shop. The Council met for the first time since the Georgian war
in Lisbon, and will focus on talks to create “a common space of peace, security
and stability”. Second, cooperation on theatre missile defence: a NATO–Russia
Council working group on missile defence will be resumed, focusing on creating an ‘Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence’ (ALTBMD). Third,
cooperation on Afghanistan: Russia will aid NATO by keeping open land supply
routes for non-lethal materials and will provide assistance with helicopters to
the Afghan security forces.
Working out a more cooperative and more balanced relationship will not be easy,
given the powerful constituencies within both Russia and NATO that remain suspicious and mistrustful of each other. Nonetheless, as German Chancellor Angela
Merkel noted, “the fact that we are talking to Russia about common threats and the
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chance to cooperate with Russia on missile defence is an extremely important step.
That could be proof that the Cold War has ﬁnally come to an end”.
2. Global security threats beyond NATO’s borders
The second signiﬁcant impact of the shifting balance of global power is the awareness
that NATO countries are increasingly vulnerable to security threats from beyond
the Euro-Atlantic area, and that existing mechanisms of global security governance
need refashioning. “Instability or conﬂict beyond NATO’s borders can directly
threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and transnational illegal activities such as traﬃcking in arms, narcotics and people”, the New
Strategic Concept notes (§11). Furthermore, “all countries are increasingly reliant
on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international
trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international
eﬀorts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption” (13). The Lisbon
Summit identiﬁed two relatively new issues that are increasing in saliency on the
NATO agenda: energy security and maritime security. The importance of the latter
has great potential signiﬁcance, given the crucial need to keep open SLOC (Sea
Lines of Communication) – the arteries of the global economy. For this reason
NATO, in the future, may well ﬁnd itself taking on additional responsibilities for
maritime security, which will require a shift in resources towards naval capabilities
and maritime power projection.
3. The Mediterranean and the Gulf States
NATO’s growing concern about the two interlocking issues of maritime and energy
security have focused attention on the countries bordering the southern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East and Gulf region. The Gulf remains the key energy
source for Europe, although North Africa’s importance in this regard is growing. The
Mediterranean is already the site of a maritime counter-terrorism operation and the
Gulf of Aden is seeing a counter-piracy initiative. In the light of possible confrontation
over Iran’s nuclear programme, the SLOC running through the Straits of Hormuz will
become vulnerable. More generally, the MENA region is the focus of many of NATO
concerns about terrorism, nuclear proliferation, regional conﬂicts and failed states.
Consequently, the Lisbon Summit stressed the importance of deepened cooperation
within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue and of opening this up to other
countries in the region. The New Strategic Concept also placed emphasis on the
importance of NATO’s ‘security partnership with our Gulf partners’ and noted that
it remained “ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative”.
This focus on MENA and the Gulf is part of a broader geostrategic reorientation of
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NATO away from its Cold War East–West focus to a new axis of concern running
from North to South.
4. More modest global ambitions
One of the longest-running post Cold War debates in NATO has been that on ‘outof-area’. The US has long advocated a more ambitious and far-reaching role for NATO
beyond its traditional North Atlantic hunting ground. The current NATO Secretary
General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has also apparently advocated this. France and
Germany, on the other hand, have sought to limit the scope of NATO’s reach to more
regionally focused concerns. With the Afghan campaign NATO has clearly acted
‘out-of-area’, but the broader debate continues. The Lisbon Summit appears to have
made relatively modest claims about a global role for NATO, stressing instead the
importance of partnerships. Lisbon also seems to have reinstated the key role of the
UN, which was weakened by both the Kosovo war and the US-led invasion of Iraq.
The modest global ambitions of NATO reﬂect opposition from rising powers like
Russia, China and Brazil, all of whom oppose a ‘global policeman’ role for NATO.
Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, has explicitly noted that “Russia
can’t be happy with NATO’s transformation into a world policeman” or “something
like Orwell’s Big Brother”, whilst the semi-oﬃcial Chinese People’s Daily voiced
explicit fears in September 2006 about a ‘Global NATO’, capable of interference
in hotspots around the world.3 In the run-up to the Lisbon Summit the Brazilian
Defence Minister Nelson Jobim also mounted a concerted diplomatic oﬀensive to
signal his country’s strong opposition to any role for NATO in the South Atlantic
(fears kindled by some rather inept Portuguese diplomacy).4
5. NATO’s partnerships
Rather than trying to carve out a high proﬁle global role for itself, the NATO Alliance has sought to shape the wider international system by developing a series of
partnerships. This theme was reiterated over and over again at the Lisbon Summit,
and the Strategic Concept also stressed the need for partnerships “so that it [NATO]
continues to be eﬀective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners” (Preface). The importance of these partnerships is clear from
the Afghan campaign, where there are currently some 3,000 troops from eighteen
non-NATO countries participating in ISAF. These partners do not play a purely
symbolic role (as with many of the US-led coalition’s partners in Iraq), but perform
signiﬁcant operational roles. More generally, NATO recognises the need to cultivate
partners if it is to be able to respond to global security problems (from maritime
security to crisis management).
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The Lisbon summit and the global recession
The second ‘elephant in the room’ at Lisbon, alongside the changing global balance
of power, was the global ﬁnancial crisis that erupted with the ﬁnancial crash of 2008.
The euro has taken a battering following the crisis in Greece, then Ireland, and now
Portugal. The European response to the recession has been economic austerity, ﬁscal
retrenchment and budget deﬁcit reduction. The American response, on the other
hand, has been a policy of monetary expansion and a weaker US dollar, generating
new ﬁssures in the transatlantic relationship.
The real worry for NATO decision makers is that ﬁscal retrenchment in Europe has
resulted in severe reductions in European defence budgets. Defence expenditure
reductions in the ‘big three’ (Germany, France and the UK) are seen as particularly
troubling. The German Defence Minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, for example,
has been told to ﬁnd savings of €14bn by 2013. Consequently conscription is to be
ended, the Bundeswehr is to be reduced in size from 250,000 to 190,000, a number
of barracks will be closed and a streamlined command structure will be introduced.
Collectively, European NATO states have reduced their defence expenditure from
€228bn in 2001 to €197bn in 2009 (despite Afghanistan, the Global War on Terror
and a greater number of EU and NATO missions).
Given that defence cuts are politically and ﬁnancially unavoidable in Europe, the key
question is how European NATO allies will manage these cuts. Broadly speaking
there are two choices: a series of ad hoc, uncoordinated cuts by diﬀerent member
states, which would further exacerbate existing problems of duplication, wastage and
functional incompatibility; or coordinated cuts leading to more collaborative, and
therefore more eﬀective, defence procurement programmes and to a restructuring of
defence industries. The latter approach would reﬂect the need for greater industrial
defence specialisation, the pooling of resources, greater functional specialisation
and more cooperation – resulting in leaner but more integrated European NATO
militaries. “Every European government that is a member of the EU or NATO knows
exactly what should be done”, as Kees Homan of Clingendael (Netherlands) notes.
“We should pool resources. When it comes to military equipment, countries should
specialise. But duplication continues. It means less eﬃciency and higher costs. NATO
will go nowhere as long as the Europeans fail to harmonise their military equipment
or specialise”.5
The recent UK–France Defence Cooperation Treaty is a step in the right direction
in this regard; it involves sharing equipment and nuclear missile research centres,
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and establishing a joint force of 9,000 soldiers with air and sea support. However,
across Europe as a whole defence cuts seem to be proceeding with little coordination
and Europe’s defence industrial sector remains wasteful and ineﬃcient. Europeans,
for example, have 21 naval shipyards (the US has three) and 89 diﬀerent weapons
programmes (the US has only 27). The problems with the procurement process are
highlighted by the travails of the A400M air transport carrier and the spiralling
costs of the euroﬁghter jet. Until and unless the political will is generated in Europe to address the problems of declining defence expenditure, ineﬀective defence
procurement and duplication in the defence industries, Europe’s military weakness
will continue to create transatlantic disputes over burden sharing.

Conclusions
The New Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit noted that Alliance
members face a ‘changing’ and ‘unpredictable’ world, which is generating a “broad
and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and population”.
The Strategic Concept itself was designed to “guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be eﬀective in a changing world, against new threats,
with new capabilities and new partners”.
NATO remains a key pillar of European security and a factor of stability in an
uncertain international system. As well as serving as an insurance policy for the
territorial integrity of Alliance members, its greatest added value is that it serves
as a military toolbox for pragmatic, ad hoc cooperation for addressing threats to
Alliance members beyond their immediate borders. However, it faces a number of
pressing problems that will require concerted political energy to manage.
The ﬁrst problem is that NATO’s enlargement from the 16 Cold War members
to the 28 of today has greatly exacerbated the diﬃculties in building consensus on
a series of diﬀuse security threats in an unpredictable world. Despite claims that
NATO is a ‘unique community of values’, the reality is that NATO members as
diverse as Albania, Norway, Turkey and Spain share very few values in common and,
more importantly, they see the world in very diﬀerent ways and do not necessarily
share common geostrategic interests. At the same time, the North Atlantic Council
has failed to oﬀer an eﬀective forum for transatlantic debate on substantive issues
of common concern, such as Iran, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen or North Korea. The
NAC’s arteries are clogged with routine work, limiting the time available to discuss
broader security issues.
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Second, the Afghan campaign has highlighted the problems of burden sharing, not
just between the US and Europe, but also between NATO’s European members. The
UK, the Netherlands and Denmark have all engaged in major combat operations
alongside the US and Canada. Germany, Italy and Spain, on the other hand, have
sought to avoid signiﬁcant risk to their troops by hiding behind a series of national
caveats. This in turn is linked to a further worrying trend – the ‘demilitarisation’
of signiﬁcant parts of Europe. Noting the deleterious impact of European defence
cuts and the fact that only 5 of 28 NATO members had reached the agreed defence
spending target of 2% of GDP, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates warned in a
speech in February 2010 that;
“These budget limitations relate to a larger cultural and political trend aﬀecting the
Alliance. One of the triumphs of the last century was the paciﬁcation of Europe after
ages of ruinous warfare. But I believe that we have reached an inﬂection point, where
much of the continent has gone too far in the other direction….
….The demilitarisation of Europe – where large swaths of the general public and
political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it – has turned
from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and
lasting peace in the 21st…
….The resulting funding and capability shortfalls make it diﬃcult to operate and
ﬁght together”.6
Thus whilst the Lisbon Summit and the New Strategic Concept represent signiﬁcant and important steps forward for NATO in adjusting to an unpredictable
and increasingly complex security environment, the Alliance continues to face
serious political, economic and strategic problems. Building a new relationship
with Russia and fostering new partnerships are clearly important steps forward,
but much work remains to be done in recalibrating transatlantic relations and
establishing a more cooperative security relationship between NATO and the EU.
NATO therefore remains a work in progress and, as Winston Churchill noted
about European defence cooperation in 1948, “We’re not making a machine,
we’re growing a living plant, and we must wait and see until we understand what
this plant turns out to be”.7
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4. Russia and NATO after the Lisbon Summit: a New
Beginning – Once Again? 1
Karsten Jakob Møller

The character of the NATO–Russian relationship is basically dependent on U.S–Russia relations. After the nadir of the G.W. Bush period, especially in the wake of the
Russo–Georgian War in the autumn of 2008, the takeover of the Obama Administration in January 2009 has brought along a signiﬁcant improvement in the bilateral
relationship between the two countries, the so-called ‘reset’.
It was therefore only logical that Anders Fogh Rasmussen, from his very ﬁrst day as
Secretary General of the Alliance, made NATO–Russian relations his ﬁrst priority.
But it was not a path without risks. It was no secret that the Russia question divided
the Alliance seriously. The internal discussions on the New Strategic Concept are
vivid proof of the profound disagreement. The ‘old’ members, e.g. Germany, France,
Italy and now also the United States, wanted to expand cooperation with Russia in
various ﬁelds while the new members, primarily Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, supported by the Czech Republic and Hungary, looked with deep scepticism
on cooperation with Russia, a scepticism founded in their historical experiences. For
years these countries have argued for NATO military contingency planning on their
territories in order to counter a potential future Russian invasion.
This way of presenting the problem displays NATO’s Russian dilemma. Since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact the Alliance has claimed that
Russia no longer constitutes a threat to its members, that Russia is a trusted partner.
Nevertheless the Alliance has been expanding to include countries whose primary
goal has been to seek protection against a Russia who, by them, is seen as a potential
threat. How do we explain this in a credible way to our Russian partner? It is simply
not possible and therefore the mistrust of the West by the Russian political and
military elite has been considerable and probably still is. It has almost certainly not
diminished after Wikileaks cables revealed that NATO had drawn up secret plans to
defend Poland and the Baltic countries. According to The Guardian these plans were
agreed in January 2010 by the Military Committee under silent procedure.1 The East
Europeans insisted on hard security guarantees but were curbed by Western Europe led
by Germany, which did not want to antagonise Russia. The article quotes a so-called
well-placed source: “We’ve found the way forward with Russia. The Baltic States have
received strategic reassurance. That is backed up with contingency planning that did
55

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

not exist before. It is done now. We told them we’ll give you your reassurance if you
agree to the reset with Russia. That made it easier for the Germans”.
I doubt whether the Russians perceive this as a conﬁdence building measure. On
the other hand I am sure they had been informed in some way or the other during
the process. Russia has many friends in NATO who are willing to tell them what is
going on in every corner of the Alliance. So it is probably not a surprise for the Russian leadership but it is extremely inconvenient that it has been made public. There
are many members of the political, economic and military elite who, deep in their
hearts, are sceptical towards the West, a well-known phenomenon in Russian history.
Moreover and on the other hand, I would be rather surprised if Russian contingency
plans for the Baltic States do not exist.
The main purpose of the NATO Summit in Lisbon was to agree on the way ahead
for the Alliance, especially concerning the future engagement in Afghanistan. The
adaptation of a new strategic concept was intended to present a renewed NATO
and an Alliance in agreement. The future relationship with Russia played a major
role, which is reﬂected in the Lisbon Summit Declaration and the New Strategic
Concept, ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’ and the following summit of the
NATO–Russia Council and the NATO–Russia Joint Council Statement that was
adopted there.
The Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, was invited to the Lisbon Summit and
after some hesitation he agreed to participate but this only happened following the
trilateral summit in Deauville in France between Medvedev, Sarkozy and Angela
Merkel. The Russian president not only obviously wanted to explore the possibility of
positive results at the NATO Summit but also at the following European Union–Russia Summit in Brussels. He was pursuing the most important mission of his foreign
policy: namely to create favourable external conditions for ensuring the security and
prosperity of Russia. Russia is interested in investments, the newest technologies and
innovative ideas as well as stable and open markets so it can carry out a comprehensive
modernisation of the country and this is reﬂected in the present pragmatic approach
to NATO and the European Union.
For the Secretary General, who was staking a lot on cooperation with Russia, the result
had to be a success and it was no surprise that he called the NRC meeting ‘historical’.
This term was also used by the Russian president as it was important for him to be
able to show some concrete results to his many sceptics back in Moscow.
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In the Joint Statement Russia and NATO aﬃrm that they have embarked on a new
stage of cooperation towards a true strategic partnership, referring to the goals and
principles set forth in the NATO–Russia Founding Act (1997), the Rome Declaration (2002) and the OSCE 1999 Charter for European Security, including the
‘Platform for Cooperative Security’. They recognise that the security of all states
in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible and that the security of NATO and
Russia is intertwined. They will work towards achieving a true strategic and modern
partnership based on the principles of reciprocal conﬁdence, transparency and predictability, with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace,
security and the stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.
It is also stated that the NRC member states will refrain from threats and use of
force inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and the principles found in the
Helsinki Final Act, against each other or any other state.
There are many good reasons for the parties to remind themselves of the principles
governing their mutual relations; solemn principles adopted at previous summits in
diﬀerent organisations. The NATO countries once again wanted to remind Russia
of the unacceptability of the Russian response to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia, the following recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and probably also
the so-called cyber attack on Estonia in 2007. Russia wanted to remind NATO of
the attack on Serbia in 1999, which was a clear violation of the principles laid down
in the NATO–Russia Founding Act as well as the US-led attack on Iraq in 2003,
which was a violation of the UN Charter.
For the Russian president it is important to underline the indivisibility of the security
of the Euro-Atlantic area and possibly also to demonstrate the need for an overarching
legal security treaty unifying the guiding principles from the documents mentioned,
something which he proposed in the summer of 2008 in Berlin.
The Joint Statement deals with the role of the NRC and underlines that it consists
of 29 equal partners. This principle can be found in the Rome Declaration of 2002,
which is the foundation of the NRC. It has been stated several times by the Russian
ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, that Russia often has been met by a uniﬁed
‘wall of NATO members’ during the meetings in the Council.
This was certainly the case for the NRC’s predecessor, the NATO–Russia Permanent
Joint Council, where the positions of the NATO members were closely coordinated
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prior to the meetings. This is not the case any longer, although the Russians have occasionally begged to diﬀer. The Secretary General of NATO who chairs the meetings
is making a diﬀerence in his way of conducting them.
The importance of the NRC as a forum for political dialogue at all times and on
all issues is emphasised, including where the parties disagree. It will be interesting
to see how the parties will live up to this promise. During the Kosovo crisis in 1999
Russia broke oﬀ all relations with the Joint Permanent Council when NATO started
the bombardments in Serbia. Relations to NATO were only restored in 2002 at the
NATO Summit in Rome in which President Putin participated and where the Rome
Declaration was adopted, followed by the formation of the NRC. During the RussoGeorgian war in August 2008 NATO decided to cancel the meetings and they were
only resumed in late spring the following year, even though it had been described as
an ‘all weather’ council.
So what we can read from the ﬁrst half of the Joint Statement is that the parties are
promising each other to make an eﬀort to live up to the principles they have agreed
upon several times before. There are, however, substantial diﬀerences in the interpretations of the diﬀerent documents mentioned in the Joint Statement and that
will be the case for the foreseeable future, indicating that the road to a true strategic
partnership might be very long and diﬃcult.
The more positive signal, however, lies in the parties’ pragmatic assessment of their
mutual interest, which is stated in the second half of the Joint Statement.
The Council endorsed a Joint Review of the 21st Century Common Security Challenges identifying common interests and important challenges. This review was more
than a year in the preparation and has been the basis for the agreement on concrete
practical cooperation activities.
The NRC agreed to resume Theatre Missile Defence Cooperation following an
agreement on a joint ballistic missile threat assessment. NRC is tasked to develop a
comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation, to be assessed in the June 2011 NRC meeting of the defence ministers.
The decision on missile defence is crucial to the future cooperation of Russia and
NATO. The Secretary General has audaciously claimed that it will be one of the
cornerstones. Basically it is more a bilateral question between the United States and
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Russia, but the involvement of NATO might be helpful in solving some of the
more diﬃcult problems concerning command and control. If this cooperation
turns out to be successful it might profoundly contribute to the development of a
true strategic partnership. If it fails, the consequences will probably cause a serious
setback in US–Russia relations and thereby also NATO–Russia relations. This is
an example of an issue where the Devil is hidden in the detail, especially when it
comes to the more technical problems. It should be noted that President Medvedev,
during his press conference after the NRC meeting, voiced rather serious reservations about whether the NATO members had realised the tremendous complexity
of the problems that had to be solved. He stressed several times that Russia would
cooperate, but only on the condition of being an equal partner in the system.
“Our participation should be absolutely that of equals… we either participate in
full, exchange information and are responsible for solving this and that problem,
or we don’t participate at all. But if we don’t participate at all, then we for obvious
reasons will be forced to protect ourselves”, the president said and continued: “It
is quite evident that the Europeans themselves do not have a full understanding of
how it will look, how much it will cost. But everybody understands that the missile
defence system needs to be comprehensive”.2
This is not the place to go into further details on the complexity of joint missile
defence, but fundamental problems such as sensitive information sharing, technology
transfer, a capacity for rapid decision making and solving the challenges of command and control issues should be mentioned. Multilateral control over a missile
defence system will be an extremely diﬃcult task. Launch decisions have to be made
in a very short time span, actually only a few minutes. NATO has been working
on the problems for more than ten years without obvious success. NATO–Russia
cooperation will require that the problems of diverging technical standards and
operational procedures are solved. It is evident that Russia will insist on exercising
control over the use of Russian assets. The United States on the other hand would
never rely on a system requiring immediate Russian authorisation for its use. It is
diﬃcult to imagine an agreement on one of the two main theoretical possibilities: a dual key system, which seems to be unacceptable for both the United States
and Russia, or a US-led and NATO-integrated system with Russia as an add-on.
This is certainly not acceptable for Russia. The ﬁring systems must probably be a
national responsibility, while launch monitoring and threat assessment could be
integrated. It will be a diﬃcult process to ﬁnd viable solutions. It will require a high
level of mutual trust, which is certainly not present for the time being but might
be developed during the process. We can at least hope for that.
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Russia and NATO have obvious common interests in Afghanistan and in Central
Asia. The logistics arrangements between Russia and ISAF were conﬁrmed and the
scope of the NRC Project on Counter Narcotics Training was expanded and a Russian promise of assistance to further institutional capacity-building was noted, as
well as the development of the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund in order to
facilitate the Afghan Air Force to operate eﬃciently. The Joint Statement underlines
that the NRC will strengthen its cooperation on counter-terrorism and on ﬁghting
piracy and armed robbery at sea.
It should be noted that the Joint Statement also mentions the desire of the NRC to
revitalise and modernise the conventional arms control regime in Europe and will
be ready to continue dialogue on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
– some of the more traditional subjects for discussion between the two parties.
Seen from a NATO point of view the Lisbon Summit contributed to clarifying the
Alliance’s position towards Russia. A compromise had been made beforehand: the
Baltic countries and Poland got their strategic reassurance and contingency planning
in return for a reset of the Alliance’s relationship with Russia. Russia was oﬀered
participation in the development of a Theatre Missile Defence System and it is now
up to the Russians to contribute to a constructive solution. The Secretary General
claimed that the summit was a fresh start for a positive and substantial cooperation
in the NRC. But it should be noted that Russian inﬂuence in the Alliance continues
to be limited. Russia will not be able to exercise decisive inﬂuence for as long as it
doesn’t have the power to veto a decision.
From a Russian point of view it could be noted that the shadows of the RussoGeorgian war are fading away and are being substituted by a much more cooperative
NATO. Both parties have decided to concentrate their eﬀorts on mutual interests
and on solving common security challenges, e.g. Afghanistan and Central Asia.
The Russian proposal on closer cooperation in the area between NATO and the
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) found no support. The summit,
however, tacitly conﬁrmed that Georgian membership of the Alliance is not on
the agenda for the foreseeable future, although it was not excluded. The election
of Viktor Yanukovych as the new president of Ukraine has decisively removed
Ukrainian membership of the Alliance from the agenda. The planned deployment
of missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic has been cancelled
and Russia has been invited to participate in a Joint Theatre Missile Defence System with the possibility of exercising considerable inﬂuence on the development
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and conﬁguration of the system. Seen from Moscow, Russia’s security situation
has improved considerably over the last year, not so much because of the eﬀorts of
NATO but rather due to the reset of US–Russian relations.
In assessing the results of the NRC Summit it is diﬃcult to ignore the fact that
only a few concrete decisions were taken except from some details concerning the
situation in Afghanistan and, to a certain extent, missile defence. There are some
prospects for a resumed and hopefully fruitful dialogue in the NRC on various
subjects. Dmitry Rogozin recently said that there was an obvious reason why no
minutes from the NRC meetings existed: that they would reveal the absurd emptiness of the discussions. Let’s hope this will be changed in the future. There appeared
to be an agreement that the two parties do not pose any threat to each other. “That
alone draws a clear line between the past and the future of NATO–Russia relations”
as a press release from NATO after the meeting stated. It will be interesting to see
when this will be reﬂected in the relevant Russian documents, namely the National
Security Concept and, in particular, in the Military Doctrine. In the meantime
it can be noted that it is part of the New Strategic Concept, despite the secret
contingency planning for the Baltic–Polish region. It was good fortune that this
was leaked only after the NRC meeting. The damage could otherwise have been
serious. So the issue remains of whether some of the NATO members still regard
Russia as a potential threat, which might very well be the case. The same goes for
the doubt regarding whether Russia considers the United States to be a long-term
security threat. In spite of the much-publicised new strategic review the Alliance
still represents a legacy of the Cold War period with very little vision of its longterm role in the developing world order. The few decisions at the NRC Summit
did not contribute to the development of a much-needed single, undivided security
space in the Euro-Atlantic area.
The two summits strengthened the possibility of the development of a strategic
partnership. Small steps have been taken but there is a long way yet to go before the
mutual trust between the Russian and the NATO members has reached the level
of true strategic partnership. Still, the key to this goal is the continuation of the
positive US–Russia relationship, which unfortunately is highly dependent on the
future political fate of President Obama. With a Republican majority in Congress
the room for optimism about the future is considerably limited.
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5. NATO and International Terrorism: Can NATO Move
Beyond Controversy?
Berit Kaja Børgensen

NATO’s New Strategic Concept illustrates that the Alliance has gone from being
focused on the European territory and neighbourhood in the 1990s to an Alliance
focused on unconventional and indeed global threats. The New Strategic Concept
thus reﬂects and builds on developments in the security environment as they have
unfolded since the terror attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001.
It is also clear, though, that NATO’s momentum created by the ﬁght against international terrorism, once both clear and irresistible, is now losing steam. Terrorism
has in eﬀect become everybody’s business and it is no longer clear what NATO can
and should do.
The New Strategic Concept seeks among other things to strike a balance between
diﬀerent views on NATO’s future role in combating terrorism. All Allies have a stake
in the issue but they are not fully aligned, and so the question becomes whether the
Strategic Concept can be said to provide guidance for the years to come. As we shall
see, there is certainly room for improvement.

NATO and terrorism before 9/11
When NATO adopted its ﬁrst post Cold War strategic concept in 1991 terrorism
hardly ﬁgured among its concerns. Although some allies had experienced the severe
consequences of terrorist attacks, NATO considered these incidents domestic lawenforcement problems calling for national solutions rather than the mobilisation of
an international security alliance.1 NATO’s focus was instead on instability in Central and Eastern Europe, the remaining Soviet threat and Europe’s strategic balance.
However, cognisant of the wider security context, NATO did mention terrorism in
the 1991 Concept as one among several security risks ‘of a wider nature’.2
Given its ongoing and strenuous struggles with Kurdish separatists, Turkey was the
most prominent advocate of a change of pace in NATO and the collective identiﬁcation of terrorism as a serious threat. This resulted in the modiﬁcation of NATO’s
near neglect of terrorism at the Brussels Summit in 1994 when NATO condemned
all acts of international terrorism as a threat to the peaceful conduct of international
relations and called for eﬀective counter-terrorist cooperation.3 Terrorism was thus
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cautiously identiﬁed as an international phenomenon and problem and not merely
a domestic problem. It remained a declaratory stance, though.
In the following years other security issues, such as the operations in the Balkans,
captured NATO’s attention. Terrorism held a permanent position on the Alliance’s agenda but no major policy action followed.4 Still, partnership initiatives
launched in parallel became a driver also within the counter-terrorism domain.
Terrorism was one of the concerns and an area identified for cooperation and
consultation in the partnership programmes launched with individual countries such as Russia and Ukraine and also within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC).5 The issues nourished each other: partnerships encouraged
NATO to find common areas of interest, thereby advancing the role of terrorism
on the agenda, whilst terrorism also generated a demand for closer cooperation
between the partners.
The 1999 Strategic Concept reaﬃrmed collective defence but, reﬂecting the Balkan experience, clearly addressed crisis management and non-Article 5 operations.
Though the United States was one of the driving forces behind the New Concept,
US and Turkish attempts to include a whole paragraph on NATO’s role in countering terrorism did not succeed. In an almost identical fashion as in 1991, terrorism
was once again mentioned as a risk that could aﬀect Alliance interests, and Article 4
consultations were still the only measure of response. However, given lessons learned
from the Balkan operations, the Concept did address the need to protect NATO’s
forces and infrastructure against terrorism.6
The Alliance thus did not seriously consider the issue of terrorism through the 1990s.
According to Christopher Bennett “…there was no consensus on NATO’s role in what
were seen by most allies as internal security problems. As a result, there was little or
no sustained discussion of the nature of terrorism, of its sources, or its implications
for Alliance concepts, policies, structures or capabilities”.7

9/11 and NATO’s immediate response: urgent need for a new
policy
This radically changed after 9/11. In what seemed like a split second, terrorism shot
to the top of NATO’s agenda, starting with the ﬁrst ever invocation of the Alliance’s
collective defence commitment, Article 5. Terrorism was now central to NATO and
nearly every aspect of the Alliance was in need of an overhaul. Though some countries,
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especially France, were reluctant to raise the issue to the level of an Alliance core
concern, terrorism clearly was at the heart of NATO’s matter.
The Allies soon agreed to a range of measures to meet the ‘new’ threat including,
for instance, enhanced intelligence sharing and the provision of assistance to Allies
and other states whose participation in the counter-terrorist campaign caused them
to be threatened. The deployment of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern (and
later the entire) Mediterranean through Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), and
of ﬁve (later seven) NATO AWACS aircraft to the US to support operations against
terrorism, was a consequence of some of these measures.8
In December 2001 the Alliance published NATO’s Response to Terrorism and
stated that meeting the challenge of international terrorism was “fundamental to
our [NATO’s] security”.9 For the ﬁrst time the hybrid threat posed by terrorists and
WMD was explicitly recognised, making disarmament and non-proliferation essential
contributions to the ﬁght against terrorism. This connection between terrorism and
WMD has remained in NATO’s outlook to the present.
Although the 1999 Strategic Concept had recognised international terrorism as
a risk to Alliance security and that Article 5 would cover an armed attack against
the Alliance from whatever direction, it took 9/11 to connect these two dimensions of NATO’s strategic thinking. Consequently, in Reykjavik in May 2002 the
old debate about whether NATO should act ‘out-of-area’ was ﬁnalised with the
North Atlantic Council conﬁrming that NATO would be ready to act when and
wherever necessary in order to meet the fundamental challenge to security that
terrorism posed.10
The Alliance aﬃrmed from the outset that it could not do everything itself. Much
was still up to national authorities and other organisations, and military tools were
not suﬃcient. Broad and civil–military cooperation thus also became integrated into
NATO’s counter-terrorism policy. Though cooperation was meant to apply across
the board, NATO gave special emphasis to the EU.11 Other partnerships soon followed, though. The NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council was replaced by a new
NATO–Russia Council in May 2002, with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson
emphasising that, “What was lacking from the earlier NATO–Russia dialogue was
a true sense of shared purpose and urgency. The events of 11 September provided
that impetus...”.12 A new Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) was
adopted at the Prague Summit in November 200213 and a decision to upgrade the
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political as well as the practical dimensions of the MD was made at the Reykjavik
Summit in May 2002.14
These rather radical policy reforms fostered an urgent demand for new capabilities.
Although military reform had been on the agenda through the 1990s, 9/11 made
international terrorism one of the primary drivers of NATO reform and inspired the
urgency captured by reform’s new header: ‘transformation’.
At the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002 terrorism dominated the agenda
and the many decisions adopted there all paved the way for NATO’s new role as an
important actor in the ﬁght against international terrorism with its own military
concept for defence against terrorism.15 It deﬁned four roles for NATO: anti terrorism (defensive measures), consequence management (dealing with after eﬀects
of a terror attack), counter-terrorism (oﬀensive measures) and military cooperation. This meant being ready to deploy its forces when and where required in order
to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks,
directed from abroad against NATO. The Alliance should provide assistance to
national authorities in dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks and, on a
case-by-case basis, provide its assets and capabilities to operations in defence against
terrorism undertaken by or in cooperation with other international organisations or
coalitions involving Allies.16
The reform eﬀort reverberated through the NATO toolbox. A NATO Response
Force (NRF) came into being as a “technologically advanced, ﬂexible, deployable,
interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to
move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the [North Atlantic] Council”.17
Moreover, NATO streamlined its command structure, implemented a Civil
Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan and ﬁve nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence initiatives, approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment,
and set out to strengthen capabilities to protect against cyber attack.18 Some of
these measures had been underway since the 1990s and were not directly related
to international terrorism. The NRF, for instance, was in many ways an answer to
an older – primarily US – push to make European forces more expeditionary. But
9/11 created the window of opportunity that allowed for political consensus. The
decisions were, in the words of Secretary General Lord Robertson, far-reaching,
and made NATO more eﬀective in support of the common international ﬁght
against terrorism.19
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Controversies
Despite NATO and Allied eﬀorts several member states were struck by terror attacks
in the years following 9/11, both on home soil and in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO
maintained a strong and principled stand against terrorism, for instance by issuing
a Declaration on Terrorism20 pointing out terrorism and proliferation of WMD as
key threats to NATO and international security and approving a Defence against
Terrorism Programme (DAT) in the ﬁrst half of 2004.21
NATO also found a vital role to play in the ﬁght against terrorism by taking over
command of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in August 2003.22 The decision
came on top of the transatlantic Iraq dispute and therefore came in handy as a way
of demonstrating NATO cohesion and resolve in relation to terrorism and to the
Prague ‘transformation’ agenda. Not only was it the Alliance’s ﬁrst operation outside Europe; as ISAF’s mandate was expanded to include the whole of Afghanistan,
the operation was soon described as NATO’s key priority and perhaps, as Secretary
General de Hoop Scheﬀer argued, NATO’s litmus test.
Real operations and policy implementation took their toll and disagreements about
burden sharing and the weight of counter-terrorism versus reconstruction and development in the Afghanistan operation arose and came to dominate NATO diplomacy.
Some within NATO spoke up for a full-scale review of the Strategic Concept due
at this point but consensus proved elusive. Instead, and in a nod towards terrorism’s
ability to disrupt Alliance politics, the Allies adopted a Comprehensive Political
Guidance (CPG)23 setting out the priorities for the Alliance’s capabilities, planning
disciplines and intelligence for the following decade. This was at the Riga Summit
in late 2006.
Lessons learned from Afghanistan and international terrorism clearly inﬂuenced the
CPG. NATO’s perception of international terrorism coupled with WMD as a principal
threat to the Alliance was now deliberately mentioned. It also indicated the degree to
which the meaning of collective defence had changed: 9/11 was explicitly used as an
indication of what kind of scenarios could be expected in the future. Terrorism had
become an Article 5 trigger. NATO therefore needed capabilities to meet challenges
from wherever they might come, and to launch and sustain a greater number of smaller
and large-scale high intensity operations within and beyond Alliance territory.
The CPG in many ways deﬁned a path that the Alliance has followed and reﬁned up
until today. First, international terrorism became a more oﬃcial and central part of
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NATO’s strategic outlook and threat assessment. Moreover, it marked the beginning
of a trend of embedding terrorism and NATO’s role in ﬁghting it in a more global
context. For instance, Afghanistan and the general emphasis on NATO’s ability to
conduct operations wherever and whenever (evident in the 2009 Declaration on Alliance Security [DAS]24 as well) have pulled the Alliance in a more global direction.
Expeditionary warfare is obviously an essential capability but Riga also launched new
work on the political and practical potential of NATO’s partnerships.25 The Afghan
footprint was notable but it did not make for NATO consensus: NATO remained
seized by a diﬃcult debate on the nature of collective defence and its contribution
to global security. Still, it was largely uncontested that NATO needed to pursue the
Comprehensive Approach in cooperation with international partners.26
A number of questions linger. Should the Alliance follow the globalist camp, led by
the United States, and engage in global security issues such as crisis management
beyond Alliance territory? Or should it keep its focus on the collective defence of
its member territories as the regionalist camp containing, among others, some of the
new Eastern European members, argue? Furthermore, what are the real lessons of
Afghanistan? That NATO should prioritise counter-terrorism or development and
reconstruction; and how do we ﬁt counterinsurgency into this equation? In sum,
NATO consensus peaked soon after 2001 and has deteriorated since. 9/11 opened
a window of opportunity for radical policy changes but that window has closed.
Fighting terrorism is everybody’s business today, and NATO has lost direction. This
is where the new 2010 Strategic Concept can be of help.

Compromise: NATO’s New Strategic Concept
The newly assigned Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, steered the reﬂection
and negotiation process from Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009 to Lisbon in November
2010, but the underlying conditions did not change much. Rasmussen highlighted
that in order for NATO to be relevant in the 21st century it needed to meet global
challenges, including terrorism. In his view, globalisation is increasingly deﬁning our
security and “terrorism has mutated from a regional phenomenon into a global franchise”,27 and a whole new approach to security and collective defence is necessary.
It is obvious that terrorism has impacted on the work of the Expert Group convened
by the Secretary General as well as on the ﬁnal document. Many of the recommendations in the Expert’s report are in one way or another related to international
terrorism. First of all unconventional threats are identiﬁed as the most probable
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threats to the Allies in the coming decade, one of these being strikes by international
terrorist groups. Though NATO’s core commitment to collective defence still stands,
it needs to be rethought in light of changes in the security environment, making
the Experts recommend that on a case-by-case basis unconventional threats such
as cyber or terrorist attacks should be recognised as Article 5 threats. Furthermore,
partnerships of global reach as well as the comprehensive approach were prominent
recommendations.28
These elements ﬁgure in the New Strategic Concept but it also remains a compromise
between post 2001 consensus on the one hand and wider terrorism controversies
on the other. There is thus room for improvement, or, need for a continuous Allied engagement with the issue. There is no doubt that terrorism is a threat NATO
takes seriously. There is equally no doubt that the fear of terrorists acquiring WMD
remains. However, the Concept also mentions instability and conﬂict beyond Alliance borders as possible causes of terrorism and a direct threat to the security of the
Alliance. At the same time terrorists are explicitly mentioned as possible sources of
cyber attacks.29 These concerns hardly narrow the limits of NATO’s business: they
instead invite more work beyond Alliance borders and in cyber space. Without
clear deﬁnitions of when and where the Alliance should add value in these areas, the
potential for controversy is signiﬁcant.
Similarly, collective defence remains a core task in the Strategic Concept but its meaning and content has changed. The Strategic Concept states that NATO will deter
and defend against any threat of aggression and emerging security challenges where
they threaten the fundamental security of the Alliance. As in the context of regional
instability and cyber attacks, this is not a clear guidance. While NATO maintains that
collective defence of the territory of its member states is the core task, the Concept
opens the way for an Alliance with global, non-Article 5 responsibilities.
Though controversial, the comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is
also stated as necessary for eﬀective crisis management. The decision to form a modest
civilian capacity within the Alliance to interact and coordinate with other civilian
organisations does at least outline a clearer role for NATO in crisis management
operations: it is now obvious that NATO will be better suited to ﬁll civilian gaps.
But not much is clear beyond this point. NATO has yet to deﬁne its new and small
civilian capacity and NATO’s relationship to other organisations remains dynamic. The
Strategic Concept therefore settles for ‘ﬂexible formats’ – which is politically astute
but not of much use in planning the countering of terrorism and other threats.30
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The Strategic Concept has in eﬀect enlarged the space for political disagreement.
Even if we accept the Comprehensive Approach, it is not clear how much NATO
should actually do, and how much it should leave for other international actors.
Nor is it quite clear how much NATO intends to get involved in counter-terrorism,
crisis management and cyber security. It is clear that NATO intends to involve more
partners but it is not yet clear exactly how NATO intends to involve them. Should
the dividing line between NATO allies and non-NATO partners remain clear and
visible, or should it recede into an almost invisible background depending on the
nature of operational coalitions?
The next years will reveal whether the Alliance with Secretary General Rasmussen
at the helm can agree on more than a ‘communiqué NATO’ and actually put into
practice the many and diverse roles for NATO. Terrorism worked, for a short while,
as a real glue in the Alliance; it increasingly no longer is. Much work is therefore to
be done by member states that must provide military capabilities and political will
and by NATO’s organisation that must tie the strings together and provide for effective policy implementation.
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PART 3
A Comprehensive and
Cooperative Alliance?

73

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

74

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

6. NATO’s Institutional Environment: the New Strategic
Concept Endorses the Comprehensive Approach
Niels Henrik Hedegaard *

NATO operations in the Balkans and not least in Afghanistan have made it clear that
we require a comprehensive approach by all parts of the international community
involving a wide range of both military and civilian tools in order to eﬀectively meet
current challenges. Military means are of course essential to keep the peace or to ﬁght
insurgents, but they are not enough to create lasting stability and development. For
that, local authorities capable of delivering basic services with the support of the local
population are the only solution. In order to support local authorities, civilian expertise
is needed in the form of advisors and trainers as well as aid and investments. When
it comes to building local security forces, military and law enforcement expertise is
of course required. All tools in the crisis management toolbox are needed and their
employment has to be planned and coordinated based on a shared assessment of the
local circumstances. Such an approach would be a truly Comprehensive Approach
to crisis management, taking into account both military and civilian instruments.
The lessons identiﬁed are often summarised in the statement: no security without
development and no development without security.

The New Concept fully endorses the Comprehensive Approach
In the New Strategic Concept the Alliance fully endorses the need for a Comprehensive
Approach and commits itself to working more closely with international partners,
most notably the UN and the EU, in preventing crises, managing conﬂicts and stabilising post-conﬂict situations. The New Strategic Concept also contains a number
of concrete steps to further improve NATO´s ability to engage with civilian actors.
These include the formation of an appropriate but modest civilian crisis-management
capability in NATO, which, among other things, will help NATO to interface more
eﬀectively with civilian partners.

A Danish priority
The Danish Government has been working to promote a more comprehensive approach to crisis management in NATO since 2005, when Denmark hosted a high
*

The author writes in a personal capacity.
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level seminar in Copenhagen on the topic. The Danish Defence Agreement of 2004
had underlined the need for an improved ability to coordinate Danish military and
civilian tools in crisis management. The main conclusion from the 2005 NATO
seminar was the need for a more systematic approach in NATO – fewer ad-hoc solutions and more planning and preparation. At the summit in Riga in November 2006
NATO decided to initiate work on how to achieve this by looking at NATO’s own
procedures and at how to improve the cooperation with other international actors
including NGOs. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 NATO Heads of State
and Government endorsed an action plan containing a set of pragmatic proposals to
develop and implement NATO´s contribution to a Comprehensive Approach. At the
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009, a ﬁrst stocktaking of the implementation of
the Action Plan was done and further work in a number of areas was launched. At the
Lisbon Summit this work resulted in a number of concrete decisions and directions
for further work and, not least, in the New Strategic Concept where NATO commits fully to a Comprehensive Approach in crisis management. The overall message
from Lisbon is that NATO is ready to engage with others when it comes to security
– including meeting new threats and challenges.

What NATO has done
Implementing the Comprehensive Approach has and will continue to bring change
both within the Alliance and in its relations with other actors. Over the last decade
and a half NATO has developed its procedures and directives for planning to take
better account of both military and civilian aspects of crisis management. Engagements with other actors including NGOs have also been in focus, but progress here
has been more modest. Both areas remain high on the agenda. Inside the Alliance
one can point to a number of improvements and results, which naturally mainly
relate to the engagement in Afghanistan.
Building local support and contacts through the so-called CIMIC (Civil–Military
Cooperation) teams was and is an essential tool for NATO forces in the Balkans and
in Afghanistan. CIMIC teams are composed of military personnel but their function
is to liaise with local authorities and civilian actors in the area in order to secure their
support behind the military presence. The teams can support local projects of mutual
beneﬁt from the limited pool of development funds they normally administer. NATO
has a Centre of Excellence for CIMIC in the Netherlands which provides training
and advice, and CIMIC is one of the elements of the Comprehensive Approach as
it promotes dialogue and contact between the military and civilian actors, not least
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local authorities. NATO has also strengthened the identiﬁcation of lessons learned
from operations when it comes to civil–military cooperation through NATO’s Lessons Learned Centre ( JALLC), which is part of NATO’s Transformation Command
(ACT). There is now a more systematic approach to collecting and analysing lessons
learned, and lessons learned from Afghanistan have played an important role in the
further development of the Comprehensive Approach.
NATO has furthermore established a database with national civilian experts available
to advise and to assist in crisis management operations within their areas of expertise.
The need for more civilian experts available at short notice and ready to work in
theatre is a common challenge for all nations.
In Afghanistan the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) where civilian
and military representatives work side-by-side to coordinate eﬀorts to improve governance and secure development and stabilisation, has been developed and is supported
by NATO. Both CIMIC teams and civilians representing national development and
aid organisations as well as various ministries normally work in the framework of the
PRT. There are now 27 such teams in Afghanistan working closely with the local
Afghan authorities and the various international actors who are active in the regions.
It is important to note that the PRT is only a vehicle for coordination. The leader of
a PRT has no command and control over the other actors. The mission is to support
the local authorities and ensure better coordination of eﬀorts. Over time national and
regional plans have been developed as a result of these eﬀorts and they now guide the
eﬀorts of both the international community and the local authorities.
The post of NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan has also been
strengthened and now plays an important role in the overall political–strategic
coordination of NATO’s eﬀorts with those of other actors, notably the UN and
the EU and, not least, also with Afghan authorities. NATO’s Military Commander
in Afghanistan and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative are working closely
together to ensure a more Comprehensive Approach.
NATO has also embraced more fully a counterinsurgency strategy in its doctrines,
plans and operations, combining military eﬀorts with development and support to
local authorities, not least in building local security forces. In this respect NATO has
supported the Afghan Government in developing a transition plan for how progress
in development and governance will result in the gradual transfer of responsibility
for security to Afghan authorities.
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What will NATO do in the future?
It is important to stress that NATO is not trying to take over responsibilities
from others – neither in Afghanistan nor in future conﬂicts or crises. NATO
will continue to do what it does best, namely to provide a robust set of political
and military capabilities. This is the message from the summit in Lisbon. As a
rule stabilisation and reconstruction are best undertaken by those actors and organisations that have the relevant expertise, mandate and competences – like the
UN, EU and NGOs and of course local authorities. However, there needs to be
close cooperation and coordination between all actors – both before and during
a crisis management engagement. This is the core of a Comprehensive Approach.
There can, however, be exceptions where circumstances may prevent other actors
from undertaking their tasks, or from undertaking them without NATO support.
NATO must therefore have the ability to plan for, employ and coordinate civilian
as well as military crisis management capabilities that nations provide for agreed
Allied missions. In other words, if the security situation keeps other actors away
then NATO must ultimately be able to use national civilian capabilities in order
to support stabilisation and reconstruction in the area, but this will remain an
exceptional situation that will only last as long as other actors are not able to take
on their normal responsibility. This is the situation in many areas of Afghanistan,
notably in Helmand. Both the ‘rule’ and the ‘exception’ require NATO to have
the necessary civilian expertise to engage with others in all phases of crisis management and, if necessary, to employ and coordinate civilian activities. This was
one of the key decisions at the NATO summit in Lisbon. NATO’s headquarters
in Afghanistan already have many civilian members of staﬀ. This also needs to
be the case ‘at home’ not least at the Operational Command in Mons and at the
NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

Lisbon decisions on NATO’s ability to engage in a Comprehensive
Approach
In order to appreciate the many decisions taken in Lisbon it is important to realise
that the Comprehensive Approach starts at home – before engagement. NATO is
therefore committed to engaging actively with other international actors before,
during and after crises. The aim must be to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conducting of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence
and eﬀectiveness of the overall international eﬀort. Even when conﬂict comes to
an end, the international community must often provide continued support to
create the conditions for lasting stability.
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The many concrete decisions taken at Lisbon to enhance NATO’s contribution to a
Comprehensive Approach cover all phases of crisis management:
• NATO will aim to better predict when crises might occur and how they can best
be prevented. Early warning means early and orderly planning but also, of course,
early engagement to manage a crisis and prevent its deterioration.
• NATO will further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary
operations including counterinsurgency, stabilisation and reconstruction eﬀorts.
This will continue to inﬂuence NATO’s defence planning process, capability
building and doctrinal work.
• NATO will form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability
to interface more eﬀectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned
from NATO-led operations. This capability may also, as already mentioned, be
used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for
the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors. The civilian expertise
must become an integrated part of existing NATO structures and commands.
NATO has yet to decide the precise number of experts and their location.
• NATO will further enhance integrated civilian–military planning throughout
the crisis spectrum.
• NATO will develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones,
so that local authorities are, as quickly as possible, able to maintain security without
international assistance.
• NATO will identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by allies for selected missions, to enable them to work
alongside NATO military personnel and also civilian specialists from partner
countries and institutions.
• NATO will, ﬁnally, broaden and intensify political consultations among allies
and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis
– before, during and after.
These decisions, which are set out in the New Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit Declaration, will now be implemented and turn the Comprehensive Approach
into a reality visible in NATO bodies, policies, doctrines, capabilities etc.

NATO’s relations with other actors
Local authorities are of course the most important actors, as they will eventually
have to take full responsibility. But in the initial phase they are often weak and
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unable to engage eﬀectively. A Comprehensive Approach will assist local authorities by engaging them in coordination and planning and thereby also building
local capacity for the future. The need for civilian experts to advise and assist
local authorities remains a key component, which is why NATO will do more to
identify and train such national civilian experts. The NATO Defence Planning
process is one vehicle for focusing nations’ eﬀorts on the need for such capabilities and on the critical issue of availability. NGOs have often been in crisis areas
for decades – they know the local situation and are important partners. They put
great emphasis on preserving the humanitarian space – avoiding being seen as
part of the conﬂict – as do many international organisations. This is a reality that
NATO of course needs to respect and take into account, but it does not exclude
engagement and cooperation, especially outside the area of conﬂict. Continued
dialogue is essential to ensuring the broadest and deepest possible cooperation
given local circumstances and the views and experiences of the NGOs. There
will be no ‘one size ﬁts all’ when it comes to developing NATO’s NGO contacts.
The UN and the EU are very important partners for NATO. The New Strategic
Concept underlines the importance of the UN Charter and aﬃrms the primary
responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international
peace and security. Further steps were taken in Lisbon to deepen political dialogue
and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN–NATO Declaration
signed in 2008, including through:
• Enhanced liaison between the two headquarters
• More regular political consultations
• Enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are
engaged
For some time NATO has had both a military and a civilian liaison oﬃcer at UN
headquarters in New York. The presence of a civilian NATO representative in particular has served to stimulate interest in NATO and what NATO and the UN can
do together.
The New Strategic Concept underlines that the EU is a unique and essential NATO
partner. The EU and NATO share the majority of their members, and all members
of both organisations share common values. There is a need for and space for both
organisations and they should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles
in supporting international peace and security. NATO recognises the importance of
stronger and more capable European defence and welcomes the entry into force of
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the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities
to address common security challenges.
But we all know that there are barriers to a closer cooperation. Where you stand in this
discussion depends on where you sit. Seen from the EU it is a problem that NATO
has not concluded a security agreement with one member state (Cyprus), which is
consequently barred from all meetings and from receiving any NATO documents.
Seen from NATO it is a problem that the original understanding that all Allies should
be oﬀered full involvement in the European security and defence cooperation (as they
were in the Western European Union [WEU] and the Western European Armaments
Group [WEAG]) has been partly ignored (even for European non-EU allies) and
that one ally (Turkey) is barred from taking part in the European Defence Agency
– again because of the lack of a security agreement. Members of both organisations
would like to break through this deadlock. Both the NATO Secretary General and
the EU High Representative have been asked to work towards ﬁnding solutions and
they are both very committed to this, but any progress requires full agreement in both
organisations including on how to take the necessary steps in parallel. Clearly this is
a very unsatisfactory situation. The rationale for close cooperation is a so called ‘no
brainer’ as the Americans would say. Fortunately informal contacts are tolerated and
in operations there seems to be a growing acceptance that both informal contact and
informal cooperation are needed. The alternative could be loss of lives and certainly
a waste of resources, which naturally is wholly unacceptable. The New Strategic
Concept sets out a number of objectives and principles which will hopefully serve
to facilitate a breakthrough or at least substantial progress:
• NATO will fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU in the spirit of
full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy
and institutional integrity of both organisations.
• NATO will enhance the practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis
spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the ﬁeld.
• NATO will broaden the political consultations to include all issues of common
concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives.
• Finally, NATO will cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise
duplication and maximise cost-eﬀectiveness.
NATO will also continue to engage with other international organisations such as
the OSCE, The African Union and UN organisations like the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). In future crises and operations the ambition will be to
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have contacts with all relevant actors – NATO needs to be able to ‘plug and play’
with all. Such contacts should be established in advance and then intensiﬁed when
the need arises.

New challenges
It is not just the traditional challenges of bringing peace and stability to conﬂict
areas that require a Comprehensive Approach. Twenty-ﬁrst century challenges
such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons and dangerous materials, the threat of
cyber warfare, threats to energy supplies and to international transport routes can,
likewise, only be met with a combination of military and civilian instruments. The
mix of instruments and their relative weight will depend on the nature of the threat
and the concrete circumstances. Thus, the Comprehensive Approach is likely to be
at the core of the international community’s eﬀorts to counter the challenges and
threats to international security in the 21st century.

Conclusion
Experience from NATO operations has demonstrated that coordination among military and civilian actors is essential to achieving the key objectives of lasting stability
and security. NATO is therefore working to improve its ability to ‘plug and play’ with
other actors. These contacts need to be developed before they are needed, so that they
can be activated for real when a concrete challenge arises. NATO is not aiming to
coordinate or direct the work of others. Only the UN or the local authorities could
take up such a responsibility. NATO’s ambition is that the various instruments in the
crisis management toolbox are used in a coordinated and eﬀective way so as not to
waste resources and, especially, to achieve results. NATO is not out to compete with
others but to ensure that the international community becomes better at employing
the full range of tools from the toolbox we possess together. It makes perfect sense.
Our public expects nothing less. But it is a challenge that will remain with us. With
the new Strategic Concept, NATO is among the most forward-leaning actors when
it comes to asking others to cooperate. NATO is ready but it takes two to tango,
and other actors will hopefully also fully adopt and embrace the Comprehensive
Approach.
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7. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach after Lisbon:
Principal Problem Acknowledged, Solution Elusive
Peter Viggo Jakobsen

“[A] comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for eﬀective
crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors
before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and eﬀectiveness of
the overall international eﬀort.”

The Strategic Concept, Lisbon, November 2010
Since 2006 when the Comprehensive Approach (CA) was oﬃcially adopted at the
Riga Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has time and again
hailed CA as the key to successful crisis management and the Alliance’s operation in
Afghanistan. The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept quoted above is no exception
to this rule. In the meantime the gap between the collective CA vision espoused in
NATO rhetoric and the practical realities on the ground in Afghanistan has widened.
Here the Alliance and its partners have failed to play the roles that NATO’s CA vision
assigns to them, a failure that throws the viability of the entire concept into doubt.
Many, including the group of experts appointed by NATO’s Secretary General,1 urged
the Alliance to address this problem in its New Strategic Concept, and the purpose
of this article is to assess to what extent the Alliance has succeeded in doing so.
The good news is that the New Strategic Concept acknowledges the fundamental
problem that the operation in Afghanistan has exposed; the bad news is that it does
little to solve it. My argument has four parts. The ﬁrst part provides a brief introduction to CA and its evolution to date. Part two identiﬁes the gap between theory and
practice that has opened up in Afghanistan. Part three explains why the New Strategic
Concept does very little to address it before part four discusses how NATO could
improve matters. A conclusion sums up the major points at the end.

CA and its evolution prior to Lisbon
CA is NATO-speak for the widely accepted idea that crisis management operations
must combine civilian and military instruments in a coordinated and concerted
manner in order to succeed in building the foundations for lasting peace. Denmark
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put the need for an integrated civil–military approach to crisis management on the
NATO agenda in 2004–2005; the Alliance embraced the CA concept at the Riga
Summit in 2006 and two years later it agreed to a CA Action Plan pragmatically
outlining a series of steps that the Alliance must take in order to implement its CA
in practice.2
NATO learnt in Bosnia and Kosovo that it could not win the peace on its own, and
that success in peace and stabilisation operations ultimately depends on civilian
instruments that the Alliance does not possess. NATO therefore conceptualised its
CA as a collective endeavour involving all the actors engaged in such operations. Unlike the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), both of whom have
developed CA policies of their own, NATO does not envision itself in the driver’s seat
when executing its CA. The CA is not conceived as NATO owned and should not
be NATO driven. NATO’s CA is intended to foster cooperation and coordination
between all the relevant actors involved in such operations – international organisations, individual states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector
and host governments. In order to facilitate such cooperation, NATO has invited
other actors to assume responsibility for overall coordination, it has pledged not to
compromise any organisation’s independence, to respect the humanitarian space
deemed essential by the humanitarian community and, ﬁnally, the Alliance has
pledged to refrain from developing civilian capacities. The Alliance has, in other
words, gone out of its way to reassure the civilian actors it considers essential to the
success of its CA that it does not intend to trespass on their turf.
To implement this NATO has pursued a two-pronged approach. Internally, it has
striven to enhance its own ability to conduct its military operations in accordance
with CA requirements. Externally it has actively sought to establish better relations
with the other actors it is likely to cooperate with on such operations, notably the
EU, the UN and NGOs. The Eﬀects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), the
Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (2010), NATO’s Counterinsurgency
(COIN) Doctrine (2010) and the Civilian Advisor (CIVAD) concept (2010) are
all intended to enhance NATO’s ability to incorporate non-military aspects into its
planning process and to facilitate practical cooperation with other actors. In addition,
NATO has been very proactive in its attempts to establish closer relations with the
EU, the UN and NGOs, both at the strategic level and in the ﬁeld.
The principal driver of NATO’s implementation eﬀorts has of course been its desire
to succeed in Afghanistan with its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
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Most CA innovations have resulted from attempts to address problems in the ﬁeld.
The variety of civilian advisers employed by ISAF at all levels in theatre, the NATO
Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) introduced in 2003 and recently boosted from
the two-star to the four-star level and provided with a much larger staﬀ (up from 6 to
24), and the 27 joint civil–military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating
across Afghanistan all illustrate this process. These successful operational practices
have then trickled upwards towards the strategic level, inﬂuencing concepts, training and doctrine. EBAO and COIN were thus employed in ISAF before they were
formally adopted by the Alliance, and the development of the CIVAD concept was
inﬂuenced by the widespread use of civilian advisers in ISAF headquarters and PRTs
as well as by the need to improve cooperation with the civilian actors in theatre.

The fundamental CA ﬂaw highlighted by Afghanistan
However, Afghanistan has not just helped CA implementation, it has also been a
colossal hindrance in other ways. NATO’s initial thinking on the CA was to a large
extent shaped by its experience in Kosovo. Kosovo indicated a need for temporary
NATO involvement in civilian tasks such as law and order, governance and humanitarian assistance that would be scaled back as the security situation improved,
allowing civilian actors to move into theatre and take over. Kosovo pointed to an
international division of labour whereby NATO took care of security, logistics and
intelligence, the UN provided overall coordination and state building, and the NGO
community took the lead in providing humanitarian assistance and in facilitating
development and reconstruction. This template informed NATO’s initial involvement in Afghanistan but the Alliance’s inability to provide security pulled the rug
from under the Kosovo model. NATO’s inability to provide security made its own
members reluctant to provide troops and equipment and also meant that the civilian
organisations were less willing to engage and less capable of performing their tasks.
The result was a vicious circle of resentment and disengagement by the civilian actors
and ever-deeper NATO involvement in governance issues, humanitarian assistance
and reconstruction and development. This dynamics made it impossible for the Alliance to establish the deep cooperative relationships with other actors that its CA
is premised on. Needless to say, the absence of a capable and legitimate government
or transitional authority (which there was in the form of the UN in Kosovo) has
compounded NATO’s problems.
The fundamental problem that Afghanistan poses for NATO’s CA is, in short, that
none of its requirements for success have been realised. NATO has not been able to
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provide military security, the UN and the local government have failed to provide
legitimacy, good governance and overall coordination, and the civilian actors have
failed to provide humanitarian assistance, rule of law and development and reconstruction. NATO’s aspiration to act in support of the international community and
the local government has thus proved impossible to realise.3
This failure not only raises uncomfortable questions on the prospects of success for
the ISAF mission, it also calls into question the viability of NATO’s CA concept as
a whole, and it is this broader conceptual issue that is of interest here. The problems
encountered in Afghanistan of realising the international division of labour that
NATO’s CA concept is premised upon force the Alliance to consider the following
questions:
1. Is it viable and wise to employ a CA concept that depends on others for
success?
2. Should the Alliance take on a leadership role in CA?
3. Should the Alliance develop civilian capabilities that will enable it to lay the
foundations for success on its own?

CA in the New Strategic Concept
The answer that the New Strategic Concept provides to these questions can be
summarised as: ‘In support when we can and in the lead temporarily if we must’.
NATO’s preference for staying in the background and acting in support of others is
reaﬃrmed. The Strategic Concept pledges to continue the existing NATO policy
of pushing for closer cooperation with the EU and the UN. At the same time the
Concept also signals a determination to take on civilian tasks temporarily if need be.
The Alliance is to establish a ‘modest civilian crisis management capability’ that can
be used “to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for
the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors”. The promise in the
Riga Summit Declaration to not develop civilian capabilities has been broken and
the door is now opened for the establishment of a capability that will allow NATO
to implement CA on its own in war zones or insurgencies where civilian organisations ﬁnd it diﬃcult to operate.
It is good news that the Alliance members have at long last been able to agree on
the need to establish civilian capabilities – a move vehemently resisted by France
for a long time. The Riga decision not to develop civilian capabilities has now been
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proven wrong by what has taken place in Afghanistan, which has demonstrated a
clear need for a civilian capability that can enhance the Alliance’s ability to cooperate
with external civilian actors and help to ﬁll the gap temporarily in operations where
the civilian support provided by others proves insuﬃcient. It is crucial that NATO
acquires such a capacity because the civilian capacities provided by others in future
wars/insurgencies will remain limited. While the UN can be expected to provide a
token presence, as is currently the case in Afghanistan, most NGOs will stay away
as long as the security situation does not permit them to operate without military
protection. If NATO wants to conduct counterinsurgency operations or engage in
stabilisation in war zones in accordance with its own doctrinal and best practice
requirements, it will have to bring its own civilian capacities.
Deﬁning what ‘modest’ means in practice will not be easy, however. It will be determined by mission requirements and the ability and willingness of other actors to
cooperate with NATO. Just as the problems in Afghanistan have paved the way for
the establishment of civilian capabilities, so may future ones induce the Alliance to
beef them up. It is not diﬃcult to imagine future operations which would require a
robust civilian capability to create the conditions necessary to allow NATO to transfer
civilian responsibilities to other actors. This said, a decision to create a full-blown
civilian capacity enabling the Alliance to go it alone would have been a bad mistake,
as it would have alienated the civilian actors, fuelled organisational suspicions and
rivalries and led to unnecessary duplication and waste.
Establishing even a modest civilian capability is easier said than done, however,
and it is bad news that the approach to civilian capacity building proposed in the
Strategic Concept essentially copies the ineﬀective approach employed by the EU.
The Concept merely asks Alliance members to identify and train civilian specialists
and make them available to the Alliance for rapid deployment. The problem with
this approach is that the member states do not have civilian experts in the required
numbers with the required skill sets. While several NATO member states have established their own civilian rapid reaction rosters or made individuals available to rosters
established by other international organisations, such as the EU, the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the UN, the vast majority of these experts
are not trained to work in war zones in close cooperation with the military and are
unlikely to volunteer to do so. The failure of the EU to ﬁnd 400 police oﬃcers to
go to Afghanistan illustrates the problem, as do the diﬃculties the United States is
facing with respect to meeting its target of deploying 1,500 civilians to Afghanistan
by 2012.4 If NATO wants a pool of capable civilian experts willing to deploy into
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war zones to work together with its military forces, the Alliance will have to play a
proactive role in creating and training it. How this could be done is the topic of the
next section.

The road ahead: supporting CA capacity building
To succeed NATO must do a lot more than merely appeal to its members to create
civilian rapid reaction capacities. This is the approach that the EU and the UN has
employed with little success for the past decade,5 and there is no reason why NATO
appeals to the same countries are likely to prove more successful. To speed up the
process of capacity building NATO will have to establish a dedicated organisational
entity tasked to promote CA within NATO both at the Alliance and at member state
levels. Such an entity would have to act as a catalyst for implementing CA just as the
Stabilisation Unit is doing in the UK.6 The entities set up, to date, in various places
in NATO are not capable of performing this role eﬀectively. The new CA entity
should promote and develop CA doctrine, concepts and training at the Alliance
level and also act as a one-stop shop for member states (and others) wanting advice
on how to set up CA structures and civilian rapid reaction capacities, CA training,
best practice and lesson learning in the ﬁeld.
The work of such an entity would have to be supported by a decision taken by the
Alliance making it mandatory for member states to provide their military contingents
with the civilian personnel and support necessary to make CA work. To give an example, nations should not be allowed to lead PRT type units if they are incapable of
providing the civil–military nucleus that is necessary for it to work eﬀectively.
Needless to say, it is the national level that will decide the fate of NATO’s future
eﬀorts to implement the CA. While a CA entity at the Alliance level would greatly
facilitate the creation of reliable civilian rapid reaction capabilities and other equally
important CA components, it will not make much diﬀerence if member states do
not make CA a real priority. Creating CA structures, capacities and mindsets takes
time, and each member state will have to devise its own way of doing so, taking into
account its own bureaucratic structures, culture and capacities.
Regardless of the model chosen, experience shows that it will require fundamental
cultural change within the national bureaucracies involved, and that success is unlikely
unless governments make CA implementation a priority and make it attractive for
the relevant individuals and organisations to support the process. Individuals can be
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attracted with money and fast track promotion schemes, organisations by additional
resources permitting them to build up the extra capacity that is required to enable
them to release talented individuals at short notice without compromising their
primary day-to-day functions.
Experience also shows that it is crucial that civilian and military CA capacities are
not developed separately but jointly. Civilian CA personnel should be trained jointly
with military personnel from day one in order to break down cultural barriers and
facilitate the creation of the joint CA mindset that is necessary for success. NATO
would therefore do itself a favour by changing its terminology. Instead of distinguishing between civilian and military personnel, it should employ the phrase ‘CA
personnel’ in order to put civilian and military personnel on an equal footing and
emphasise the joint nature of the enterprise. The importance of joint civil–military
training cannot be over-emphasised.

Conclusion
Since NATO adopted its CA at the Riga Summit in 2006, the gap between rhetoric
and practice in Afghanistan has continued to grow. It has proved impossible for
NATO to realise its vision of a collective CA where the Alliance acts in support of
the international community, i.e. the variety of civilian actors typically involved in
crisis management operations. Many therefore urged NATO to close this gap in its
New Strategic Concept. While the decision in the Concept to establish a civilian
crisis management capability is an important step in the right direction, its approach
to civilian capacity building is too timid and unambitious. It is not enough merely
to call on member states to make civilian specialists available to Alliance operations.
Such specialists do not exist in the numbers required and the Alliance must make
a proactive and sustained eﬀort to convince member states to create them. A new
dedicated NATO entity tasked to promote CA will be required to this end, but while
such an entity can facilitate CA capacity building it cannot make it happen on its
own. Eﬀective CA capacity building ultimately depends on the political willingness
of member states to build eﬀective CA capacities at the national level. It will take
time and money and no easy ﬁxes exist – and there is far more to this than simply
increasing the number of civilian specialists.
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8. Cooperative Security: Waning Inﬂuence in the
Eastern Neighbourhood
Henrik Boesen Lindbo Larsen

One of the real success stories of NATO in the post Cold War era has been its remarkable ability to establish strategic partnerships with a wide range of third countries
and to leverage inﬂuence far beyond its borders. The 2010 Strategic Concept is an
ambitious document to the extent that it tries to maintain the signiﬁcant leverage that
NATO has been able to uphold throughout the 1990s and early 2000s and in so far
as it has now elevated this form of activity to being one of its core tasks. Indeed, the
2010 Strategic Concept states explicitly that Euro-Atlantic security is best assured
through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations
around the globe (§28). Strategic partnerships have therefore become a vital part
of NATO’s strategy towards promoting security and political change beyond the
borders of the Alliance.
‘Strategic partnerships around the globe as means of inﬂuence’, however, begs the
question of whether NATO is able to obtain the real inﬂuence which the Alliance
has outlined as its new vision in a number of strategically and politically important
countries that are not located ‘around the globe’, but rather which are located on
NATO’s own doorstep. The problem seems to be that whereas NATO retains signiﬁcant international leverage as a security actor in the West Balkans, and certainly
is aiming at a greater level of inﬂuence further aﬁeld, the inﬂuence of the Alliance
has signiﬁcantly decreased in another geographical area of strategic importance
for NATO: the eastern neighbourhood. The four East European countries in the
border zone with Russia: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, increasingly appear as ‘hard cases’ that are beyond Western inﬂuence and democracy promotion.
This leaves NATO faced with serious questions about how to maintain a degree of
inﬂuence in the eastern neighbourhood that matches the ambitions expressed in the
New Strategic Concept.

Cooperative security
NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept draws attention towards one particular aspect of
security, ‘cooperative security’, by which is meant NATO’s ability to promote security
and political change beyond its borders through strategic partnerships with third
countries. Cooperative security has risen markedly in the order of priority since the
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1999 Strategic Concept,1 where the concept did not assume any central position,
arguably reﬂecting a reorientation of NATO’s inﬂuence-seeking strategies. The 2010
Concept emphasises cooperative security as one of the three so-called core tasks for the
Alliance (§4), hence in principle giving equal importance to collective defence, crisis
management and cooperative security. The concept is further reiterated in relation to
NATO’s enlargement policy (§27). The aim of cooperative security must therefore be
taken seriously as a key task through which the Alliance tries to deﬁne itself and seeks
to exert international inﬂuence beyond its borders. The importance of cooperative
security is particularly reﬂected in the Strategic Concept in paragraphs 4 and 27:
“Cooperative security. The Alliance is aﬀected by, and can eﬀect, political
and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnerships with relevant
countries and other international organisations […]; and by keeping the door
to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet
NATO’s standards”. 2
“NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies: the
prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced
stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing
common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European
countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures”.3
Cooperative security follows a long established tradition in the Alliance introduced
with the Harmel Report in 1966. The concept has a clear ideological underpinning,
which became increasingly visible after the end of the Cold War where common
values and democracy promotion became intrinsically connected to enlargement
and as means of establishing strategic partnerships through a ring of democratic
friends and a growing ‘zone of democracy’. Arguably, this has been one of NATO’s
most successful policies resulting in an elaborate institutional framework for
managing a wide range of diﬀerent relationships with third countries and resulting in the enlargement of the Alliance to its present 28 member states. The 2010
Strategic Concept takes speciﬁc note of Ukraine and Georgia, reiterating the
declaration of the 2008 Bucharest Summit that the two states, some time in the
future, will become members of NATO.4 This is an interesting step in light of the
obvious limitations that exist today with regard to any realistic integration of these
two countries into NATO following the democratic backlashes and the political
crises that have occurred in both countries. Moreover, in the cases of Belarus and
92

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

Moldova, the aim of aﬀecting inﬂuence through cooperative security faces an even
tougher challenge.
All four states represent ‘hard cases’ in the sense that they are increasingly immune
to NATO’s self-declared intention of playing a role as a political and security actor
and that they each present NATO with very speciﬁc challenges through diﬀerences
in aspirations and domestic politics. A changed strategic balance in favour of Russia
is part of the explanation for NATO’s declining inﬂuence. In all four cases serious
doubts therefore exist about whether the ambitions expressed in the 2010 Strategic
Concept are actually realistic.

Georgia and Ukraine
Both Georgia and Ukraine seemed on a fast track towards NATO membership in
the mid-2000s after the initial positive experiences with the ‘colour’ revolutions
against the old Soviet elites. A new pro-Western course coupled with democratic
progress nourished high expectations for the integration of the two countries in
Euro-Atlantic structures.
The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 occurred as a landmark event which revealed the
real dangers of hasty enlargement plans to include geopolitically exposed countries.
In a scenario where Georgia would have been a full-ﬂedged NATO member at the
time of the outbreak of the war, the result could have been a situation where the
Alliance would either face military confrontation with Russia or refuse to bring
military assistance to Georgia – which in turn would expose the enlargement plans
as a huge bluﬀ with the risk of undermining the credibility of the Alliance’s collective
defence clause. As later certiﬁed by independent investigations,5 Georgia had a main
responsibility in initiating the actual actions of war against South Ossetia, thus further
nourishing the doubts about enlargement and the wisdom of issuing security guaranties to unstable countries with internal conﬂicts where it is hard to determine ‘who
ﬁred the ﬁrst shot’. NATO accession now represents a distant promise for Georgia,
which however maintains membership as long-term strategic goal.
Georgia is an interesting case as NATO continues to upkeep strategic leverage in the
country in spite of Russian recognition of and de facto control over both Abkhazia
and South Ossetia – and not least despite Georgia’s distant membership prospects.
This is so primarily because of large amounts of, in particular American, assistance to
the country6, which allows Georgia to still look to the West for foreign support.
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Georgian aspirations for closer association with NATO, however, are complicated
by the democratic standstill in the country. It is increasingly evident that the ‘rose’
revolution in 2003 did not bring about the grand democratic changes that many had
hoped for. President Saakashvili has been exposed to criticism for his increasingly
authoritarian methods, especially regarding freedom of the media and his violent
crackdowns on demonstrators.7 In addition, Saakashvili bears a strong personal responsibility for taking the ﬁrst step towards the military invasion of South Ossetia
in 2008, leading to the disastrous military defeat against Russia and the de facto loss
of the two breakaway republics.
Ukraine’s political development bears many resemblances to Georgia’s. Ukraine’s
‘orange’ revolution in 2004–05 brought about important constitutional changes but
quickly resulted in political rivalries between the coalition parties and their ability to
deliver political results. This led to the return of Yanukovich from the ‘ancien régime’
already in the subsequent presidential elections in 2010, which was a signiﬁcant blow in
light of the widespread expectations of the ‘orange’ revolution as a spark of democratic
change within the post Soviet sphere and as a means of anchoring Ukraine within
the transatlantic security community. Contrary to his predecessor Yushchenko, who
made NATO accession a foreign policy priority, Yanukovich has declared Ukraine
non-aligned and has thus in practice ended Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership.
Moreover, Yanukovich has extended the agreement with Russia on her Black Sea ﬂeet
harbouring in Sevastopol for another 25 years, leading to signiﬁcant improvements
in the relationship with Russia.8 In addition, Ukraine has suﬀered particularly hard
from the ﬁnancial/economic crisis with a severe contraction of the economy and
within the foreseeable future Ukraine is therefore likely to remain inwardly focused
on economic recovery and stable energy provisions from Russia. While in Georgia
NATO still seems to uphold leverage, the political development in Ukraine points
ﬁrst and foremost to close strategic partnership with Russia at the resulting expense
of the kind of partnership that NATO aims at in the 2010 Strategic Concept.

Belarus and Moldova
Whereas Georgia and Ukraine have been examples in the eastern neighbourhood
of rapid change and instability, Belarus has been characterised by marked political
status quo ever since the country was set on the authoritarian path with the rise to
power of Lukashenko in 1994. The gradual ‘disappearance’ of a viable political opposition and civil society in the country and the violent crackdowns on demonstrators
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and arrests of leading opposition ﬁgures in spite of international condemnations in
connection with the 2010 presidential elections are witness to the regime’s practical
immunity to outside interference. The recent elections, which unsurprisingly secured
Lukashenko another term in power, and the remarkable stability of the regime, seem
to indicate that NATO’s (and the EU’s) ability to leverage inﬂuence in Belarus will
remain depressingly limited. For example, the EU’s experiences with failing attempts
to inﬂuence the Lukashenko regime with the use of both sticks and carrots (visa bans
and trade incentives) is illustrative of the lack of inﬂuence of any Western power on
Belarusian politics. The number one strategic partner for Belarus remains Russia
– despite occasional political clashes, Belarus is highly dependent on the economic
ties and energy supplies from the Russian neighbour. There seems to be little or nothing that NATO can oﬀer to initiate any substantial partnership intended to aﬀect
Belarus’s foreign strategies or alter the incentives for domestic reforms.
The fourth ‘hard case’ for NATO’s ambitions of cooperative security is Moldova,
which has also exhibited interesting political developments. Until recently Moldova
was overwhelmingly dominated by the Communist party and seemed just as much
outside the reach of Western inﬂuence as Belarus has always been. However, since
the burning of the Moldovan parliament and the storming of the presidential building by angry anti-Communist demonstrators in April 2009, the country has been
marked by considerable political instability. Several re-elections have failed to solve
the constitutional deadlock by gathering enough parliamentary mandates behind
the election of a candidate for the presidency, which controls the country’s foreign
and security policy.9 The country is headed by a coalition government, the ‘Alliance
for European Integration’, which at least rhetorically advocates a ‘balanced’ foreign
policy. The coalition, on the other hand, has opposed any move to join NATO.10
The events in Moldova are interesting as they show how seeming stability with post
Soviet incumbents in power can come to an abrupt end oﬀering possible windows
of opportunity for reform. On the other hand, apart from ousting the Communists
from oﬃce, the current government has so far been able to achieve little in terms of
democratic progress.11 At the end of the day, Moldova is so economically integrated
with the other CIS countries that political detachment from Russia is highly unlikely
– Moldova is deeply dependent on Russia, both as an export market and as an energy supplier. Most important is, however, the breakaway republic of Transnistria,
whose de facto independence from Moldova today remains militarily guaranteed
by Moscow with the presence of a major peacekeeping contingent in the separatist
republic – an obvious parallel to Georgia’s pre-war situation. The Moldovan govern95
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ment is therefore very unlikely to take any move that would upset Moscow. From
NATO’s perspective, strategic partnership with Moldova that would live up to the
ambitions of the Strategic Concept seems far-fetched for as long as Russia maintains
the zero-sum logic that NATO inﬂuence gained is equal to lost Russian inﬂuence
in her ‘near abroad’.

Partnerships for what?
The Russo–Georgian war in 2008 and the broken illusions of the ‘colour’ revolutions
in both Georgia and Ukraine became the turning point in NATO’s relations with
the eastern neighbourhood countries. Leaving the ‘hard’ geopolitics aside, Russia’s
inﬂuence in the eastern neighbourhood is also based on a shared history, strong cultural ties and a signiﬁcant amount of soft power such as access to the Russian labour
market, visa-free regimes and the dominance of Russian media12 in comparison with
which NATO and the West presently have little to oﬀer.
At the same time institutions in themselves seem to have limited inﬂuence on NATO’s
relations with third countries. All the ‘hard cases’ investigated in this chapter take
part in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and all except Belarus take part in NATO’s
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), setting the frame for dialogue and cooperation between the parties. In addition, the speciﬁcally designed NATO–Georgia and
NATO–Ukraine Commissions provide an additional institutional framework and
supposedly closer relations and more opportunity for leveraging inﬂuence. However,
in both cases little or no progress can be detected since their establishment, which
certainly underlines the necessity for real political will on both sides as the primary
driving force behind international change.
In practice it seems that realistic membership prospects remain NATO’s only eﬀective
tool to exert inﬂuence in the spirit of cooperative security. However, the only eastern
neighbourhood country upholding this aspiration today is Georgia but as NATO
is unlikely to initiate even the ﬁrst steps towards membership (Membership Action
Plan) within the foreseeable future, membership, and hence inﬂuence, seem rather
distant. Distant membership for Georgia has always been advocated by NATO’s
continental powers, notably France and Germany, and is now also supported by the
Obama administration in a far more prudent approach to the question of NATO
expansion eastwards. As a result the ambitions expressed in the 2010 Strategic Concept
appear not to be directed towards NATO’s eastern neighbourhood, as these enlargement plans seem to have been eﬀectively shelved. This may leave states enthusiastic
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for enlargement, notably Poland, disillusioned with NATO’s lack of ability to aﬀect
security development and spread democracy eastwards13 and it certainly raises serious questions about the prospects for actually achieving cooperative security in the
‘hard cases’ in NATO’s eastern neighbourhood.

The implementation paradox
The ‘hard cases’ point to clear geographic limitations to NATO’s ability to establish
eﬀective partnerships that could leave the Alliance signiﬁcant leverage as international
actor. The above has sought to demonstrate a growing paradox between vision and
reality vis-à-vis the eastern neighbourhood countries, where NATO’s inﬂuence has
been signiﬁcantly reduced after having been present for some time.
NATO seems aware of the problems and it may be that the planned overhaul of
NATO’s partnership structure to be presented at the April 2011 Foreign Ministers
meeting in Berlin14 will bring NATO’s ambitions and actual institutional structures
for partnership more into line, if only for the reason that Georgia and Ukraine de facto
no longer are prospective members. These ‘hard cases’ belong in the same category
as other ‘hard cases’ – beginning with Moldova and Belarus – and not in the basket
of willing NATO partners such as Sweden, Finland and Western Balkan countries.
What NATO must do now is to work with these categories of soft and hard – easy
and diﬃcult – partners and align political possibilities and ambition. NATO may not
be able to formalise the distinction for political reasons but it should operationalise
it nonetheless.
The security landscape in the eastern neighbourhood now is best described as a geopolitical straitjacket made up of authoritarian political traditions and regimes and correspondingly declining ambitions to join or cooperate with NATO. NATO’s principle
of cooperative security writ large is therefore challenged on NATO’s doorstep. Given
that cooperative security is listed as a core task, on a level with crisis management and
the crucial collective defence principle, it leaves the Strategic Concept vulnerable on
yet another ‘implementation’ front. A stronger geopolitical dimension in NATO’s
partnership policies seems pertinent not only in the relationship to Russia but also
vis-à-vis ‘emerging’ powers like India and China.
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9. Three Questions for the Strategic Concept
Mark Webber

The subject of great expectation, NATO’s ‘new’ Strategic Concept was oﬃcially
unveiled at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. Secretary General Anders
Rasmussen, who had been tasked with ﬁnalising the document, noted at the time
that the Concept would help “launch an Alliance that will be more eﬀective, more
engaged, and more eﬃcient.”1 The summit’s ﬁnal declaration was equally emphatic:
the Concept, it proclaimed, laid out “a vision for the Alliance for the next decade.”
On that basis NATO would be better placed “to defend its members against the full
range of threats; [more] capable of managing even the most challenging crises; and
better able to work with other organisations and nations to promote international
stability.”2 It is too soon to judge the merits of these claims. Formally, NATO’s 2012
summit in the US has been mandated to measure progress on the Concept’s core
themes – but already experts, politicians and commentators on both sides of the
Atlantic have made their views known. This debate is, in fact, an extension of the
discussions which accompanied the Concept’s gestation, a unique process by which
NATO oversaw expert seminars, social networking and the measured labours of the
Group of Experts, and which, in turn, encouraged a public debate that had been largely
absent when the predecessor documents were conceived in 1991 and 1999.
Process should not, however, be mistaken for substance. The public and political attention given to the Strategic Concept could all too easily lead one to exaggerate its
signiﬁcance and to over-emphasise its qualities. The reality is that the document marks
only a modest step forward. Politically exhausted by the campaign in Afghanistan,
disoriented by the strategic ephemera of Iraq and the ‘war on terror’, and constrained
by the new age of defence austerity, NATO has become victim to a marked crisis of
conﬁdence. It has thus avoided creative thinking and has failed to grasp quite reasonable possibilities for Alliance action.
Bearing these initial thoughts in mind, three questions are worth asking of the Strategic Concept. What’s diﬀerent? What’s new? And what’s missing?

What’s different?
The Strategic Concept was intended to be ‘succinct and easily digestible’, a tool of
public diplomacy able to convey to the sceptical or the unaware the purposes of
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NATO and thereby to mobilise support for its activities.3 The Concept has done
rather well in cataloguing concisely a variety of prior and known NATO positions,
but to the well informed there are few surprises.4 Much of the Concept’s content
was heralded in the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance, in summit and other
ministerial communiqués of the last few years, and in keynote national statements
– the French Defence White Paper, the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review,
and the US National Security Strategy.
This tendency toward repetition reﬂects the diﬃcult task of reconciling national
positions. In an inter-governmental organisation, a document such as this has to
satisfy a large constituency, one which has grown by twelve states since the end of
the Cold War. The Alliance is spared the agonising process of national approval
that attends the adoption of historic documents in the EU (the Strategic Concept,
in this sense, is not the Lisbon Treaty) but it has to address a problem all of its own
– satisfying US demands while at the same time bringing together often discordant
European positions. Constructive ambiguity is thus an ever-present possibility. To
wit, on nuclear issues, Franco-German diﬀerences are elided in a bland statement5
that allows for both the latter’s desire for cuts in NATO tactical nuclear weapons in
Europe and the former’s scepticism toward any move that might cast an unfavourable light on its own nuclear forces. Ballistic missile defence, meanwhile, is noted in
a very short paragraph (admittedly, more detail is contained in the Lisbon Summit
Declaration), that both masks the concerns of allies such as Norway and Germany
and renders indiscernible the doubts of some about cost, technical diﬃculty and
possible damage to relations with Russia. Perhaps most artful of all is the resolute
insistence on the importance of Article 5 collective defence (paragraph 4). This is
NATO’s essential and agreed bottom line. Expressed in the Concept as relevant to
‘any threat of aggression’ and any ‘emerging security challenges’, it is elastic enough
to encapsulate the concerns of all Allies but suﬃciently vague to avoid committing
them collectively to a particular course of action.
Compromise and the aﬃrmation of set positions are not without political merit but
does this mean the Strategic Concept is devoid of substance?

What’s new?
NATO’s most recent Strategic Concept has a lineage that goes all the way back
to the inception of the Alliance. Four Strategic Concepts were adopted during
the Cold War (in 1949, 1952, 1957 and 1968). A ﬁfth – and the ﬁrst to be made
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public – was released at the Cold War’s end in 1991. A major revision followed
in 1999 and this, in turn, has now been replaced by the current document. The
circumstances surrounding each of these keynote statements diﬀer, yet all share the
same essential purpose – they are ‘strategic’ in the sense of deﬁning key priorities
and orienting the Alliance toward the means of fulﬁlling them. During the Cold
War this was a relatively straightforward task in that the functions of the Alliance
were narrowly focused – to deter the Soviet threat and, if necessary, to engage in
combat with the adversary. But providing focus has become that much harder
since 1991 as NATO has lost its central point of reference. Its documents have
thus become more conceptual than strategic, with a consequent tendency to map
the external environment as a prelude to, and justiﬁcation for, the variety of functions the Alliance is held to perform. This is an exercise that works well when that
environment is in ﬂux. The 1991 Strategic Concept was thus an important signiﬁer of the birth of a new Europe, and the movement of the Alliance toward a ‘new
strategic environment’ of ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘multi-directional’ risks.6 The 1999
Concept could not make such a claim to historical importance. Yet, in many ways,
it too marked an important point of departure. What is striking in that document is
the note of self-conﬁdence, the assertion, after a decade of post Cold War turmoil,
of NATO’s place at the centre of Europe’s military and security governance.7 That
this came in the midst of a major NATO intervention in the Balkans advertised
just how unsettled the environment continued to be, but equally, how purposeful
NATO could be in response.
The two Strategic Concepts which bookmarked the 1990s were framed by reference
to the ‘Euro-Atlantic area’. This Euro-centrism, however, did not sit comfortably
with a US less and less inclined toward the continent’s aﬀairs; neither did it entirely
accord with NATO’s own proclamations on the proliferation of risks, many of
which lacked a territorial base. The US had, in fact, been pushing a more globalist
perspective for some time. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had spoken in
1997 of the need for NATO to face up to ‘challenges beyond Europe’s shores’ only
to be rebuﬀed by European allies wary of the uncertainties surrounding a ‘global
NATO’.8 The strains of operations in Bosnia followed in short order by Operation
Allied Force over Kosovo, only added to this wariness. The Strategic Concept of
2010 is not a radical departure in this connection. Its ‘three essential core tasks’ of
collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security continue to be referenced to Euro-Atlantic security as, indeed, do other major tasks such as enlargement
and partnerships with Russia and the EU. More eye-catching is the characterisation
of a ‘security environment’ replete with problems of terrorism, instability beyond
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NATO borders, cyber attacks, environmental and resource constraints, and threats
to communication, transport and transit routes; all suggestive of a deterritorialisation or globalisation of security. Many of these challenges were noted in 1999 but
here they are given greater prominence. What this means in practice, however, is
less clear. Tellingly, those instances where NATO has already demonstrated an
ability to go beyond traditional boundaries are barely mentioned. Afghanistan, to
use a cliché, was the ‘elephant in the room’ in the framing of the Security Concept.
The Afghan mission is not the only expression of how NATO has adapted to the
post 9/11 strategic context (its naval operations are also important) but it is by far
the most obvious. What it signiﬁes – in the language of the 2010 Concept – is an
acceptance among many allies, led by forceful US example, of the need to act ‘at
strategic distance’.9 That this message is not articulated with any great enthusiasm,
however, tells us two (possibly contrasting) things. Firstly that the Strategic Concept is striving to be ‘future proofed’, to rise above current, perhaps only temporary,
predicaments. Secondly, and less generously, it reﬂects the impasse to which the
Afghan war has led the Alliance. NATO’s emerging globalist perspective has for
several years had to contend with an American-led agenda shaped by 9/11. The
Alliance as an organisation did well to avoid the war in Iraq but its eﬀorts since
have become synonymous with the United States’ initial military response to the
attacks on Washington and New York – the overthrow of the Taliban. From this
the long, slow-burning Afghan war has followed. That it has been so controversial
and that NATO is looking for life beyond is now obvious. The 2010 Concept allows for that possibility, although where it fails (and here the contrast with the
1991 and 1999 documents is clear) is to articulate how this approaching watershed
should compel a new sense of direction.

What’s missing?
That the Strategic Concept is seemingly so predictable sits badly with the promise
of the consultation exercise that preceded it. Perhaps this was to be expected. An
inescapably political process of consensus building was never going to result in a clear
statement on political hot potatoes such as a reform of NATO’s decision-making
procedures (a very obvious omission in the Concept), burden sharing (also omitted)
or force generation and defence capabilities (merely hinted at in paragraph 37). The
Group of Experts Report, somewhat less mindful of these political realities, contains bolder statements on some of these matters (including an extensive section on
capabilities).10 And an earlier but less noticed eﬀort, the ‘Multiple Futures’ project
overseen by Allied Command Transformation, provides an extended overview of
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NATO’s urgent force transformation requirements.11 These two documents share
the Strategic Concept’s preoccupation with the turbulent security environment
facing the Alliance. But such awareness has led to self-defeating consequences, a
fruitless quest on NATO’s part for ever-greater security. The irony of the Strategic
Concept lies in the fact that an Alliance tested to the limits in a single theatre of
war judges its relevance not by what it can do best or could do better but by how
it can safeguard its interests against ever more abstract, distant and unvanquishable threats. Cataloguing multiple problems is not the same as willing the means
to address them or, indeed, that the means when provided will be suﬃcient or
even useful. In giving the go-ahead for a missile defence capability, for instance,
the Alliance is about to embark upon an expensive and unproven system against a
threat which, at present, barely exists. At the same time, it allows for only a ‘modest
civilian crisis management capability’,12 in an area – the comprehensive approach
to crisis management – where NATO has a solid track record.
In this light a degree of modesty would seem wise counsel. One possibility, reasonably well rehearsed before the Lisbon Summit, is for NATO to return to its
principal function as a defence alliance, called into action when necessary “to deter
and defend the North Atlantic from direct attack from other states.”13 This accords
with NATO’s uncontroversial central purpose but would be against the grain of the
transformational work, political and material, it has invested in over the last two
decades. Indeed, the strategic culture within the Alliance is less and less attached
to such a static role. NATO, rather, needs to continue in the direction of travel it
has moved in during the post Cold War period but to do so in a manner that avoids
the pitfalls of over ambition. The Strategic Concept hints at such a synthesis in
its three core tasks. The importance of the ﬁrst – collective defence – is clear. The
second and third, however, lose focus owing to the panoply of tasks which then
follow. What is missing is precisely the sense of vision which the Strategic Concept
was meant to articulate.
The basis for that vision ought to be the notion of human security.14 Such a position
has several advantages. First, it connects with NATO’s political roots. The preamble
of the North Atlantic Treaty makes plain a commitment to the moral principles
at the heart of human security – democracy and the rule of law. Article 2, meanwhile, commits the Alliance to promote ‘conditions of stability and well-being’ in
international relations and thus, by implication, is a mandate to act in the face of
genocide, ethnic cleansing and the systematic abuse of human rights. Second, it is
a vision to which NATO has already steered. Recall here the justiﬁcation given for
103

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

Operation Allied Force – “to avoid a humanitarian tragedy outside [of NATO’s]
own borders.”15 The ISAF mission, meanwhile, is mandated to promote a ‘secure
environment’ in Afghanistan for a very particular reason – so that the Afghan authorities, the UN and civilian NGOs can engage in ‘reconstruction and humanitarian
eﬀorts.’16 This important task has been largely superseded by kinetic operations,
but NATO counterinsurgency (most obviously under erstwhile ISAF commander
Stanley McChrystal) has, it is claimed, always been married to civilian protection,
reconstruction and support for humanitarian relief.17 Third, NATO already has the
potential capabilities to undertake such a role. As Berdal and Ucko have suggested,
the recent emphasis on expeditionary combat has diverted the Alliance from the
course of transformation it embarked upon during the 1990s in light of experience
in the Balkans. Stability operations and peacekeeping, however, remain in their view
“a proﬁtable and perhaps Alliance-saving niche for NATO”, a more achievable goal
of military transformation than expeditionary wars “for which there is insuﬃcient
will and capacity.”18 Fourth, NATO’s commendable eﬀorts to develop partnerships
would be best served by such a course. The Strategic Concept’s desire to “deepen
[...] practical cooperation with the UN”, and to develop “partnerships through
ﬂexible formats” allows NATO the opportunity to oﬀer those resources (high
readiness force headquarters, strategic lift capacity, logistical support, security sector
expertise, and rapid-reaction forces) which others sorely lack.19 Its humanitarian
airlifts to Haiti and Kashmir, several years of cooperation with the African Union
and the legacy of cooperation with the UN and the EU in the Balkans, point to
what is possible here. Fifth, and ﬁnally, it is a course which is likely to have greater
public support than the politically sapping mission in Afghanistan. One, moreover,
which has moral standing, which connects to international legitimacy through the
notion of responsibility to protect, and which demonstrates best NATO’s readiness
to cultivate wide and inclusive partnerships.
In one of his ﬁnal speeches as Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheﬀer suggested
that the soon-to-be updated Strategic Concept should take account of “the new
agenda of human security”. To do otherwise would be to ignore one of the main
trends in “the evolution of the security environment.”20 Regrettably, the framers
of that document have not taken his advice. The 2010 Strategic Concept is meant
to last for at least a decade. Let us hope that in its actions the Alliance can make
good that omission.
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10. From Lisbon to Lisbon: Squaring the Circle of EU and
NATO Future Roles
Sven Biscop

NATO emerged from its 19–20 November 2010 Lisbon Summit with a New Strategic Concept (SC) that is concise and readable. That is an achievement in its own
right, as those who, in preparing for the summit, struggled through the previous
long-winded 1999 version will appreciate. The new text does not break a daring new
path for NATO nor does it bridge any age-old divide, which perhaps explains why
attention from the media and the general public outlasted the summit itself by just
a day or two. Even so, the summit can be deemed successful, for NATO needed a
new and clear mission statement as the public, and many governments, were growing restive about Afghanistan and were beginning to doubt whether that seemingly
never-ending war did not put a mortgage on the Alliance’s reason for living: the
collective defence of its territory.
The New Strategic Concept provides the answers that were to be expected. Of
course, NATO must be capable of both Article 5, i.e. territorial defence, and
non-Article 5, i.e. worldwide crisis management operations. Evidently, the Alliance must remain committed to nuclear disarmament while maintaining nuclear
deterrence as a core element of Article 5: “As long as nuclear weapons exist,
NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance” (SC §17). Naturally, it is better to have
a “strong and constructive partnership with Russia” (SC §34) than to steer an
antagonistic course – Russia’s own interpretation of that will become clear soon
enough. The Strategic Concept offers a neat expression of NATO’s mission and
how it seeks to go about it in the years to come.
And yet, a forceful Strategic Concept has not generated a self-conﬁdent Alliance,
and not just because at the same time as strategising NATO had to downsize as well.
The NATO structure will be cut from some 13,000 to some 8,000 personnel. The
much more fundamental reason for the existential unease that marks NATO today
is its loss of centrality. The Strategic Concept contains a number of ambiguities as a
consequence of trying to reconcile two ways of dealing with this loss of centrality:
staying relevant by strengthening the core business, or staying relevant by adding
new business lines.
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The political centre of gravity has shifted
As long as the Cold War lasted it was logical for defence against the vital military
threat to the territorial integrity of the Allies to be high on the political agenda, hence
the centrality of NATO in the multilateral relations of Europe and North America.
Now that there no longer is a vital threat it is equally logical that territorial defence
and the Alliance that organises it have lost that central position; other issues have
risen to the top of the agenda: climate change, energy scarcity, global economic and
ﬁnancial governance, the role of the emerging powers. These are not threats entailing
an immediate risk of violence, but challenges. They cannot be tackled by military
means, but require a mix of diplomatic, economic, technological and other instruments. In short, this is foreign policy – not defence.
The gradual shift of the political centre of gravity away from NATO should not be
resisted. While unpleasant perhaps for NATO, it is in fact a luxury problem: there
are no more vital threats to our territory, hence we can aﬀord to prioritise other issues. NATO is not equipped to deal with those – NATO cannot do foreign policy.
Trying to keep NATO relevant by artiﬁcially forcing all of these issues onto its
agenda is counter-productive, for as the Alliance will not be able to solve them it only
risks being discredited without hope of achieving success. At the same time means
and eﬀorts will be distracted from its core business of territorial defence and crisis
management, which does in fact ensure NATO’s relevance – only in a less central
position than before.
That does not mean that NATO cannot discuss climate change or energy scarcity, but
only in so far as they have implications for security and defence. Nor does it imply
that NATO should not have a dialogue with third states. Obviously, all those that
deploy forces on operations are entitled to “a structural role in shaping strategy and
decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute”. Perhaps NATO might
even “develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organizations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international
relations” (SC §30). As long, that is, as NATO realises that it cannot be the main
forum through which Europeans and Americans channel their relations with states
such as China, India and Brazil, or even Russia.
The simple reason is best expressed in one of NATO’s own buzz phrases: the ‘comprehensive approach’. NATO is a politico-military organisation, which deals with
one dimension of foreign policy only, i.e. security and defence. Responses to global
challenges and relations with third states require a much broader, comprehensive
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approach that encompasses all of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy
and the military. While NATO can contribute, it is not equipped to take the lead.
That is up to the governments of its members, including notably the United States
and those members and non-members that happen to have organised themselves into
the European Union. The US and the EU: these are the true, comprehensive foreign
policy actors in Europe and North America. The EU’s foreign policy institutions were
greatly strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December
2009, and in Lisbon, back-to-back with the NATO Summit, the EU’s new President
of the European Council met with the President of the US for bilateral talks. In an
age where, fortunately, foreign policy challenges outweigh direct security threats, the
EU and the US, and direct consultation between them, logically take centre stage.
Focusing on the ‘hard’ core business
NATO must continue to play a leading role, by contrast, in what constitutes its core
business: ‘hard security’ – both defence against threats to our territory and global
military crisis management. Here lies the strength and the continued relevance of
the Alliance.
If today there are no more vital threats to Alliance territory, it cannot be excluded
that in the long term NATO will again see a major threat arise, or may have to
ward off the consequences of inter-state war between other powers. To that end
Article 5 functions as the ultimate insurance. The call, particularly from East
European allies, to reconfirm Article 5 is understandable and legitimate, hence
the firm statement: “NATO members will always assist each other against attack”
(SC §4). However, the credibility of this commitment is not enhanced by those
who seek to expand the scope of Article 5. What does the reference to ‘emerging
security challenges’ (SC §4) mean? The North Atlantic Treaty is clear: “an armed
attack against one or more […] shall be considered an attack against them all”.
Once one starts to add other types of contingencies than armed attack, such as
energy or cyber security, a grey zone quickly emerges, making it more difficult
to decide what constitutes sufficient grounds to invoke Article 5. For how long
must the gas be cut – a day, a week, a month? How to react to cyber attacks perpetrated by fluid collectives of individuals, some of them underage? Once more
the Alliance will not be kept relevant by trying to imagine military responses to
non-military challenges: energy security, cyber security, even terrorism are best
tackled by a holistic foreign and security policy, including notably the police
and justice dimension, in the framework of which the military instrument is
but a last resort.
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In the absence of a vital threat, it can be doubted too whether missile defence of all
Alliance territory constitutes an indispensable and eﬀective contribution to collective
defence. The actual threat of missile attack seems limited and certainly not markedly
higher than other types of threat that cannot be stopped by missile defence, notably
terrorism, which is currently the only direct threat of violence against our citizens on
Alliance territory. Would not the combination of deterrence and a proactive foreign
policy in cooperation with other powers suﬃce to contain, and ideally come to a
mutual agreement with those states that acquire a signiﬁcant missile capacity? As it is,
the eﬀectiveness of missile defence technology to protect our entire territory remains
very much in doubt, while the ﬁnancial burden will certainly be very heavy. At the
moment though, that will mostly be borne by the US, which will contribute the actual
missile defence capability, while the other allies will fund the required command and
control system for an amount in excess of €700 million over ten years (including
€200 million added in Lisbon to expand protection from troops deployed in theatre
to Allied territory itself ). Their contribution will hopefully remain at this level, for
in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis European allies would better focus their reduced
defence budgets on generating deployable capabilities for crisis management.
If after Afghanistan the appetite to undertake new large-scale operations has surely
diminished, Europe and North America will nevertheless continue to have to engage
in crisis management. For there will be crises in which vital interests are at stake,
interests such as “the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which
international trade, energy security and prosperity depend” (SC §13). Furthermore,
there will sadly be instances of crimes against which Europe and North America have
a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ populations in the context of the collective security
system of the United Nations. Crisis management beyond the North Atlantic area
thus also forms part of NATO’s core business.
However, which organisation Europeans and Americans will act through in which
case cannot be decided beforehand. NATO, the EU’s Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP), the UN – the most suitable framework for military deployment
will have to be selected on a case-by-case basis. On occasions when Europeans and
Americans both want to engage, it will be NATO. But on other occasions Americans
might have other priorities than Europeans, or might already be engaged elsewhere, or
for political reasons NATO might be less welcome in a region. Alternatives are thus
required if we want to be able to act in every contingency and deploy forces in the
quickest and safest manner. The CSDP framework too, therefore, must be completely
operational, including a permanent command and control structure that allows for
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permanently ongoing contingency planning, a smooth planning process in crisis
situations and the conduct of all types of crisis management operations, including
combat missions if necessary. As the NATO command and control structure is being
downsized by no less than 5,000 staﬀ, nations should certainly be able to ﬁnd the
300 or so oﬃcers that would have to be seconded to the EU to that end. At the same
time, a permanent EU capacity would be a lot cheaper for those three EU member
states that presently always have to multinationalise their national headquarters to
run CSDP operations: France, Germany and the UK.
In crisis management too, the primacy of foreign policy is uncontested. The military
end state aimed at by an operation is never an end in itself, but a step towards a comprehensive political end state. That is decided upon by the foreign policy actors: the
governments and, when the European governments work in concert (which ought
always to be the case), the EU. Regardless of the framework in which European
troops are deployed – NATO, CSDP or the UN – Europeans discuss the wider
foreign policy objectives in the EU framework. That is the case for Lebanon e.g.,
in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, even though the 8,000
European soldiers are there as Blue Helmets, under UN command. It is the case for
Kosovo, where European military are deployed under the NATO ﬂag. And it ought
to be the case much more for Afghanistan, if Europeans want to have an impact on
strategy towards the country and the region.
Crisis management requires capabilities. At the summit NATO adopted the Lisbon
Capability Package, ﬁxing the funding for a number of multinational projects. The
boots on the ground however have to be provided by the nations. European allies
are still struggling to improve the eﬃciency of their defence eﬀort: their combined
defence budgets ought to generate much more deployable capabilities. But they do
not, because in reality they are not combined – the problem of European defence is
fragmentation. The answer is integration: a combination of specialisation, pooling of
eﬀorts, and doing away with redundant assets. The answer, furthermore, is Europe: such
integration has to, and can only, take place among Europeans – the US has no need
to pool its military. Hence CSDP is the platform from which to launch a stepped-up
European defence eﬀort. On 9 December 2010 the Ministers of Defence of the EU
agreed on the so-called Ghent Framework, referring to their earlier informal meeting in that city in September. Each EU member state will analyse its capabilities in
order to identify: (1) those it will maintain on a national level; (2) those to which it
will contribute through pooling with other member states; and (3) those to which it
will no longer contribute, relying on specialisation and role sharing between member
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states. If done in a permanent and structured manner, such a process will lead to true
cooperation – as envisaged by Permanent Structured Cooperation, the new defence
mechanism in the Lisbon Treaty. The end result will beneﬁt everybody: more eﬀective forces, no matter how integrated, will be available for national as well as CSDP,
NATO and UN operations.

Avoid ‘soft’ branching-out
Crisis management is not exclusively military. In Lisbon, NATO decided to create
“an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability” in order “to interface more eﬀectively with civilian partners”, but it “may also be used to plan, employ
and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those
responsibilities and tasks to other actors” (SC §25). Undoubtedly this ‘interface’ is
highly necessary. An arrangement is needed that, whenever NATO is chosen as the
framework for a military operation, allows from the very start for the involvement
in NATO planning of whichever actor will take charge of the political, social and
economic tasks, be it the EU or the UN. These can then implement those tasks in
full coordination with the military – but under their own command. Once more,
the primacy of foreign policy must be recognised. The highest political authority,
which will set the comprehensive foreign policy strategy towards the country concerned, will always lie outside NATO, with the US and the EU and, utimately, with
the UN. It is not up to NATO to command the various civilian dimensions of this
comprehensive strategy.
The added value of creating a NATO capacity to ‘plan, employ and coordinate’
civilian tasks is doubtful therefore. Certain civilian tasks will in any case have to be
implemented from the start, simultaneously with military operations. That civilian
capacity will in any case have to be provided by nations (e.g. police, gendarmerie, civil
protection), by other international organisations (notably various UN agencies), and
by NGOs, and will in any case require military protection. Building a NATO ‘civilian HQ’ would duplicate existing civilian command and control structures, notably
the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity (CPCC), without adding more
capability. More importantly, this would be a useless duplication, for even if initially
NATO itself would conduct some civilian tasks, eventually the other actors will always
need to come in – certainly the Alliance will not create a development policy, a trade
policy etc. Better then to leave the short term (i.e. civilian crisis management in its
strictest sense) and the long-term civilian dimension in the same hands. Nor would
it be very useful then to “identify and train civilian specialists from member states”
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(SC §25). A plethora of national, EU and UN courses for civilian crisis management
already exist. The problem is not how to train policemen, judges etc. for deployment
abroad – the issue is where to ﬁnd them.

Conclusion
NATO remains the forum where Europe and North America organise their collective
defence and it remains one of the key actors through which they do crisis management and cooperative security. Those are the three ‘essential core tasks’ deﬁned by
the New Strategic Concept (§4). The more capable NATO will be of implementing
those security and defence tasks, the more relevant it will be. Attempts to broaden
NATO’s agenda beyond those core tasks and move into civilian crisis management
and even into foreign policy cannot achieve success, for the Alliance is an alliance,
not a foreign policy actor. Instead, such distractions will only serve to undermine the
core tasks and thus to question NATO’s relevance. What this artiﬁcial broadening
of the agenda will not do is bring back the centrality that NATO enjoyed during
the Cold War. Fortunately – for to put it simply the fact that today the agenda of
Europe and North America is no longer dominated by a vital threat to their territory
is a good thing.
NATO’s loss of centrality does not aﬀect the transatlantic relationship, however, for
we should not make the mistake of equating transatlantic relations with NATO alone.
Logically, if defence is no longer the main concern, the main debate moves elsewhere,
particularly to the direct EU–US relationship. That transatlantic link, between the
two fully-ﬂedged foreign policy actors, needs to be deepened and operationalised.
Within such a fundamental political partnership NATO remains a key asset, the
executive organisation that Europeans and Americans use when they need to act
together in the military ﬁeld. Let us hope that an eﬀective foreign policy can limit
those occasions as much as possible.
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PART 4
Military Operations and
Challenges
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11. Testing Times: NATO War-Making in Afghanistan
and Beyond
Theo Farrell

The hard experience of war in Afghanistan has not put NATO oﬀ going global.
On the contrary, the New Strategic Concept deepens NATO’s commitment to its
global security role. So it is an opportune time to ask: how has NATO performed
in Afghanistan, and what does this tell us about NATO’s ability to ﬁght future
wars?

Bosnia all over again?
Why back to the Balkans? In 1992, Bosnia presented the Western allies with a new
strategic challenge, namely managing the humanitarian and geostrategic consequences
of dramatic state failure. Bosnia also presented NATO militaries with a range of new
operational challenges, especially protecting civilians in the midst of war, and working with a bewildering array of civilian partners in the operational space. In other
words Bosnia provided a window into the wars of a post Cold War era that would
involve the liberal West.
Of course, Bosnia was not a NATO mission. Bosnia was Europe’s mess to sort out, and
Europe’s chance to prove itself as a strategic player. Bosnia quickly became the source
and site of divisions between American and Europe. The new Clinton administration wanted more muscular action on Bosnia but was unable to commit American
ground forces because the US military was preoccupied in Somalia up to September
1993, and thereafter with the consequences of the collapse of the Somalia mission.
The Europeans wanted a more modest mission focused on support to aid operations.
Thus, the Western forces that went into Bosnia were too small to do much. Too small
even to protect the civilian population, as tragically demonstrated by the failure of
Dutch forces to stop Serb forces from entering Srebrenica and slaughtering the male
population. It took three years for the Americans and Europeans to agree on a common and coherent strategy, which was essentially to broker a coalition between the
Croats and Muslims, and back them against the Serbs.
In short, Bosnia gave the Western allies plenty of warning on the kind of challenges it
would face across the world in Afghanistan. Bosnia was characterised by transatlantic
disunity of purpose and eﬀort, and by a small force that was grossly inadequate for
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the task and not prepared for its primary mission: to protect the population from
the worst eﬀects of the war. Ten years on, was NATO any better prepared? Did the
Western allies do a better job of it?

Saving states
NATO was prepared at the most basic level of understanding why it was in Afghanistan.
The 1990s saw western states ﬁght a series of humanitarian ‘wars of choice’ – Bosnia,
Somalia, Kosovo, and East Timor. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Iraq
contained from 1991, surplus western military power was available for humanitarian
use. At the same time, the west could pick and choose when to project that power.
9/11 changed everything. State failure and murderous regimes, even in the farthest
reaches of the world, were no longer merely humanitarian challenges. Ill-governed
spaces were launch pads for transnational terrorist attacks. 9/11 was a wake-up call for
the west: it could no longer aﬀord to ignore the most miserable parts of the world.
This, in turn, created a new logic for western military intervention. Unlike the 1990s,
when intervention followed a humanitarian logic of selective and often minimal commitment, post 9/11 western military intervention would follow a national security
logic. The purpose is not to ‘save strangers’ but to save states – to stop terrorists from
setting up shop in failing states. This is the logic underpinning the NATO eﬀort in
Afghanistan. NATO is clear: it is not waging war to make life better for Afghans, but
to secure the country against the return of the Taliban and their erstwhile Al Qaeda
allies. NATO’s New Strategic Concept aﬃrms the place of this logic in Alliance
thinking, in recognising the importance of state building, and of stabilising states
beyond Europe through strategic engagement and partnership.

The emerging character of conﬂict
Was NATO prepared in terms of understanding the character of the wars it
faced in the post 9/11 world? Scholars, statesmen and soldiers spent much of the
1990s trying to figure out the character of the ‘new wars’ that were demanding so
much western attention. These wars were seen as new in that they were fuelled
by a lethal mix of greed and grievance rather than driven by a clash of national
interests, and were waged by irregular armed groups within and across state
borders, rather than between states by their professional militaries. Of course,
wars of this character are not really new, they have raged across history. But the
emphasis on irregular war is new after two centuries of western preoccupation
with major state-on-state war.
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Last year the British Ministry of Defence produced a major study on ‘the Future
Character of War’ (FCOC), which informed the 2010 British Security and Strategic Defence Review.1 Much that is in the FCOC is recognisable from the ‘new
wars’ of the 1990s. Hence, the new British Chief of the Defence Staﬀ, Gen. Sir
David Richards, prefers the expression ‘the emerging character of war.’ Whilst
immensely complex in actuality, the emerging character of conﬂict can be boiled
down to three concepts.
The ﬁrst is ‘3 Block War’. The Commandant of the US Marine Corps, Gen. Charles
Krulak, minted this concept in order to capture the complexity of tasks for western
forces engaged in stabilising states. The basic idea is that a marine unit must be prepared to simultaneously undertake a variety of operations – humanitarian assistance,
peacekeeping, and war-ﬁghting – all within an area of operations that is the size of
three city blocks. Crucially, this concept highlights the need for intervention forces
to be able to ﬁght, even if deployed on a humanitarian mission.
The second concept, coined by retired British Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith, is ‘war among
the people’. Of course, throughout history war has often gone on around and in
populated areas. But the new wars are waged in populated areas to a greater degree
than in the past. The ‘battleﬁelds’ of these wars are simply cluttered with civilians and
their objects. Populations are also often the target of the warring sides in new wars,
to be exploited and coerced or, in the extreme, to be terrorised and slaughtered. In
writing about new wars Smith was reﬂecting on his experience as the commander
of the UN force in Bosnia in 1995. This led him to emphasise another aspect of
such wars among the people, namely the glare of the world’s media. Hence, he notes
wryly, one may speak of the ‘theatre of war’ in two senses – the conventional military
sense of the overall area of operations, but also in the more real sense that new wars
are played to audiences. Today’s wars involving western forces are invariably waged
in media-rich environments and attract the attention of multiple audiences: local,
regional, home, and international.2
The third concept emerged in the mid-to-late 2000s and, in particular, from the lessons of the Israeli war against Hezbollah in 2006. When the Israeli Defence Forces
(IDF) launched an oﬀensive against Hezbollah, they were prepared to ﬁght against
an irregular opponent. Hezbollah put up a largely conventional defence, involving
fortiﬁcations and combined arms operations, and some surprisingly high-end capabilities including a missile attack on an Israeli warship. In essence, the IDF quickly
became drawn into a conventional war but were slow to realise this, and slow to
117

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

respond appropriately. The 2006 Lebanon War showed the dangers of underestimating irregular opponents: technologically enabled, irregular opponents are able to
present conventional threats. The lessons is that western militaries must be prepared
for ‘hybrid warfare’, that is wars against opponents able to mix unconventional with
conventional modes, means and methods of war in order to exploit vulnerabilities
in western intervention forces.3
In Afghanistan NATO ﬁnds itself engaged in a war that requires forces to support
humanitarian operations and engage in combat operations at the same time and in
the same operational space. In other words, to win hearts and minds NATO forces
must be prepared to start rebuilding within hours of clearing insurgents out of an
area. This is war among the people. Indeed, the key terrain on which NATO is focusing the ﬁght is precisely where people are concentrated. This is also a war that is
being conducted under the close watch of the world’s media. Finally, in this war the
opponent is waging a hybrid campaign, mixing conventional and unconventional
tactics and capabilities. Indeed, it is hybrid in an even deeper sense in that behind the
shield of its military campaign, the Taliban has sought to build a shadow government
to threaten the very functions of the Afghan state.

NATO’s strategic performance
So how has NATO done in Afghanistan? We may keep two scorecards on this – one
on NATO’s performance at the strategic level, and the other on NATO’s performance in operations.
As a global security actor NATO is a provider of military capability. Here we obviously need to distinguish between the US eﬀort and the NATO eﬀort in Afghanistan.
In brief, NATO stepped in when the United States became distracted by Iraq. Even
before the coalition had conquered Afghanistan in 2002, US Central Command
was turning its attention to preparing for the 2003 war against Iraq. NATO took
charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003, then conﬁned
to protecting Kabul. Hence NATO took responsibility for the whole of Afghanistan
when ISAF expanded in stages to the north, west, south and east over 2005–06.
ISAF encountered ﬁerce resistance from insurgents when it pushed into the south
and east. And here NATO held the line, especially the British, Canadians, Dutch
and Danish in the south, as well as the Americans in the east. In sum, for all the criticisms of the scale of European military eﬀort – that it did not match US force uplift
under President Obama, and the caveats that prevent full use of German, Italian and
118

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

Spanish forces in the north and west – NATO held the insurgents in place while
America was focused on Iraq.
On the downside, NATO has been a passive strategic actor. NATO has a political–military plan for Afghanistan. But in terms of strategy, it takes its lead from the
United States. The transition strategy for Afghanistan has been deﬁned by the United
States. Formally, the Afghan government determined the end date for transition to
Afghan security lead. In reality the transition process, conditions and timetable will be
deﬁned by the Obama administration with guidance from the American-dominated
command in Kabul. Many European states – Britain and Denmark included – lack
a proper national strategy for Afghanistan, deﬁning national interests and purpose
in the war, and matching resources to these.4 So perhaps it is not so surprising that
NATO lacks a proper strategy and follows America’s lead.
A related problem is NATO’s failure to fashion a credible strategic narrative to explain
to NATO’s publics, as well as to Afghan and regional publics, why NATO is ﬁghting in Afghanistan. Most Afghans are mystiﬁed by the western states’ involvement
in Afghanistan.5 Theories abound. A favourite is that the West wants to get hold of
Afghanistan’s rich deposits of strategic minerals. European publics are little more
convinced by the war, if declining support for the war is anything to go by. Certainly
the British government has failed over a number of years to come up with a compelling
storyline. The claim that Britain is ﬁghting in Afghanistan to keep terrorists oﬀ the
streets of Birmingham is widely ridiculed. And yet, the counter-terrorism mission is
widely accepted in the United States. This suggests the scale of the challenge facing
NATO. It is unlikely that one strategic narrative can be made to ﬁt all member states.
And yet, NATO needs a common account of what it is doing in Afghanistan and
why, in order to avoid 28 national narratives, which risk contradicting each other.

NATO’s operational performance
If NATO has largely failed as a strategic actor in Afghanistan, it has got better at
operations. From 2005–2009 there was poor unity of eﬀort and poor practice in
terms of counterinsurgency (COIN). When Gen. Stanley McChrystal took command of the campaign in the summer of 2009 he found ISAF waging not one war
but ﬁve, with each regional command doing its own thing. Indeed, unity of eﬀort
was poor even within many regional commands. For instance, RC-South did little
more than dish out assets not held at the national task force level, such as air power
and the regional battlegroup. It did not command, in the proper sense, the American,
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British, Canadian and Dutch task forces in its sector, nor did it have an overall plan
for Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan. McChrystal imposed unity of command on
the campaign, principally through a new three star headquarters – ISAF Joint Command – that was speciﬁcally tasked with managing the conduct of the war. Through
this, ISAF has achieved improved unity of eﬀort. This is most clearly seen in the
designation of Helmand and Kandahar as campaign ‘main eﬀort’ and, to this end,
the concentration of forces in the south (see table 1).
Table 1. ISAF force levels by regional command6
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NATO forces have also got better in their approach to COIN. Here too, McChrystal
deserves most credit. When he took over McChrystal discovered a campaign that
had stalled. His initial assessment, delivered to Secretary of Defence Robert Gates in
August, was that “the overall situation is deteriorating”; that ISAF faced “a resilient
and growing insurgency” and “a crisis of conﬁdence among Afghans”.7 Accordingly,
McChrystal set out to ‘redeﬁne the ﬁght’. Under its previous US commander, General
David McKiernan, ISAF was focused on defeating the insurgency, and this resulted
in a fairly conventional military campaign. McChrystal brought the campaign back
to classic COIN principles. He understood that the conﬂict was essentially a political
struggle rather than a purely military one. The greatest threat to stability in Afghanistan was not from insurgent violence but from insurgent shadow government, as well
as local power struggles. McChrystal concluded that the key to eventual success in
the campaign was to demonstrate to the Afghan people that their government could
protect and provide for them. He declared that “ISAF’s center of gravity is the will
and ability to provide for the needs of the population ‘by, with and through’ the
Afghan government”.8
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McChrystal brought in a whole new approach to operations, which he dubbed
‘population-centric COIN.’ The aim was to ‘connect with the people’, in order
to build relationships with Afghan partners and the local population.9 Population-centric COIN involved two new operational priorities. First and foremost
was for ISAF to ‘protect the population’ from violence, intimidation and corruption. The second imperative was to accelerate ANSF development and ownership of Afghan security through ‘embedded partnership’ of ISAF with ANSF.
Both measures would enable ISAF to forge better relationships with Afghan
stakeholders. Tactically this required ISAF forces to assume more tactical risk
by getting out of forward operating bases and armoured vehicles, and getting
closer to Afghans.
McChrystal was able to drive ‘population-centric COIN’ down into ISAF. A key
priority in protecting the population was protecting civilians from misdirected ISAF
force. A new culture of restraint, especially in the use of NATO air power, has ensured
that civilian casualties did not rise over 2009 and into the ﬁrst half of 2010, even
though there was a major increase in the tempo of ISAF operations. All ISAF ﬁeld
commands practice embedded partnering with Afghan security forces with varying
degrees of success. For instance, in a major operation to clear insurgent strongholds
in central Helmand in early 2010, partnering between ISAF and ANA worked better
in planning than in operations, and was more extensive with the British in northern
Nad-e-Ali than with the US Marines in Marjah. Embedded partnering is especially
important in the context of an army that is growing rapidly with some risk to force
quality; indeed, the basic training regime was reduced from ten to eight weeks in
order to speed up army growth. The Afghan National Police (ANP) is also growing
fast and is in even worse condition in terms of corruption, drug abuse, poor discipline,
and ethnic tensions within the force. And yet the ANP are even more important
than the ANA to NATO’s transition strategy for Afghanistan, because ultimately
it is the ANP that will be responsible for holding ground that has been cleared of
insurgents by the army. In 2009 ISAF was focused on partnering with the ANA. In
2010 all regional commands now recognise the imperative to partner with ANP to
improve them in the ﬁeld.
Of course, there is still variation in roles and performance by individual NATO
militaries in the ﬁeld. The Germans in RC-North are still hindered by national caveats in their ability to get out and about on the ground. The Italians and Spanish in
RC-West lack the capabilities to take the ﬁght to the insurgents. But ISAF has got
around this by deploying US task forces into these regions to undertake those parts
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of the mission that European militaries are unable to perform. Thus American special
operations forces have been hunting down insurgents in the North and the West with
considerable success. Indeed, across the whole theatre, coalition special forces are
operating at three to four times the tempo than they did in Iraq in 2005–2006. Over
a 90-day period up to early November 2010 ISAF special forces killed or captured
over 3000 insurgents.
The Chief of the British Defence Staﬀ, Gen. Sir David Richards, recently told the
House of Commons Defence Committee that the insurgents are ‘getting hammered’ in Afghanistan. And so it would seem, especially in the South. From late
2009 to mid 2010 ISAF cleared insurgents from key areas in the south and centre
of Helmand. In designating Helmand as ISAF ‘main eﬀort’, McChrystal hoped to
inﬂict a ‘strategic defeat’ on the Taliban. This has happened, though it has taken
longer than McChrystal hoped. ISAF has now turned its attention to Kandahar
city and the surrounding districts of Damn, Arghandab, Panjwaye and Zhari. The
insurgents have been cleared from Damn and Arghandab. A tough ﬁght continues in Panjwaye and Zhari. Reports suggest a dramatic improvement in security
in Kandahar city in October 2010. However, the sustainability of these gains in
Kandahar province is unclear, especially as the clearout was helped by an earlier
than usual migration of foreign ﬁghters back to Pakistan, as customarily happens
at the end of the ﬁghting season. One presumes these ﬁghters will return when the
ﬁghting season resumes.10

After Afghanistan
Afghanistan has tested NATO to its limits – politically, militarily and geographically.
How has NATO performed? In some respects it has done pretty well. NATO held
the line in Afghanistan when the United States was preoccupied elsewhere. And
even though the United States now is fully engaged, NATO continues to deliver
signiﬁcant command, combat, logistical and training capabilities for the war eﬀort.
A war that lacked unity and was too conventionally focussed has been corrected.
Improved unity of eﬀort and better counterinsurgency practice came with a new
American commander. NATO commands and forces in theatre have rolled under
this revived American eﬀort.
NATO has done poorly in other respects. In comparison to the United States,
the European allies have generated far less military capability, in relative as well as
absolute terms. Britain has done best, with 10,000 troops in Afghanistan in 2010.
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Economies and militaries of comparable size, France and Germany, have deployed
far fewer troops: France has sent around 3,800 and Germany about 4,300. In addition, many European militaries have sent far less capable, as well as smaller, task
forces. For instance, the Italian force of almost 3,700 in Regional Command-West
lacks the capability to clear routes of explosives. Finally, some European states have
imposed national caveats on what their forces may be asked to do. Thus, German
forces may not be deployed outside of Regional Command-North, and face restrictions on operating at night. As noted above, ISAF has mediated these operational
limitations by deploying more capable US units to augment European forces in
the North and the West.
NATO’s main failure in Afghanistan has been as a strategic actor, independent of the
United States. NATO eﬀectively follows American strategy for Afghanistan. Unlike,
NATO’s Kosovo War, where Britain took the lead, this war is entirely American
led. Any major change in strategy originates from Washington D.C. Hence, the
war was allowed to drift from 2002–2005, during America’s Iraq adventure. The
insurgents were allowed to regenerate in the South and East, embryonic moves by
some insurgents to reconcile were ignored, Afghan government corruption was
left to fester, and nobody got a grip of a failing military campaign. It took a change
in leadership in the United States to reset the strategy. NATO has also failed to
fashion a compelling strategic narrative for the war to explain to its publics why
the war is necessary.
What of the future then? Afghanistan is indeed a window into the future for NATO.
Future wars will have many of the characteristics of Afghanistan. NATO will be
called upon again to stabilise failing states, and to secure their populations. NATO
forces will ﬁnd themselves conducting combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations in the same areas of operation. NATO will struggle to bring decisive
force to bear on irregular armed opponents. At the same time, thanks to increasingly porous borders in most unstable regions in the world, irregular opponents
will be able to acquire conventional capabilities. In short, NATO will have to be
ready to ﬁght but will likely ﬁnd ﬁghting to be a frustrating experience. Overall,
future wars are unlikely to be resolvable militarily. Rather military force will be
required to create the space for a political solution. Rebuilding state institutions,
especially security forces, will be central to this. All of this will unfold under the
world’s gaze. Indeed, strategic communications is likely to increase in importance
and complexity, thanks to the information revolution and the diversiﬁcation of
news media.
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As it happens, NATO is transforming itself for the wars of the future. This programme
of transformation has its origins in a high-tech American vision of warfare involving
information-empowered, networked, modular forces, generating precise eﬀects in
the battle space. Afghanistan has challenged this vision. Information technologies
(IT) – crucially UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and networks – have increased the
situation awareness of friendly forces, but not in the way and to the extent required.
In short, IT can light up a conventional battleﬁeld, but less so the civilian-populated
counterinsurgency space. The bottom line is that counterinsurgency wars are far more
human-centric than techno-centric.
The American vision of military transformation has also brought in a new military
doctrine of eﬀects-based operations (EBO), which involves scientiﬁc modelling of
how military capabilities may generate precise eﬀects. EBO has also been challenged in
Afghanistan and Iraq: both have revealed the true nature of war to be chaotic, impossible to predict, and involving a mix of rationality, passion and chance.11 The Europeans
have always been more sceptical about modelling warfare. Their version of EBO has
focused more on the importance of civil–military cooperation in counterinsurgency
– what they call the ‘Comprehensive Approach.’ Progress on this has been slow in
Afghanistan. Civil–military cooperation remains dogged by considerable disunity
of eﬀort. The main vehicles for the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan – the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) – do not even follow a NATO template,
let alone NATO strategy and instruction. Instead they have been set up by individual
NATO members; they vary greatly in size, formation and capability, and they follow
national guidance and instruction.
In short, NATO has much to learn from Afghanistan, and indeed much to improve
in Afghanistan. History reveals that states and militaries do learn from war, and get
better at the business of war making. But Afghanistan has been a very diﬀerent war for
diﬀerent NATO members. For those in the East and South – the Americans, British,
Canadians, Danish, Dutch and French – it has been a high-intensity counterinsurgency
war. For those in the North and West – the Germans, Italians, Norwegians, Polish,
Swedes and Spanish – this has been more akin to a tough peacekeeping mission. The
risk, therefore, is that diﬀerent NATO members and their militaries will draw very
diﬀerent lessons from Afghanistan about the character of future wars, and what the
Alliance needs to do to prepare for them.12
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12. The Strategic Concept and NATO’s Command
Structure: Shifting Gears?
Paal Sigurd Hilde

There is little room for big surprises in a consensus-based strategic concept, nor is
such a document intended to bring any. One expected adjustment to NATO’s declared priorities in the 2010 Lisbon Strategic Concept was a rebalancing of emphasis
between crisis response operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area (referred to here
as ‘out-of-area’), and attention to Article 5, collective defence and challenges in
NATO territory and at its periphery (referred to as ‘in-area’).1 Most of the previous
decade was marked by an increasing and, from about 2005, almost exclusive focus
in NATO on ISAF and other out-of-area operations. The emergence, particularly
from 2007, of a renewed, often bluntly expressed self-conﬁdence in Russia’s foreign
and security policy saw, however, several NATO members call for more attention in
NATO to potential challenges ‘at home’. After the Russian intervention in Georgia
in August 2008, consensus quickly emerged on the need to emphasise in-area ‘visible assurance’.
In line with the recommendations of the NATO Group of Experts, the New Strategic
Concept on the one hand emphasises and develops NATO’s role in out-of-area operations, for instance by stressing the need for a ‘comprehensive political, civilian and
military approach’ to crisis management.2 On the other, it places ‘collective defence’
as the ﬁrst of three core tasks (deterrence and defence came third in 1999) and stresses
that the conventional threat (against NATO territory) cannot be ignored.3
The New Concept has been described as ‘a mercifully short, very plausible, and eminently readable document’.4 To a large part it achieves brevity by shifting into other
documents, notably a new Political Guidance document due in March 2011. Most of
the more detailed guidelines for NATO forces are found in Part IV of both the 1991
and 1999 concepts. The new concept thus gives limited insight into how NATO is
going to implement the new balance in practice. The Lisbon Summit Declaration
gives some more pointers. Notably, it states “We have agreed on a framework for a
new NATO Command Structure, which will be […] better able to deploy on operations, including Article 5 contingencies and providing visible assurance”.5
The NATO Command Structure (NCS) indeed stands at the heart of measures to
confer substance to NATO’s new balance. It has also done so in the Alliance’s visible
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assurance eﬀorts during the last two years, notably in terms of contingency planning.
The Lisbon reforms shift the trend towards ever-greater emphasis on out-of-area
operations that has marked the evolution of the Command Structure after the end of
the Cold War. The NCS has never fully disengaged from in-area tasks. Commanding
air policing, including the Baltic air policing mission, is just one example. However,
the NCS’s overall focus has, over the last two decades, clearly and increasingly shifted
towards out-of-area operations.
However, another goal has been even more important than NATO’s out-of-area
ambitions in driving the latest round of command structure reforms: cost cutting.
With defence budget cuts in most NATO countries, common funded budgets in
NATO have also come under pressure with expenditures on the command structure a
prime target. This strong emphasis on reducing the cost – the size – of the command
structure begs the question to what extent extensive cuts are compatible with giving
the NCS a range of new, or renewed, tasks.
The aim of this chapter is ﬁrst to very brieﬂy describe the process that led up to
reemphasis on visible assurance in the New Strategic Concept and examine in some
detail the latest rounds of NCS reform. Based on this, the chapter will attempt to
assess the degree to which the command structure reform strengthens or weakens
NATO’s ability to fulﬁl the rebalanced set of objectives in ‘Active Engagement,
Modern Defence’. Does the current NCS reform entail a change in emphasis, a
shift in gears, consistent with rebalancing? The chapter will thus not only aim to
contextualise the guidance given in the Lisbon Strategic Concept, but also highlight an issue that deserves increased attention: the operationalisation of strategic
level decisions in NATO.

Visible assurance
With the price of oil surging in the mid 2000s and peaking in summer 2008,
Vladimir Putin’s Russia gained ﬁnancial solidity. This solidity again spurred
self-conﬁdence in Russian foreign and security policy. 2007 marked a turning
point and saw a number of expressions of the new, forward leaning Russia. These
included Putin’s famous speech at the Munich Security Conference, a Russian
moratorium on its CFE commitments, a surge in ﬂights by Russian strategic
bombers, a cyber attack on Estonia with suspected oﬃcial Russian involvement,
and a highly publicised ﬂag planting on the sea ﬂoor below the North Pole. With
NATO almost singularly focused on Afghanistan, calls emerged for renewed atten127
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tion in NATO to security challenges closer to home, for both security and wider
political reasons. At the ﬁrst ministerial meeting after the August 2008 Russian
intervention in Georgia, the informal defence ministers’ meeting in London in
September 2008, several members called for active and visible measures. Suggestions included tasking the NATO Response Force with Article 5 deployments
and initiating contingency defence planning for the Baltic States. 6 Both these
measures were later adopted. A further set of concrete proposals was focused on
the NATO Command Structure. In a non-paper titled Strengthening NATO
– Raising its proﬁle and ensuring its relevance, Norway suggested several measures that, importantly but not only, would increase the NCS’ ability to react to
in-area challenges.7 Two concrete proposals were central: the reintroduction of
an in-area geographic focus for NATO’s operational level headquarters, the Joint
Force Commands ( JFCs), and the development of relations between JFCs and
national, joint headquarters.
The size constraints of this chapter do not allow a closer look at what factors were
important in the rapid emergence of consensus on a more visible, in-area proﬁle for
NATO. What is signiﬁcant from the perspective of this paper is that that the two
abovementioned, concrete measures proposed by the Norwegian non-paper were
adopted and are speciﬁcally referred to in the Lisbon Summit Declaration.8 While
details remain to be decided, the two measures thus form a core part of the decision
to rebalance the focus of the NCS. Consequently, they also stand at the core of the
overall NATO ‘in-area – out-of-area’ rebalancing act.

The evolution of the NCS
The NCS has changed fundamentally over the past 20 years. Just one expression of
this is that the Peacetime Establishment (PE) – the total number of positions in
the Command Structure – has been reduced from about 24,500 in the late 1980s,
to about 13,900 in 2010.9 Political aspirations, military requirements (including
new technologies), and cost cutting have all been important in shaping the NCS’s
post Cold War evolution. The reform agreed at the Lisbon Summit constitutes
the fourth major NCS reform since the end of the Cold War. The previous ones
took place in 1991–92, 1994–97 and 2002–03. In addition, there were smaller,
but signiﬁcant adaptations between these. The adoption of two diﬀerent concepts
aimed to make the NCS more deployable, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)
in 1994 and the Deployable Joint Staﬀ Elements (DJSE) in 2008, are the two most
important.
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Reform in the 1990s and the Prague watershed
The ﬁrst two rounds of post Cold War reforms were clearly marked by the gradual
adaptation of NATO to the new security situation in Europe. A new, streamlined
command structure, ‘adapted to the new environment’, was adopted in the wake
of the 1991 Alliance’s Strategic Concept. 10 Before it was implemented in 1994,
however, it was evident that the reforms were inadequate. They reduced the size of
a command structure still geared towards a Cold War threat that no longer existed.
Even more importantly, NATO had from 1992 gradually committed itself to supporting peacekeeping operations, as well as to building a European security and defence
identity. In January 1994, the Brussels Summit launched a more substantial revision
of the NCS. At the core of measures to increase ﬂexibility and capability stood the
CJTF concept.11 CJTF was to provide NATO with a deployable HQ capability
that would not only enable it to deploy headquarters to crisis response operations,
but also to make command and control capability available for EU-led operations.
Agreement on details proved very hard, however. A breakthrough came at a North
Atlantic Council (NAC) ministerial meeting in Berlin on 3 June 1996; later forming the basis for the Berlin Plus arrangement.12 Full agreement on a new command
structure was only reached in 1997.13
The signiﬁcance of the 1994–97 reforms, which were fully implemented in March
2000, lay in a clear reorientation on several levels. Most importantly, the nature of
the main challenges NATO was seen to face in or close to the Euro-Atlantic region
was such that it blurred the purely military distinction between non-Article 5 and
Article 5 crisis response operations.14 Consequently the emphasis in the CJTF concept
on ﬂexibility and ‘jointness’, which was implemented in the new structure, was also
applied to static, sub-regional commands.
While the 1997 reforms represented a change in emphasis, the third round of reforms
following the 2002 Prague Summit represented a watershed. Apart from the new
direction set by the 1999 Strategic Concept, the key driver behind the rapid and
radical reform were the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001.15 Out-of-area now
became the key task. An important expression of this was that on the operational
level, former regional commands were no longer given a speciﬁc in-area geographic
ﬁeld of responsibility. The new structure saw the creation of a single strategic command for operations, Allied Command Operations (ACO), and a strategic functional
command, Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Within ACO the two former
regional commands were redesignated Joint Force Commands (JFCs). A third, smaller,
Joint Headquarters was established in Lisbon. The operational level HQs were to be
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ﬂexible and generic, and thus able to assume command of a NATO, or EU, operation
anywhere. Finally, the number of tactical level commands was cut drastically. Only
three single service component commands remained for each of the two JFCs. The
overall structure adopted in June 2003 will remain in place until the Lisbon reforms
are implemented. Not long after 2003, however, pressure again mounted for further
reform. Several factors played a role. One was the guidance given by the Senior Ofﬁcials Group (SOG) appointed by the Prague Summit to establish consensus on a
new NCS. In its June 2003 report the group of senior representatives from all member
states set the ambitious target of a 30% cut in NCS personnel numbers.16 This aim
became a leitmotif of the 2006–09 Peacetime Establishment Review.
At least as important was that NATO’s Level of Ambition was changed in the 2006
version of Ministerial Guidance (MG 06), which gives political guidance for NATO
defence planning. The previous (2003) version had established that NATO should
be able to conduct three concurrent, major, joint operations. In 2006 the Level of
Ambition was changed to two major and six small joint operations. Moreover, in
line with the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), which stated that,
“Large scale conventional aggression against the Alliance will continue to be highly
unlikely” (note the phrasing ‘large scale’), Article 5 operations were reduced compared
to previous MG documents.17 Finally, whereas the 1999 Strategic Concept refers
to out-of-area operations mainly in a Euro-Atlantic context, CPG takes a global
perspective. Focus thus changed both from a few large to several smaller operations
and from mainly in-area or close to it, to strategic distance. This had signiﬁcant
implications for the NCS.

The 2006–2009 Peacetime Establishment Review
The same June 2006 meeting of defence ministers that approved Ministerial Guidance
2006 also endorsed the start of a new, major Peacetime Establishment review. The
review was to cover the NCS and the new NATO Communication and Information
Systems Services Agency (NCSA) established in 2004. It was to be based on the
guidance given in CPG and MG 06 and thus be geared towards enhancing NATO’s
ability to conduct out-of-area operations. Moreover, it was to make the NCS and
NCSA more aﬀordable. The review was to have two phases: phase 1 would cover
mission, tasks and roles, and phase 2 the manpower requirements.
NATO Command Structure 2010, diagramAt least some member states and senior
NATO oﬃcials sought to make the PE review into a larger reform. The 2002–03
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reforms saw the closing of a number of major headquarters, but many saw room for
further cuts, particularly in ACO. This was not to succeed due to a traditional obstacle
in command structure reforms: geographic footprint. The insistence of many member
states on having a NATO HQ on their territory has been a persistent factor shaping
the Command Structure throughout its history. It was also the most important obstacle to more radical reform in the 1990s. In 2006–07 such opposition prevented the
Military Committee from reaching consensus on a comprehensive reform package.
New guidance from the NAC in July 2007 ended any hope of substantial reform as
it held that neither the geographical footprint, nor the status of existing commands
could be touched.
While much more limited in scope than some had hoped, the completion of phase
1 in September 2007 nevertheless saw a number of changes to the NCS. Two were
particularly signiﬁcant. First, the name and status of Joint HQ Lisbon was changed
to JFC Lisbon to reﬂect that, though smaller, it basically had the same tasks as the
two other JFCs. Secondly, and more importantly, phase 1 introduced the Deployable Joint Staﬀ Elements concept. In many ways the DJSE was a reﬁnement of a
modiﬁed CJTF concept developed for the NATO Response Force (termed Deployable Joint Task Force, DJTF). The core idea was to ﬁeld a small, easily deployable,
forward HQ that would remain closely linked to a JFC, enabling the JFC to lead
crisis response operations in situ.18 In February 2009 the recommendations of
phase 2 were ﬁnally endorsed by the NAC. While substantially smaller in terms of
personnel, the recommended structure was not cheaper to run. Individual member
states have to cover the cost of their own oﬃcers working in NATO commands.
Thus, a reduction in the PE hardly reduces NATO’s expenditures, only the member states’. While the latter was an important aim, so was a reduction in common
funded expenditures. Given that no headquarters could be closed, and that the
establishment of six DJSEs required investments and additional civilian technicians (who are paid by NATO, not member states), the new NCS became more
expensive. With a global ﬁnancial crisis just unfolding, pressure for more radical
reform quickly emerged with force.

The 2010–2011 reforms
The fourth and latest round of NCS reform is distinguished by a shift in emphasis
away from the ever-increasing focus on out-of-area operations. While this is a notable
result of the reform, it was not in itself an important reform driver. The key driver
was clearly cost saving.
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At the informal defence ministers’ meeting in Istanbul in February 2010, US Secretary
of Defence Robert Gates came out forcefully in favour of a reform of NATO structures, including the Command Structure. He gained support for tasking Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen with presenting a proposal for cuts by the June
ministerial meeting. This was followed by a nine member state initiative, including
the US, UK, Germany and France, presented in April 2010. Their non-paper called
for an NCS that was “aﬀordable, scalable, and able to support deployable operations”,
that “the number of headquarters should be reduced substantially”, and the number of
personnel should be “signiﬁcantly less than 10,000 […] (towards a 7,500 level)”.19 To
fulﬁl his February tasking, Fogh Rasmussen turned to the Chairman of the Military
Committee and the commanders of the two strategic commands, earning the group
the nickname the ‘twelve-star committee’. Its proposals for drastically cut structures
were presented to NATO defence ministers in June 2010. The models, A and B,
were 7,500 and 9,500 strong respectively and both proposed cutting all component
commands in ACO, retaining only two (A) and three (B) JFCs. Instead of accepting
either of these, however, the ministers again appointed a Senior Oﬃcials’ Group to
hammer out an agreement. The SOG convened on 30 June 2010 and worked until
late September. The ‘geographically unconstrained’ model it proposed was subsequently endorsed by both the October meeting of defence and foreign ministers
in Brussels and the Lisbon Summit. It retains the two strategic commands. While
ACT is reduced somewhat in size, it is basically left untouched. ACO and to an
even greater extent the NSCA see major change. In ACO, the number of JFCs is
cut to two, and only one maritime and one air component command are retained.
Deployable HQs are to be ﬁelded by the JFCs, which are also to develop a regional
focus and relations with national, joint HQs. A much-reduced NCSA is to become
a NATO CIS Group under the command of ACO. Overall, the number of personnel is to be about 9,000. The approval of this model in Lisbon was only a ﬁrst step.
Many decisions must still be taken; the Lisbon Summit set a June 2011 deadline for
a “ﬁnal decision on a new NATO Command Structure, including its geographic
footprint”.20 It is no coincidence that geographic footprint is speciﬁcally mentioned
– it will probably, as usual, be the hardest nut to crack.

Shifting gears?
As argued above, the NCS stands at the core of NATO’s new balancing act between
out-of-area operations and in-area challenges. By placing greater emphasis on in-area,
the NATO Command Structure may improve and demonstrate the Alliance’s ability to deal with challenges in or close to NATO borders, and thus provide visible
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assurance. One way this has been done, and something we are likely to see more of,
has been to engage the NCS in eﬀorts such as in-area contingency planning and
relevant exercises.
Another approach is to (re)introduce tasks for NATO HQs, as the ‘regional focus’
and ‘a new relationship with our national headquarters’ entail. The details of what this
would mean in practice, and what resources the NCS should devote to them, remain
to be decided. Their implementation does, however, hold the promise of further refamiliarising the NCS with the geography and climate, and the potential challenges
in and around NATO’s treaty area. Cost cutting was the single most important motive for the latest round of NCS reform. The Lisbon Summit Declaration appears
to acknowledge this in the ﬁrst sentence of the paragraph dealing with the NCS:
“We have agreed a framework for a new NATO Command Structure, which will
be more eﬀective, leaner and aﬀordable.”21 Given that the total cost of maintaining
the NCS amounts to a mere fraction of a per cent of total NATO defence spending,
even the most optimistic assessment of savings remains a drop in the ocean in terms
of the overall defence resource challenge. This only serves to magnify the paradox
that, at a time when the aim to “develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons
of cost-eﬀectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity” (Lisbon Strategic Concept)
is held in such high regard, cooperation is being reduced in the NCS.22 Apart from
the devoted membership of the United States, the NCS is perhaps the single most
important element that makes NATO diﬀerent from other international organisations engaged in security aﬀairs, such as the UN and the EU. The NCS also plays an
important role as the ‘glue’ that binds NATO militaries and member states together.
Linguistic skills, cultural issues, varying emphasis on and quality of military education, and political caveats are all factors that will prevent NATO from becoming
optimally eﬃcient and the NCS is a key arena for levelling out such diﬀerences and
for fostering interoperability. Learning about NATO procedures at a military academy is a far less intensive experience than learning by doing in a truly multinational
NATO command. While the existence of large NATO HQs in operations, such as
the massive ISAF HQ, makes the problem less acute, cutting the size of the NCS will
not beneﬁt the development of doctrinal, procedural and cultural interoperability
among NATO oﬃcers. Moreover, this is a move that will hurt new members more
than old and thus, given that many new members are particularly concerned about
in-area challenges, be seen to work against rebalancing.
The establishment of links between NATO and national headquarters and cooperation with NCS HQs e.g. in organising exercises, may compensate. So may, even,
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intensiﬁed cooperation between national headquarters using NATO procedures,
and the plan to develop a system of certiﬁcation of national HQs. All of these will,
however, draw on scarce resources both in terms of ﬁnances and manpower, and thus
compete with out-of-area operations – with out-of-area probably winning hands
down until the end of ISAF.
The size of this chapter does not allow for an assessment of the degree to which the
latest reform shifts the burden of fulﬁlling the still-valid 2006 Level of Ambition
from the command structure to force structure and national headquarters, and the
implications this has. In terms of the day-to-day workload, there is little evidence to
suggest that the current NCS struggles signiﬁcantly with meeting today’s operational
tempo, although the workload is clearly unevenly shared. This despite – and this is a
crucial point – the fact that the level of actual manning for many years has consistently been at 80–85 % – which is basically the personnel size of the newly adopted
structure fully manned. Evidence thus suggests that with some synergy gained from
concentration across fewer sites, even a much smaller NCS should be able to conduct
on-going operations and even devote some resources to renewed, in-area ones.
If, however, as experience from the last two decades shows, member states continue to
underman the new, smaller structure to the same degree, the new NCS may struggle
to meet the full range of demands made of it. As long as NATO remains as heavily
involved in high priority, out-of-area operations as it is today, in-area ambitions are
likely to yield.
This returns us to the question this chapter set out to answer: namely, do the current
NCS reforms entail a shift in gear consistent with the rebalancing act envisioned by
the Lisbon Strategic Concept? The answer is that it is too early to tell and prospects
are mixed. What does seem clear is that until the end of the Afghanistan operation,
the shift will most likely only be a shift from ﬁrst to second gear in the in-area, and
from top gear down to fourth in the out-of-area operations.

Notes
1
Note that the out-of-area debate has changed character over the years. During the Cold War and most of the
1990s, out-of-area implied out of the NATO treaty area as deﬁned in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Though the term is still used in the literature on NATO, by the late 1990s and clearly after 2001, there was no
real debate in NATO on whether or not the Alliance should have a role outside the Article 6 area. The use of ‘outof-area’ might thus seem anachronistic, but as the issues involved today bear semblance to those of the Cold War
and 1990s, and for the sake of simplicity, I choose to use this (vaguely deﬁned) term and its antonym ‘in-area’.
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13. Military Change – Discord or Harmony?
Thierry Legendre

Transformation – not a new concept
Military change is a constant in defence planning. Irrespective of changes in the
security environment that can be more or less unpredictable, there will always be an
element of change and hence a need to adapt capabilities. Transformation has been
part of NATO’s evolution since its creation: for instance following its increased
role after 1953–54, or given its strategic re-orientation from massive retaliation to
ﬂexible response in the 1960s. In particular after the end of the Cold War, now two
decades ago, transformation has been integral to the Alliance. The Strategic Concept of 1991 and the follow-on changes led by former Secretary General Manfred
Wörner amounted to a major and impressive shift, which prepared the Alliance for
an operational role from 1995 and onwards.
The Strategic Concept of 1999 continued this trend, and major changes in NATO’s
command and force structures followed at the summit in Prague in 2002. Simultaneously, agreement on the Alliance’s substantial enlargement was reached during
these years. I think that the ﬁrst Supreme Allied Commander Transformation,
Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, described military change and transformation
best. In 2004 he described transformation as a continuous process recognising
“that transformation doesn’t have a beginning or an end” – it’s not a destination
in itself, rather a journey.

The road to Lisbon – a three-step approach
Some would claim – and maybe not entirely wrongly – that the Alliance stumbled
into the new millennium, with broad transatlantic disagreement on the critical
issues of capabilities (e.g. lack of burden sharing), operations (e.g. strife over Iraq)
or the international security architecture (e.g. American EU-scepticism). As a
transatlantic organisation in a time of European fragmentation and American
unilateralism NATO had a hard time keeping its members united. It reminds us
that NATO can only reﬂect the actual state of aﬀairs amongst its members and
between Europe and America; its dynamics are provided by its members, not by
the institution per se.
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In order to keep NATO on the transformation track it was important to construct a
new path towards the modernisation of the Alliance. Luckily for the Alliance, many
almost simultaneous changes had a positive eﬀect on transatlantic relations. First of
all the United States turned towards a more multilateral approach vis-à-vis its European allies – most visibly with Barack Obama in the White House but the trend
began during the second Bush administration when a more cooperative approach to
world aﬀairs became discernable, although the Europeans were no longer in listening
mode! Secondly, political changes in the Palais de l’Élysée had a positive eﬀect on
the transatlantic climate. France led by ‘Sarkozy l’Américain’ was now ready to fully
re-integrate the military structures of NATO that it had withdrawn from in 1966.
This French rapprochement with NATO was completed at the NATO Summit in
Strasbourg and Kehl in 2009. It was a summit loaded with symbolism. It was held
on the banks of the Rhine between France and Germany and celebrated the sixtieth
anniversary of the Alliance. The Heads of State and Government issued a Declaration on Alliance Security that was basically a ‘letter of intent’ underscoring solidarity
amongst Allies and outlining some of the main elements that should be included
in a new Strategic Concept, including the need for improved relations with other
organisations, the need for improved relations with Russia, emerging security challenges, and a modernisation of the organisation and its capabilities. And even more
importantly, this Declaration stipulated that a new Strategic Concept should be ready
for the 2010 NATO Summit. Finally, the Allies appointed a new Secretary General,
the Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. This was the ﬁrst time in the
Alliance history that a prime minister had been appointed to this position, which
has normally been occupied by foreign or defence ministers. It was a clear signal that
the Allies meant business and were looking for results.
After the 2009 NATO Summit it was decided to create a Group of Experts, chaired
by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In co-operation with the
Secretary General and the policy planning staﬀ in his private oﬃce, the Experts
Group ran a series of international conferences. The process helped pave the way
for a comprehensive Experts’ Report and also to clarify and, on occasion, clear out
of the way, Allied disagreements. I guess the whole process was meant as a global,
open and transparent brainstorming process that could be followed by the ‘NATO
community and hang arounds’ on the Internet. This public diplomacy approach
worked very well, though real decision-making and negotiations in NATO, of
course, still took place behind closed doors and in the corridors of Boulevard
Leopold III in Brussels.
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Lisbon 2010 – a new strategic vision?
I believe that the New Strategic Concept and the decisions taken in connection with
the NATO Summit in Lisbon oﬀer a solid basis for the continued transformation of
the Alliance in the 21st century.
First of all, I think that the New Strategic Concept oﬀers a far better deﬁnition of the
threats and challenges facing the Alliance, including new ones such as the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, failed states, cyber warfare
and energy security. Additionally, the decision taken earlier in 2010 to establish a
division in the International Staﬀ at NATO Headquarters in charge of emerging
security threats, should be seen as a clear sign of the attention given to these issues.
Secondly, it is the ﬁrst time that a Strategic Concept has such an extensive focus on
reform and the transformation of NATO and its capabilities. It is made clear that
the Allies now want value for money. The pressure on public funding and defence
budgets due to the international ﬁnancial crisis is not underestimated, and the crisis’ consequences are easily traceable in major defence reforms (e.g. Germany) and
multinational co-operation (e.g. United Kingdom and France).
Thirdly, with the New Strategic Concept a Comprehensive Approach is now a declared
and integrated part of international operations. This is a novelty. Additionally it was
decided to create a new ‘modest and appropriate’ civilian capacity at NATO, able
to interface with civilian partners. All of this is an achievement although one could
have hoped for more – a point to which I shall return.
An additional number of important decisions were taken at the NATO Summit in
Lisbon or in conjunction with it. First of all the important decision to have a NATO
Missile Defence that ultimately, within about a decade, should give European allies
a strategic missile defence. In the framework of the NATO–Russia Council (NRC)
major steps have been taken to cooperate on, precisely, missile defence. Furthermore,
it was agreed to cooperate on Afghanistan in the NRC framework. NATO’s reform
and transformation process was likewise boosted, as decisions reached prior to the
summit will reduce the existing fourteen agencies to just three and reduce NATO’s
Command Structure by 35 per cent. Finally, NATO reached agreement on a policy
on cyber defence.
In sum, the Lisbon Summit and the Strategic Concept reaﬃrmed an Alliance aware
of the multidimensional aspects of the threats and challenges with which it is faced,
and realising the need for more eﬃcient, ﬂexible and deployable force and command
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structures and a leaner organisation more generally. It is a solid basis for further
work. Now remains the diﬃcult task of implementation: the ﬁght over resources,
geographical footprints and political inﬂuence. Director of Research at the NATO
Defence College, Karl-Heinz Kamp, has often said that he had no illusion that a few
pages of written paper would change everything but that a Strategic Concept could
demonstrate solidarity amongst allies. I tend to agree and I think that the process
has been as important as the document itself. In short, the Allies have reaﬃrmed
solidarity with each other. The Allies needed that, notwithstanding that NATO has
been through more troubled waters earlier in its history. To illustrate the importance
of this procedural element I normally compare the process of drafting the Strategic
Concept to Christmas Eve: we all know what to expect, the food is always the same,
the Christmas tree hasn’t changed in size, the decorations are the same as ever and
we roughly know which presents to expect from each other. In spite of all this, we
will all leave the party feeling both better and happier and knowing we’re members
of a good and strong family!
Now that we have ‘synchronised our watches’ with a successful summit and a good and
adequate Strategic Concept, we should be ready for the demanding implementation.
Within most of the areas I have just mentioned, a series of deadlines and benchmarks
have been stipulated. Hence both the informal Defence Ministers’ meeting in March
and the formal meetings in June 2011 will be interesting to follow, as further political
guidance, action plans and implementation instruments are going to be produced
and agreed beforehand. An impressive agenda lies ahead.

Long-term challenges
The biggest challenge for NATO allies emanates from the international ﬁnancial
crisis and notably the squeeze it exerts on public spending and defence budgets. In
other words we need to, as Jamie Shea has said, get more ‘bang for the euro’, more
value for money. This goes both for capabilities and for operations.
Let me begin with the capabilities. Europe is suﬀering from defence capability duplication, and governments must break this intolerable situation. To push the argument, it
shouldn’t be carved in stone that all European allies should have three independent
services – army, air force, and navy – organised with independent command structures and multiple platforms. The duplication of bureaucratic structures and even of
real capabilities within armed forces is an area that simply needs to be looked into.
We might very well be facing a paradigm shift because we cannot maintain the level
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of quality and activity we know if we do not organise our military capabilities and
structures diﬀerently. Multinationality is going to be a key element, and pooling and
sharing of forces is being actively discussed in the European Union in the framework
of the so-called recent Ghent Initiative.
In operations we also need to do better, and the comprehensive approach – ‘winning
the peace and not only the war’ – is often presented as the silver bullet, not only by
NATO but by the international community in general. What is needed is indeed
a concerted approach to operations where civilian actors are included. Many have
claimed that it has taken the international community and NATO six or seven years
to ﬁnd out that a comprehensive approach was the answer, and to formulate a policy
for it. The claim underestimates the capacity of Western diplomats and forces to analyse and adapt strategies. Already during the Balkan wars in the 1990s (and probably
long before that) these lessons were identiﬁed and well learnt! As I said earlier, it is
positive that a civilian crisis management capability in NATO was decided in Lisbon;
it builds on these previous lessons learned.
However we are far from the kind of strategic, concerted, headquarters to headquarters, pre-mission political and military planning that would be needed to conduct
international operations successfully with a comprehensive approach. Or as they say in
the forces, ‘a goal without a plan is nothing but a dread’! The co-operation or strategic
partnership between NATO and the EU in particular is a key problem. The problem
here does not concern learning – as if NATO had been wandering mindlessly about for
the better part of 15 years (its Balkan IFOR deployment began in December 1995).
Rather, the problem concerns political will, including the well-known Turkish–Greek
Cypriot conundrum which arrests all movement in NATO–EU relations.

Conclusion
With the NATO Summit in Lisbon and the New Strategic Concept the Alliance has
once again proven its survivability and maintained its relevance as the largest defence
organisation in world history. It has once again managed to place itself at the centre
of transatlantic relations, where common command and control arrangements and
interoperability remain the smartest way for Europe and North America to cooperate
militarily. It has managed to relaunch the transformation and modernisation process
of its military and organisational capabilities. NATO has also improved relations with
Russia and signalled awareness of emerging security challenges and thereby shown its
willingness to shape its own security environment well into the 21st century.
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NATO’s new and ambitious agenda now needs to be implemented. The underlying
and longer-term challenge of maintaining European relevance through improved
capabilities, novel approaches, and working relations between NATO and the EU – all
of which must ensure better operational outcomes – should not be underestimated.
The substantial defence reforms in Germany and the new French–British defence
agreement indicate that lessons are being learned, but they remain tough lessons to
digest. To paraphrase Danish philosopher, Villy Sørensen, ‘It’s good that we are doing
better but it would be better if we were doing well’.
This presentation reﬂects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reﬂect
the opinion or the policies of the author’s previous or present employers.
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14. NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Implications for
Military Transformation and Capabilities
Christopher M. Schnaubelt 1

“Our sophisticated, industrialised and complex world is under attack from a myriad of
determined and deadly threats. If we do not take action soon, we will ﬁnd ourselves,
like Gulliver, pinned to the ground and helpless, because we failed to stop a series of
incremental changes while we still could”. (Lord Peter Levene)2
This chapter argues that the NATO document released during the Lisbon Summit on
20 November 2010 is unlikely to produce signiﬁcant changes in capability requirements or in the present direction of transformation eﬀorts. Although described as
the ‘new’ Strategic Concept, it is actually much more about continuity than about
change. The aspects that are truly remarkable concern its transparency, the process of
its development, and the resulting conﬁrmation of Alliance solidarity. It is diﬃcult
to identify another high-level political–military document that has been developed
in such an open and public manner, considering such a wide array of views and
gathering input from outside parties. However, its substantive content was at best
barely evolutionary and certainly not revolutionary. It produced neither a bold shift
in the remit of the Alliance nor a fresh approach towards achieving the security of
its members.
This continuity, however, does not imply stasis. It instead means that the Alliance is
continuing along a path that began to meander following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, but was inﬂuenced by NATO’s mission in the Balkans, and then strongly
shaped by the events of 11 September 2001 and operational experience from the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The clear implication
is that ongoing eﬀorts at military transformation will continue along the same lines.
This also implies that current shortfalls in the eﬀort to achieve the capabilities that
NATO requires to maintain its security still remain to be resolved. Furthermore, the
budgetary pressures caused by the present ﬁnancial crisis are likely to exacerbate the
problem of capability gaps as the New Strategic Concept removes hardly anything
from NATO’s plate.3
Prior to its publication some analysts expressed the belief, if not the hope, that the
New Strategic Concept for NATO would result in a signiﬁcant reduction in the
Alliance’s ambitions.4 Combined with the impact of the global ﬁnancial crisis and
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expected reductions in NATO common funding as well as cuts within the national
defence budgets of the individual members, it was frequently suggested that the
Alliance would be forced to look inward and focus almost exclusively upon Article
5 collective defence inside the Euro-Atlantic region. Such analyses implied that a
NATO that intended to accomplish less would, in turn, require fewer additional
capabilities: the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan would be
the last ‘out-of-area’ mission for NATO; the appetite for expeditionary operations
capabilities would quickly dissipate and transformation initiatives would be pared
down to measures that would primarily result in cost reductions.
Perhaps these predictions may yet come to pass, or perhaps the New Strategic Concept
is like a Rorschach blot in that it reveals more about the reader than it does about the
future direction of the Alliance. Nevertheless, it seems pretty clear that rather than
limiting the scope of NATO, both the Strategic Concept of ‘Active Engagement,
Modern Defence’5 and the Lisbon Summit Declaration of 20 November 20106 are
intended to continue and reinforce the previous trend of taking a broader view of
security for the members of NATO, as well as the recognition that future security
threats are most likely to come from areas that are not contiguous with the territory
of Alliance states.
As summarised in the Summit Declaration, the New Strategic Concept envisions
an entity that is: “able to defend its members against the full range of threats; capable of managing even the most challenging crises; and better able to work with
other organisations and nations to promote international stability. NATO will be
more agile, more capable, and more cost-eﬀective, and it will continue to serve as
an essential instrument for peace.” Article 5 and the promise that members will
assist each other in case of an armed attack remains as the key foundation of the
New Strategic Concept. Yet rather than revert to a narrow focus upon the collective defence of member territory against ‘traditional’ threats, it takes note that the
most potent challenges may be posed by actors that are not nation states at all.
Indeed, it speciﬁcally states that:
• Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread
to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance….
• Instability or conﬂict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance
security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal
activities such as traﬃcking in arms, narcotics, and people.
144

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

These types of threats are the most challenging for an Alliance that is still, to a great
degree, organised and equipped to ﬁght large-scale conventional land battles of the
kind anticipated during the Cold War. This, of course, is the reason that NATO’s
current enemies, such as the Taliban and other extremists in Afghanistan, are presently engaging in asymmetric warfare and any future adversaries are likely to follow
suit. Only the most foolish will have failed to note the following critical lesson from
the Iraq War: while America and its allies are unmatched in their ability to engage
in combined arms manoeuvre warfare supported by artillery, attack aviation, and
deep strike and close air support against conventional armies and air forces they are,
however, not nearly as dominant when it comes to ﬁghting irregular combatants who
indiscriminately use mortar and rocket ﬁre in cities, or insurgents who hide amidst
civilian populations and employ improvised explosive devices.
Among the responses to these and other threats (including conventional attacks, ballistic missiles, and cyber warfare), ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’ promises
that NATO will:
• Maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several
smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic
distance;
• Develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry
out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations,
including with the NATO Response Force;
• Further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations,
including counterinsurgency, stabilisation and reconstruction operations;
These are just a small sample of the “full range of capabilities necessary to deter and
defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations” identiﬁed
in paragraph 19 of the New Strategic Concept. Nevertheless, with the exception of
committing to a NATO ballistic missile defence – along with the hope that it will be
developed in cooperation with Russia – and taking the threat of cyber attacks much
more seriously, virtually nothing was listed that NATO had not been pursuing well
before the Secretary General was tasked to produce a new strategic concept in 2009
at Strasbourg/Kehl.7
A complete history of NATO’s evolution after the Cold War is beyond the scope of
this chapter. However, a few brief examples may be useful to illustrate the continuity
reﬂected by the New Strategic Concept and show why it is not likely to produce a
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major shift in the military transformation eﬀorts of the Alliance or signiﬁcant changes
in previously recognised capability requirements.
Interoperability and logistics challenges identiﬁed during operations in the Balkans
led to the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) announced at the Washington
Summit in 1999. The DCI listed 59 items for action with the intent to “not only
improve NATO’s ability to fulﬁl NATO’s traditional Article 5 (collective defence)
commitments, but also to prepare the Alliance to meet emerging security challenges
that may require a variety of types of mission, both within and beyond NATO territory”.8 NATO’s foreign ministers agreed at their May 2002 meeting in Reykjavik
that in order to execute “the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to ﬁeld
forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over
distance and time, and achieve their objectives”.9 This was closely followed by the
Prague Capabilities Commitment at the November 2002 summit, which agreed to
400 speciﬁc improvements that built upon the DCI.10
The Comprehensive Political Guidance agreed in 2006 found that terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were the threats NATO would be
likely to face in the following ten to ﬁfteen years, emphasising the need to be able
to “respond eﬀectively to the full spectrum of threats, risks and challenges of the
21st century from wherever they may come.” Among the most important continuing requirements this assessment generated was “the ability to conduct and sustain
operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support”.11
Possibly most important in terms of military transformation, the New Strategic
Concept is largely consistent with NATO’s Multiple Futures Project 2030 (MFP)
published in April 2009.12 The MFP’s views of future security conditions and their
implications for the Alliance generated useful planning scenarios that remain valid.
In particular, it found that asymmetric/hybrid threats would be among the Alliance’s
top security challenges and that “it is more likely the Alliance will be threatened by
instability and the weakness of others, than by invading conventional forces. Interstate conﬂicts in diﬀerent regions of the world will remain likely: while they may not
threaten NATO directly, the consequences of such conﬂicts may have a signiﬁcant
impact on the security of the Alliance”.13
In his foreword, General J.N. Mattis wrote that his aim for the MFP was “to buttress
the continuing strategic dialogue, serve as a catalyst to drive policy change, inform
defence planning, and assist in prioritising capability development”.14 It is still too
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early to judge whether these outcomes will be realised as desired. Nonetheless, the
Multiple Futures Project should continue to be useful in helping to steer NATO’s
military transformation eﬀorts.
As illustrated by the chart below,15 NATO’s post Cold War experience has been a
trend towards lighter, smaller unit conﬁgurations rather than large, heavy combat
formations. This shift in requirements needs to be matched with improved ﬂexibility,
better ability to project forces, and the capability to operate in diverse climates and
harsh environments.
Historical Reﬂection: Ability to Adapt is Critical
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Nevertheless, the scenarios developed by the Multiple Futures Project also indicate
that the trend towards missions requiring small unit operations is not necessarily
irreversible. It notes that ‘rogue states,’ which “act without respect for other states or
global norms and rules” and ‘confrontational powers,’ which are those “quick to resort
to force or threaten the use of force disproportionately to what is at stake and how it
aﬀects their vital interest” may require the capability to deploy forces of signiﬁcant
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size to deter acts that would threaten the security of NATO and to respond to such
acts should deterrence fail.
This assertion connotes that, in contrast to greater relative certainty regarding the
capabilities needed during the Cold War, NATO today cannot plan for a single or
speciﬁc type of conﬂict. Contemporary requirements include the ability to engage in
corps size Major Joint Operations (MJO), as well as Smaller Joint Operations (SJO)
up to division size, while continuing to maintain a nuclear deterrent. Additionally, it is
likely that missions will be blended rather than discrete events of a speciﬁc nature.
The following chart16 depicts the overlap of missions and forces that NATO should
be able to ﬁeld in order to meet likely security challenges:
Main MFP Implication: No Preclusive View of War
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The New Strategic Concept did not change this analysis nor alleviate the need for this
range and level of capabilities. Perhaps most critically, the Alliance still needs forces
that are highly deployable and able to conduct expeditionary operations. Indeed,
the dichotomy that some analysts seem to see between Article 5 missions versus ex148
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peditionary operations is illogical, even under the most restrictive interpretations of
Article 5. In most of the conceivable scenarios involving a direct, conventional attack
on the territory of a NATO member, other members will need to possess most of the
same capabilities needed for expeditionary operations in order to assist the ally or
allies under attack. As Daniel S. Hamilton of the Center for Transatlantic Relations
has argued, “Forces that cannot deploy are almost of no use for Alliance missions”.17
Nonetheless, in many cases Alliance members do not meet the NATO goal that 50
per cent of their land forces be deployable.
At Lisbon only very broad guidance on reform and transformation was provided:
“NATO must have suﬃcient resources – ﬁnancial, military and human – to carry
out its mission…. Those resources must, however be used in the most eﬃcient and
eﬀective way possible”.18 There is much more that needs to be done. While this
chapter is largely sceptical regarding the military implications of the New Strategic
Concept, the Summit Declaration contains more than a dozen speciﬁc tasks for the
North Atlantic Council. These may merely be an example of ‘kicking the can down
the road’ to defer dealing with very diﬃcult issues instead of resolving them. However, some may represent the kernel of a long-term solution to problems of matching
resources to goals.
It seems unlikely that consolidation, reorganisation and reform of NATO command
structures and agencies will produce substantial cost savings that can be re-directed
towards eﬀorts to attain the various needed capabilities. While theoretically possible, such an outcome would be contrary to the typical history of large organisations
in the absence of a catastrophic event such as losing a war. Nonetheless, budgetary
constraints might result in changes that signiﬁcantly reduce overhead costs and lead
to faster, more agile decision making as well as encouraging the more recalcitrant
members to make the investments necessary to close capability gaps.
While not a ‘task’ per se, the statement in paragraph 44 that the Alliance “welcome[s]
the outcome of the France–United Kingdom Summit on 2 November 2010 which
will reinforce their security and defence cooperation by introducing innovative
methods of pooling and sharing” alludes to the category of initiatives that probably
have the most potential for both increasing net capabilities and improving cost-effectiveness.19 Successful pooling, sharing, and commonly funded eﬀorts, to include
NATO owned capabilities such as the E-3A Airborne Early Warning and Control
Force, help the Alliance by improving interoperability and either reducing costs or
spreading them more eﬃciently.
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Besides the aforementioned French and British agreement, which among other
things will result in sharing an aircraft carrier and infrastructure to support
A400M transport aircraft, NATO success stories in this realm include the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (a sixteen nation consortium that leases AN-124
transport aircraft), the Strategic Airlift Capability (twelve nations that commonly
purchased three C-17 aircraft), a ten nation consortium that provides ‘roll-on/
roll-off ’ sealift capability, and the HIP Helicopter Task Force in Afghanistan.
Despite the several success stories, however, pooling and sharing programs face
the same collective action problems and potential sovereignty concerns as other
NATO efforts. Deciding on the specific military capabilities needed is the easiest
part. The political questions of how to divide up the costs and whether a nation
is willing to completely rely on others for a critical resource are by far the most
difficult. For this reason most nations are likely to maintain a full spectrum of
their own forces and jointly participate only when they absolutely cannot afford
a capability on their own, or in order to have enhanced access to a reserve or
surplus capability.
Among the many speciﬁc tasks contained in the Summit Declaration, the one with
the most potential to have a large impact on military capabilities is probably paragraph
43, which assigns the Council “to develop Political Guidance for the continuing
transformation of our defence capabilities and forces and the military implementation
of our New Strategic Concept….” The potential for revolutionary change is limited
because it will be circumscribed by the Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit
Declaration, which, as argued above, are actually rather conservative documents.
Nonetheless, the forthcoming Political Guidance may be the most likely place for
addressing the apparent mismatch between ﬁxed, if not increasing, ambitions in the
face of declining resources.
Due by the Defence Ministerial Meeting scheduled for March 2011, the new Political Guidance will be the initial eﬀort in the NATO Defence Planning Process that
was agreed in April and June 2009 and will build upon the 2006 Comprehensive
Political Guidance and other agreements as well as the new Strategic Guidance. Still
within the drafting and approval process at the time this chapter is being written,
the new Political Guidance is likely to deﬁne marginal capability improvements
while containing no surprises. It may urge allies who fall short of devoting 2%
of GDP to increase their defence spending, and ask those that currently meet or
exceed this goal to continue doing so, but provide no teeth to enforce this longstanding objective.
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Arguably, the most valuable aspect of the new Political Guidance will be to specify
Guiding Principles and Planning Assumptions for defence planning. These will set
the stage for the next step in the process: the Capabilities Requirements Review 2010.
They ought to contain unambiguous descriptions of the types of missions NATO
should consider as being both viable and reasonably likely, and deﬁne the relationship
between Article 5 collective defence operations and other missions such as Crisis
Response Operations. In this author’s opinion, the guidance should clearly state that
Article 5 has the highest priority but also that Article 5 and non-Article 5 operation
capability requirements are equivalent to a very great extent. Thus, there should be a
single force structure for the entire range of missions that NATO anticipates.
It would also be desirable to reiterate the agreed upon 50% deployable ground force
‘Usability Target’ and specify a mechanism that will do more to highlight the progress,
or lack thereof, of individual members in this respect.20 However, as is the case with the
proportion of GDP spending devoted to defence, the willingness of some members
to restructure and modernise their armed forces and, more to the point, willingness
to devote the resources necessary to reach this target, is problematic.
The classiﬁed ‘Lisbon Package’ of capability mentioned in the Summit Declaration
is likely to contain a few new requirements that build upon existing eﬀorts. Yet, the
language used in the declaration implies that the package consists mostly of previously
identiﬁed and agreed upon requirements: “We have endorsed the Lisbon package of
the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs and thereby provided a renewed focus
and mandate to ensure these critical capabilities are delivered….”21
Developing speciﬁc military capabilities within their forces is the responsibility of
NATO’s member nations. However, one of the functions of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is to help coordinate development, de-conﬂict where necessary,
and identify and address shortfalls or gaps in military capabilities. To facilitate this
process the two strategic commanders (Supreme Allied Commander Europe and
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation) have established a ‘top 50’ list of Priority Shortfall Areas (PSA). This document identiﬁes the capabilities that the strategic
commanders recommend as oﬀering the greatest potential to improve Alliance mission
eﬀectiveness and interoperability in the near, mid and long terms.
Informed by Multiple Futures Project ﬁndings and recommendations, the PSA list
has been developed from several sources that include the 2007 Comprehensive Political Guidance, the Defence Requirements Review, input from individual member
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states, and Urgent Requirements from Crisis Response Operations. Areas identiﬁed
as needing improvement include:
• Counterinsurgency Training and Doctrine
• Organisations, Training, and Doctrine to Counter Improvised Explosive
Devices
• Information Sharing with NATO Partner Nations
• Small Unit Development
• Strategic Communications and Information Operations
• Language and Culture
• Enabler Support
• Civilian–Military Teaming/Civil Aﬀairs
• Professional Military Education
• Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Processing, Exploitation, and
Dissemination
• Security Force Assistance
• Ability to Defeat Precision Guided Munitions and High Technology Sensors
As can be seen at a glance many, if not most, of these shortfalls were derived from the
experience of the ongoing ISAF mission. Given the 2014 target date for transitioning
security responsibility to Afghanistan’s government, one may argue that regardless of
what was agreed at Lisbon (and many earlier summits) these requirements will fade
if not disappear before many nations can close the gaps. One might thus conclude it
would make sense for some members to slow roll the rest of the Alliance and continue
to lag in adequately developing the capabilities of their armed forces. However, such
logic cannot be supported from a purely military perspective.
Aside from the overlap with requirements for meeting Article 5 responsibilities, these
capabilities are necessary for most of the likely scenarios wherein NATO must react to
threats that emanate from outside the Alliance’s immediate neighbourhood, whether
called stability operations, peace enforcement, or crisis management. Moreover,
as argued previously based upon the Multiple Futures Project and other analyses,
these threats are much more probable than conventional cross-border attacks on a
member’s territory.
The real challenge to NATO in being able to deliver what is desired in the New
Strategic Concept is not a diﬀerence in military assessments, not disagreement on
future threats and the capabilities needed to meet them and not the lack of a common
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view regarding what the Alliance as a whole should be able to accomplish. Rather, it
is another item of continuity, a political problem as old as NATO itself22 – that of
attaining a fair distribution of the burdens that must be carried to achieve NATO’s
security goals. Force transformation and building the capabilities needed to meet the
vision laid out in the New Strategic Concept and prior agreements are expensive. In
the wake of Lisbon the big questions remain: how many members will succumb to
the temptation to free ride, and what will be the reaction of the states who perceive
they are continuing to bear a disproportionate share of the load?
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15. Nuclear Posture, Missile Defence and Arms Control
– Towards Gradual but Fundamental Change
Trine Flockhart

NATO’s New Strategic Concept agreed in Lisbon in November 2010 follows in the
footsteps of previous strategic concepts by considering the role of nuclear weapons
and NATO’s overall deterrence posture. Granted the present strategic concept does
so much more succinctly than previous (publicly accessible) concepts have done,
and the document clearly indicates a decreasing role for nuclear weapons in the alliance of the 21st century, whilst it also indicates a strong connection between nuclear
weapons and arms control. Yet despite the apparent clarity about NATO’s continued
status as a nuclear alliance and despite the unquestionable brevity aﬀorded the topic
in the document, the precise message in the New Strategic Concept is somewhat
ambiguous and can be interpreted in two fundamentally diﬀerent ways – either as a
rather conservative ‘business as usual’ approach to nuclear weapons, or as a prelude
to fundamental change that will dramatically alter the Alliance by shifting emphasis
from nuclear sharing to missile defence sharing and from deterrence by punishment
to deterrence by denial.
On a ﬁrst reading of NATO’s New Strategic Concept, the document sounds rather
conservative on nuclear policy and the uninitiated reader could easily miss the
signiﬁcance of the brief mention of missile defence, and the rather brief and only
slightly changed wording on the role of nuclear weapons. Yet, when reading NATO
documents it is often just as important to pay close attention to what is not said as
to what is said. Indeed, brevity and bland language in NATO documents should
never be mistaken for a lack of importance – and should certainly never be assumed
to indicate consensus. On the contrary, the general rule is that the less that is said
about a subject the more controversial the issue is likely to be. It therefore seems
safe to assume that the text of the New Strategic Concept represents the extent to
which NATO’s Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen could generate consensus
among NATO’s 28 members.
Yet although the actual text only contains limited references to nuclear weapons and
nuclear posture, the nuclear issue actually has a much greater presence in the document than ﬁrst meets the eye. To glean the ‘hidden’ presence of nuclear issues, it is
necessary to adhere to the other principle that has to be used when reading NATO
documents, which is to never assume that separately numbered paragraphs can be
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read independently. In NATO documents issues are always interlinked, and in the
case of nuclear posture, paragraphs about missile defence, arms control (conventional
and nuclear) the relationship with Russia, capabilities and equal participation by
allies are all linked to NATO’s nuclear policy and deterrence strategy, and represent
a form of coded language that covers long established rules and practices related to
burden and risk sharing and to long held (and arguably outdated) truisms about the
role of nuclear weapons for ensuring cohesion in the Alliance and the credibility of
Article 5.
The view presented here is that a close reading of the strategic concept together with
a reading of the accompanying Lisbon Summit Declaration, along with being armed
with some background knowledge about nuclear issues in the Alliance indicate that,
actually, the New Strategic Concept is far from conservative but is intended to herald
fundamental change in NATO’s nuclear thinking along with radical change in longcherished principles about nuclear sharing and to directly address sensitive issues of
Alliance cohesion and deterrence posture. As described by a NATO representative, the
outcome of Lisbon in the ﬁeld of nuclear policy is somewhat ‘enigmatic’.1 This would
indeed seem to be the case and perhaps even to be an understatement as the intricate
inter-linkage of all the issues clearly shows. To some extent this is a ﬁnding that is
somewhat reassuring, as it really would be worrying if NATO intended to hang onto
an archaic nuclear posture that was developed under the very diﬀerent conditions of
the Cold War, and which in any case was always based on a rather dubious logic.

Reading the texts – the Lisbon documents
The preface of the strategic concept agreed in Lisbon starts out with declaring implicit
support for President Obama’s goal of ‘a world free of nuclear weapons’, by boldly
declaring that “it commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world
without nuclear weapons”. The word ‘conditions’ is important and can be interpreted
to refer to the inter-linkage between NATO’s adoption of a missile defence and to a
renewed and cooperative relationship with Russia and to reductions (perhaps elimination) of the non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe (§26). However,
the boldness of the commitment expressed in the strategic concept is immediately
watered down as the text continues with a loud ‘BUT’ by conditioning the commitment with the sentence ‘as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO
will remain a nuclear Alliance’. Interestingly, however, the concept does not specify
which nuclear weapons, thereby leaving the possibility for NATO’s nuclear status being premised only on the strategic arsenals of the US, Britain and France. Indeed this
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view is underscored in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the strategic concept as it is declared
that deterrence will be based on ‘an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional
capabilities’ (§17) and that “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is
provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the
United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and
France” (§18). The indication that NATO may be moving towards greater reliance
on its strategic forces is further indicated in §26, where it is stated that NATO will
seek to “create the conditions for further reductions in the future” of non-strategic
nuclear weapons based in Europe – which is linked in the same paragraph to Russia’s
stock-pile of non-strategic weapons and to conventional arms control.
The issues are somewhat clearer in the Lisbon Summit Declaration as the inter-linkage
between nuclear and conventional posture and missile defence is further speciﬁed in
the Summit Declaration (§30), which states that “NATO will maintain an appropriate
mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defence forces. Missile defence forces will
become an integral part of our overall defence posture”. The Summit Declaration
further tasks the Council to “continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring
and defending against the full range of threats” and that essential elements of the
review should include ‘NATO’s nuclear posture, and missile defence’ and that “this
only applies to nuclear weapons assigned to NATO” i.e. not the strategic forces of
the United States, Britain and France. This is indeed a point that has subsequently
been backed up by events as President Obama recently informed the Senate that
the United States, in consultation with NATO, expects to hold talks with Russia on
tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) within a year of the new START Treaty coming
into force.2
The Summit Declaration also provides a little more detail on the issue of missile
defence by specifying its aim as being to provide full coverage and protection of all
NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats
posed by proliferation. The Summit Declaration hints at a more internal role of missile defence as a means of burden and risk sharing as it speciﬁes that missile defence
should be based on the “principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO
solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens”. This is indeed a reiteration of the
view presented by the Group of Experts under the leadership of Madeleine Albright,
which stated that “A NATO missile defence system would enhance deterrence and
transatlantic sharing of responsibility, reinforce the principle that security is indivisible,
and allow for concrete cooperation with Russia.”3 That the New Strategic Concept is
indeed more wide-ranging than indicated by the text itself, can be glimpsed in remarks
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made at the recent Munich Conference by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, where
she indicates that the transatlantic relationship will continue to evolve according to
a planned move “to modernise and enhance the European security architecture” that
culminated with the approval of the New Strategic Concept.4 She goes on to say that
“now that the strategic concept has been approved, we are reviewing its implications
for the US force structure in Europe”.5

The New Strategic Concept – a bold but risky move
The picture that emerges from the Lisbon documents, from subsequent remarks
by key policy actors and from conversations with NATO oﬃcials, as well as from a
careful reading of the background to the sudden emergence of nuclear issues on the
NATO agenda, is that the renewed relationship with Russia, missile defence, arms
control and the commitment to a nuclear posture review are all pieces of a carefully
crafted puzzle that may lead to a NATO without American non-strategic nuclear
weapons (NSNWs)6 based in Europe. Such a NATO would be a dramatically altered
alliance, as the onus of risk and burden sharing would shift from nuclear sharing to
missile defence sharing, which would eﬀectively change NATO’s deterrence posture
from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial. This would constitute a
signiﬁcant shift that would have wide-ranging repercussions on some of NATO’s
most long-standing and most cherished practices and accepted truisms. With such
a potential shift it is clear that the New Strategic Concept is not at all a conservative
document, but rather a document that seems set to usher in radical change for the
Alliance of the 21st century.
The strategy is however not without risks and the outcome of the planned nuclear
posture review is far from certain. Although, a missile defence system may well seem
to be a much more timely response to NATO’s most pressing security issues, missile
defence itself raises a number of questions in relation to deterrence posture and arms
control, and if the changed relationship with Russia fails, a missile defence may do
more harm than good. Even so, under the conditions established in Lisbon a Ballistic
Missile Defence System (BMDS) nevertheless seems more appropriate than the current nuclear posture vis-à-vis the most likely security challenges of the 21st century,
as deterrence by punishment relies on a number of assumptions about a known and
rational opponent, which clearly is not necessarily going to be the condition for security in the 21st century. Furthermore, provided Russia is involved in a meaningful
and mutually beneﬁcial manner, the decision to install BMDS may ﬁnally endow
the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) with real purpose as a site for practical missile
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defence cooperation and thereby possibly contribute to lifting the NATO–Russia
relationship to an entirely new level. In addition, and indeed assuming that all Allies
will agree to such a signiﬁcant change in NATO’s nuclear posture and to the complete
reliance on strategic forces, the change is likely to fundamentally revise a number of
established, but ultimately outdated and illogical practices related to deterrence by
punishment and, not least, act as a means of maintaining Alliance cohesion and risk
and burden sharing. The puzzling question is therefore why NATO did not seize the
day in Lisbon to also decide on the withdrawal of the NSNWs that most agree are
of little strategic value and which were intended to support a nuclear posture now
widely seen as defunct. Such a move would undoubtedly have meant the document
would have been hailed as truly historic. The reason has to be found in NATO’s rather
unhappy experience with public nuclear decisions and with widespread reluctance
among a number of allies to end the established practice of having American nuclear
weapons based in Europe.

The return of the nuclear debate
The process leading towards the formulation and adoption of the New Strategic Concept was a very unusual one whereby a large number of stakeholders participated in
several seminars discussing NATO’s role in the 21st century. In the very ﬁrst seminar
held in Brussels in July 2009 the issue of the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance
was raised. However, it was very clear from the ‘icy’ reception of the question that
NATO had no intention at this stage of taking up the always-tricky issue of nuclear
weapons. This probably reﬂected the agreed knowledge in NATO that questions
about nuclear weapons consistently have the potential for causing great controversy
and disunity, which is why it is no accident that nuclear weapons have led a ‘quiet life’
in NATO since the question about stationing intermediate range nuclear weapons
in Europe caused a decade-long crisis in the 1970s and 80s. In fact, NATO’s more
than 60-year history is littered with one crisis after another following in the wake of
nuclear decisions. The absence of controversy about nuclear weapons over the last
two decades has therefore been a welcome respite that NATO oﬃcials clearly were
in no hurry to end.
Nuclear decisions are not only diﬃcult for NATO because nuclear weapons have
been of central importance for NATO’s strategy throughout the Cold War, but also
because nuclear weapons have been endowed with a deeply symbolic value, seen as
‘the glue’ of the Alliance and as material proof of cohesion and of equal sharing of
risks. The reason why NATO appeared reluctant to undertake change in its nuclear
159

DIIS REPORT 2011:02

posture at Lisbon, therefore, has to be found in NATO’s long held practice as a nuclear
Alliance. The role of nuclear weapons in NATO has throughout NATO’s history been
described as political: to deter potential adversaries and to ‘couple’ the defence of
the European NATO allies with that of the United States. American NSNWs were
placed in European NATO countries both to compensate for a chronic conventional
inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but also to ensure that the United States would
be drawn into any nuclear conﬂict and hence to deter any – inevitably disastrous
– conﬂict from erupting. The deployment of American nuclear weapons in Europe
was therefore partly intended to reassure European NATO members of the American
nuclear guarantee and of the credibility of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Moreover, the nuclear weapons deployed in European NATO countries were seen as
a symbol of NATO cohesion and solidarity through nuclear sharing, which meant
that all members ‘dipped their ﬁngers in the blood’ of a possible nuclear confrontation and that they shared risks and beneﬁts as equally as possible through hosting
nuclear weapons and by participating in nuclear planning. Since the 1960s all NATO
countries except France have participated in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).
By the early 1960s seven NATO countries hosted American nuclear weapons (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom).
The number of NSNWs peaked in 1971 at around 7,300 after which it gradually
declined and then fell dramatically after the Cold War. In 1991 the United States
unilaterally withdrew all ground-launched, short-range NSNWs worldwide, including
2,400 artillery shells, surface-to-surface missiles and anti-submarine bombs in Europe. Over the last decade the number of NSNWs based in Europe has been further
reduced as the US quietly withdrew all approximately 20 deployed warheads from
Greece in 2001, followed by around 130 from Germany and 110 from the UK in
2004. Today around 150–200 NSNWs are held in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Holland
and Turkey.7 These remaining B-61 gravity bombs, to be launched from dual-capable
aircraft owned by the European allies, have remained in Europe in almost complete
obscurity ever since, which probably was a fact that suited NATO perfectly. The
NSNWs were referred to in each of the public strategic concepts since the end of
the Cold War, but have nevertheless remained an almost forgotten part of NATO’s
nuclear deterrence.
However, with President Obama’s Prague speech in April 2009 nuclear weapons were
once again placed back on the global agenda. In addition, several other developments
have combined to bring the nuclear issue back into policy debates and public awareness. Apart from the rebuﬀed question at the NATO strategic concept seminar in
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July 2009, the issue was placed much more eﬀectively on NATO’s agenda in October
2009 when German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle persuaded Angela Merkel
that Germany should seek the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons stationed in
Germany as part of a wider NATO eﬀort to pursue nuclear disarmament and arms
control. This was on many counts a surprising turn of events, and certainly seemed
rather out of character from Angela Merkel, suggesting that perhaps the German
proposal played to a domestic audience and was more an issue close to the heart of
Westerwelle than to Merkel. Indeed, the raising of the issue might also have been
connected with Germany’s choice of aircraft – the Euroﬁghter, which does not have
a nuclear capability from the European manufacturers. In any case, Germany was
highly successful in placing the issue on NATO’s agenda and has since lobbied actively
for complete withdrawal of all NSNWs from NATO territory in general and from
German territory in particular.
In addition three crucial agreements in the ﬁrst half of 2010 have kept the issue high
on the global agenda: the new START follow-up treaty which was ﬁnally ratiﬁed in
the American Congress in December 2010; the nuclear security summit hosted by
President Obama; and the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference reaﬃrming the commitment to eliminating all nuclear weapons. Furthermore,
the delivery systems for NATO’s NSNWs (F-16 and Tornado dual-capable aircraft)
are all due for modernisation or replacement within the next decade, which raised
the issue in national capitals and which necessitated a decision about the future of
existing NSNWs. The German choice of the Euroﬁghter is especially sensitive in this
regard because a continuation of the dual-key system of operation would necessitate
release of sensitive information to the manufacturers of Euroﬁghter thereby raising
complicated issues of transfer of technical information on making the aircraft dualcapable. Clearly the issue of aircraft modernisation is intricately connected with
questions about the future of the existing (and many would say outdated) NSNWs
stationed in Europe.
Once the issue was brought out in the open several other NATO countries followed
suit. Hence the role of NSNWs and the strategic relevance of the aging B-61s was ﬁrmly
placed on NATO’s agenda at the urging of several member states (Belgium, Norway,
the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg) when foreign ministers discussed the
nuclear issue at a meeting in Tallinn in April 2010. However, although the pressure
now came from states, the proposal was once again ﬁrmly rebuﬀed at the meeting
in a statement which declared that as long as nuclear weapons exist NATO would
remain a nuclear alliance. At the meeting in Tallinn ﬁve principles were proposed by
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Secretary of State Clinton, which show the inter-linkage between nuclear posture,
missile defence and arms control and which are reﬂected in the ﬁnal strategic concept
– albeit in a more convoluted way. The ﬁve principles were:
1. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.
2. As a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is of
fundamental importance.
3. A broad aim is to continue to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons
while recognising that in the years since the Cold War ended, NATO has already
dramatically reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons.
4. Allies must broaden deterrence against the range of 21st century threats, including by pursuing territorial missile defence.
5. In any future reductions, the aim must be to seek Russian agreement to increase
transparency on NSNWs in Europe, relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members and include NSNWs in the next round of US–Russian arms control discussions alongside strategic and non-deployed nuclear
weapons.8
The problem is that although NATO’s nuclear posture may seem archaic in the
present strategic environment, there are still NATO allies who insist that the cohesion of NATO is dependent on sharing the nuclear burden. In addition many new
NATO members feel insecure vis-à-vis Russia and insist on the continued need for
nuclear deterrence. This is especially so as Russia has not reduced its NSNWs to the
extent that NATO has, but is believed to still possess in excess of 3000 warheads.
This makes the issue ripe for arms control, but as Russia claims that its holding of
NSNWs counteracts Russian inferiority on the conventional balance (which used
to be the case for NATO), the extra link to conventional arms control has already
been made. This is a link that has cropped up in several remarks since the adoption
of the strategic concept – mostly recently at the Munich Security Conference.
Regardless of the number of Russian NSNWs, it is widely agreed in NATO that
NATO’s remaining nuclear weapons have little strategic value, and that their decommissioning could be seen as a valuable contribution to the overall goal of a nuclear
free world and to be in line with the commitments entailed in the non-proliferation
regime. It might be argued therefore that the value of NATO’s existing nuclear stance
is upheld more for internal reasons of cohesion than for realistic and relevant threat
perceptions and strategic considerations. Moreover, it follows that if nuclear weapons
are a symbol of Alliance cohesion, disagreement about the role of nuclear weapons
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is equally a sign of lack of cohesion. As all nuclear decisions in NATO’s history have
inevitably led to crisis and threatened Alliance cohesion it is therefore not surprising
that most member states have been reluctant to revisit the nuclear issue, despite the
many factors in favour of such a discussion. Westerwelle’s suggestion for withdrawal
of American nuclear weapons and his invitation to discuss the nuclear issue in the
run up to the Lisbon Summit was therefore not received with enthusiasm by most
member states, although the lack of enthusiasm probably has more to do with Westerwelle’s timing than with the substance of his suggestion.

A window of opportunity for change
That the Strategic Concept did not opt for an equally bold decision as the missile
defence decision by agreeing to withdraw all NSNWs and thereby substitute nuclear
sharing for missile defence sharing was always the expected outcome of the Lisbon
Summit, as disagreement about the issue was simply too great to overcome in the
time available. However, now that the Strategic Concept is in place, one may ask
for how long a non-decision on NSNWs can be maintained? Close reading of the
Lisbon documents reveals that the New Strategic Concept facilitates the complete
withdrawal of NSNWs. The emphasis on NATO remaining a nuclear alliance as
long as nuclear weapons exist can be honoured by the nuclear guarantee provided by
American (as well as British and French) strategic nuclear forces – hence there is no
speciﬁc condition in the New Strategic Concept to maintain NSNWs. It therefore
seems likely that the combination of the political aim of moving towards Global Zero,
and the adoption of BMDS and practical security cooperation with Russia are only
ﬁrst, albeit important, steps towards changing NATO’s outdated nuclear posture and
deterrence strategy. The puzzling question remains why it was not simply included
in the Strategic Concept.
Danes, who have known Anders Fogh Rasmussen as Prime Minister, recognise that
‘chance’ and ‘coincidence’ are not words in his vocabulary and that it is fairly safe to
assume that everything the Secretary General does has been carefully planned and
very precisely scripted with insurances made that key allies – especially the United
States – are in agreement with the overall plan. It seems likely that it is in recognition of the reluctance and worry of some NATO members that Fogh Rasmussen’s
scripted plan is geared towards a gradual and discreet change on nuclear posture to
be undertaken after the adoption of the New Strategic Concept and after the placement of the new BMDS but before the next strategic concept looms. Given NATO’s
consistently bad experience with highly public nuclear decisions it is probable that
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the ‘script’ of the Secretary General foresees a quiet and circumspect withdrawal of
the remaining B-61 free-fall bombs as and when the dual capable aircraft to deliver
the bombs are withdrawn. Such a timetable would mean that the Secretary General
in cooperation with the Americans and other member states open to change have a
few years to persuade the more reluctant to change members, and for them to adjust
to the new situation as the number of NSNWs is quietly reduced. In this strategy
the emphasis is on internal dialogue rather than potentially damaging public nuclear
decisions. As NATO has no speciﬁed minimum necessary nuclear force level, the
retention of a symbolic handful of NSNWs would be in line with the text on nuclear
forces in the New Strategic Concept. This, along with the changed relations with Russia
and the agreed installation of BMDS, indicates that the Secretary General’s strategic
thinking goes well beyond the concept agreed in Lisbon. Anders Fogh Rasmussen is
known to have been a close ally of the Americans in his capacity as Prime Minister of
Denmark. He is also known to be a long-term strategic planner and never to tolerate
departure from a carefully planned script. The fate of nuclear weapons and NATO’s
move from nuclear sharing to missile defence sharing is no exception. As a result, the
change on the horizon may well signal the beginning of the end of NATO’s over-reliance on NSNWs, but that a piecemeal approach has been chosen to make the change
more palatable for the reluctant NATO members. Therefore, for those who found
the Strategic Concept agreed in Lisbon dull and conservative – it may be that they
read what was in the document – rather than what wasn’t in there!
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Referred to by Simon Lunn and Ian Kearns in NATO’s Nuclear Policy after Lisbon – The Summit Documents
and the Way Ahead, Report for the meeting of the European Leadership Network, London, January 2011.
2
Message to the Senate on 2 February 2011, reported in RIA Novosti, 3 February 2011. http://en.rian.ru/
world/20110203/162430188-print.html
3
NATO 20202: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, May 2010, pp.44.
4
Hilary Clinton, speech at the 47th Munich Security Conference, 5 February 2011.
5
Ibid
6
American nuclear weapons based in Europe are commonly referred to as ‘Tactical Nuclear Weapons’. However,
this name is speciﬁc to planned military use during the Cold War. The more precise term ‘Non-Strategic Nuclear
Weapons’ is therefore used in this chapter.
7
NATO Parliamentary Assembly; US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: a Fundamental NATO
Debate
8
The ﬁve points are listed by Simon Lunn and Ian Kearns in NATO’s Nuclear Policy after Lisbon
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16. The Alliance after Lisbon: Towards NATO 3.0?
Karl-Heinz Kamp

Even those who cannot subscribe to the NATO Secretary General’s assessment of
the Lisbon Summit as the most important event in the Alliance’s history have to
admit that this gathering was a particular one. Many previous summits from Riga to
Strasburg/Kehl either produced only limited content – at least from the meetings on
the highest political level – or were characterised by bitter disputes inside and outside
of NATO. Lisbon was an exception in the sense that it produced content without
major arguments among the Allies or between NATO and Russia.
Moreover, the summit diﬀered in another aspect from many of its predecessors; the
atmosphere in the capital of Portugal was diﬀerent. For the ﬁrst time in many years
participants felt a new sense of recommitment and new awareness of NATO as a
‘true alliance’ among the member states. This was probably not more than a nuance
but is nevertheless a relevant detail.
One reason for the positive outcome of the summit – in its results as well as in the
spirit of the meeting – was the fact that NATO had a long and open debate about
its raison d’être, which led to a New Strategic Concept signed by all Heads of State
and Government. Despite such a strategy being long overdue, it was far from sure
that NATO would succeed in ﬁnding a rapid consensus on such a document, given
the diﬀerent historical, geographical and political backgrounds within the Alliance.
Developing a new strategy was particularly diﬃcult as it was obvious right from the
outset that a strategic guidance for the 21st century would have to meet at least four
partly conﬂicting requirements:
• First and foremost, it had to clearly deﬁne NATO’s roles and missions. This has
been attempted time and again in recent years but only resulted in a plethora of
functions in order to prepare the Alliance for all foreseeable contingencies.
• Hence, the second necessity of the strategy was to set priorities which would bring
demands into line with scarce resources, even if this implied painful choices.
• Third, by deﬁning a common vision for NATO, the New Strategic Concept had
to become a tool for re-engaging all NATO member states with the core principles
of the Alliance. This was necessary to counter the trend of a re-nationalisation of
security policy – as currently can be observed in Afghanistan, where the ‘we’ in
NATO’s operations seems crucially missing.
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• Fourth, NATO’s new strategy must contribute to winning the battle of narratives.
It has to be seen as a strategic communications tool vis-à-vis an increasingly critical
public.

NATO’s New Strategic Concept
When Secretary General Rasmussen presented the Strategic Concept in Lisbon on
the evening of the ﬁrst summit day, the reactions were mixed. NATO representatives praised the paper as pathbreaking and forward oriented. Outside experts or the
media were less convinced. “Way too general and nothing new in it” was one of the
verdicts of op-ed columnists. Others asked whether these few pages could really be
the blueprint for NATO’s role in the 21st century.
However, these critics missed the point that NATO’s agreement on its own future
is not only determined by a NATO document alone but also by the pathway which
led to that document. The Alliance has evolved its new strategy in a long, open
and transparent process, involving diplomats, the military, experts, journalists and
the public. This was an intricate and time-consuming procedure and some NATO
experts quipped that this was not the right way to build consensus and would lead
to nothing more than long debates.
Nonetheless, these long debates had a clear purpose. In recent years NATO has been
too focused on its ongoing operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere and lost sight of
its raison d’être. Since an agreement on these basics of the Alliance cannot be directed
from the top, NATO needed an intense debate among all members about its future
role in a changed security environment. In that sense, the process towards the strategic
concept was at least as important as the document itself. Even if the new strategy is
inevitably generic, NATO found clarity in at least ten points, although some of the
substance can only be found between the lines:
1) NATO is a political–military defence alliance with Article 5 of the Washington
treaty – the mutual defence commitment – at its core. This is not new but has
sometimes been forgotten. NATO’s eastern members reminded their allies of
these basics of solidarity and mutual assurance.
2) NATO’s defence mission does not exclude a close and trustful partnership with
Russia – however not at the expense of the security of any NATO country.
Cooperation with Russia and reassurance from Russia are not contradictory.
Only if all 28 NATO members feel reassured is a true partnership possible.
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3) NATO defends three things: its territory, the people living there and the vital
interests of its members. NATO’s defence function is primarily directed toward
armed attacks or threats such as 9/11, where terrorists used civil aircraft as
weapons to cause mass casualties.
4) There are numerous risks such as cyber attacks or energy crises, which can become
vital threats. However, since they hardly have any direct military dimension,
NATO might only have a supportive role in dealing with them. In such cases,
though, NATO must function as the key forum for transatlantic consultations
on who is doing what – as stipulated in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.
5) This one is also a no brainer: the insight that today’s security challenges and crisis
management operations require a combination of military and non-military efforts. However, it is easy to request such a ‘comprehensive approach’ in papers and
speeches but it is much more diﬃcult to make it work on the ground, where civil
and military actors sometimes just don’t want to cooperate. And even if they want
to cooperate, ﬁguring out how to integrate their eﬀorts can be problematic.
6) To say that NATO needs partnerships is to state the obvious. Equally important
is that NATO needs close partnerships with politically likeminded countries
like Australia, New Zealand and Japan among others. They are not only contributing to NATO’s mission, they also share NATO’s values. Thus, they need
to be included in NATO decision-shaping processes as far as possible.
7) Notwithstanding its global activities, NATO is not a global institution and deﬁnitively not a world policeman or globo-cop. Rather, it is a regional institution
which needs to take a global perspective given the realities of the 21st century.
8) If nuclear weapons remain a factor in international relations, nuclear deterrence
remains relevant. Contrary to some popular views, the ultimate purpose of
nuclear weapons is not that they should be scrapped. Instead, the function of
nuclear weapons – like all other weapons – is to provide security. In cases where
they don’t serve this purpose – and with respect to NATO’s nuclear weapons in
Europe doubts are justiﬁed – they might be withdrawn and dismantled. Before
scrapping, however, all NATO members have to agree upon how to provide
suﬃcient deterrence without them.
9) The security toolbox contains not only diplomacy, arms control, deterrence and
defence, but also protection from incoming ballistic missiles. Missile defence
has always been contentious – some see it as a blessing, others as a curse. The
fact is that the interception of missiles is possible and can save lives. Thus Missile Defence is a task for the entire Alliance.
10) NATO has always been quick at announcing adaptations of its structures and
decision-making processes but it has been slow in implementing them. Some of
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its procedures are still based on the situation of the Cold War. It has proved just
too alluring for NATO members to push for prestigious positions, command
posts or a strong representation in committees and agencies regardless of actual
requirements. The coming dramatic cuts in all NATO defence budgets will be a
catalyst for a change that is long overdue.

How to proceed?
Of course, these ten points do not answer all open questions. Rather, they raise the
issue of how to implement all the intentions and objectives: how will cooperation
with Russia be organised concretely? What to do with NATO’s nuclear forces in
Europe? How to cope with the realities of ﬁnancial scarcity?
NATO has avoided all these diﬃculties in the Strategic Concept but has mentioned
them in the Lisbon communiqué, the so-called Summit Declaration. Some said that
the NATO nations took revenge on the Secretary General who had guided them so
rigorously to a short and concise strategy by putting all their national preferences and
traditional positions in the Summit Declaration, which has made it a rather cumbersome document.
However, NATO does not dodge the controversial topics but intends to take
them on in the forthcoming months. In that sense the 54 paragraph long Summit
Declaration is a novelty in itself. Instead of just mentioning the open questions,
NATO’s Heads of State have prescribed NATO a strict working agenda with
concrete assignments and strict deadlines. There is no previous summit document
that contains so many orders and obligations, almost all linked to the forthcoming
meetings of NATO’s foreign and defence ministers in spring 2011. Among other
things, NATO has to:
•
•
•
•
•

Develop a new political guidance for military planning,
Draft a new concept for non-proliferation,
Work out a new partnership concept,
Come up with a common cyber defence policy, and
Flesh out the details of a common missile defence posture.

The only assignment that is not bound to the tight deadline of 2011 is the obligation
to develop a new nuclear strategy that brings the requirements of deterrence and
arms control into a balance.
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This extremely ambitious agenda raises the question of whether or not NATO
will really make progress in all the disputed areas. The fact that a summit meeting
orders the debate of open questions does not mean that 28 member states will
ﬁnd agreement by the deadline set by their political leaders. However, it at least
provides NATO with a new dynamism by addressing those topics which had been
papered over for a long time in order not to widen existing cracks in the fabric of
the Alliance.
Still there are issues where an agreement is currently diﬃcult to imagine, among them
the nuclear question and the problem of how to deal with Russia.
In the nuclear realm, there seems to be confusion on all sides. The United States
have initiated a process towards a nuclear free world, labelled ‘Global Zero’ and
have won international praise for this initiative. At the same time, the Obama
administration acts as if nuclear weapons will be around for a long time to come.
Russia supports the idea of a nuclear free world but at the same time regards
its nuclear forces as compensation for a lack of conventional capabilities and
particularly as a means to balance US military strength. Moreover, neither Iran
nor North Korea seem terribly impressed by the global trend towards reducing
the relevance of nuclear weapons and seem to be pursuing an exactly opposite
course. Germany has pushed for the reduction of US nuclear weapons but has
not specified yet how to deal with the need for deterrence expressed particularly
by its eastern neighbours.
Confronted with all these inconsistencies, NATO will have to answer nothing less
than the core nuclear question of how to deter whom with what?
With regard to Russia, the situation is not less diﬃcult. Cooperation with Russia
is a must but it still remains to be seen to what extent it will be possible and how
it can be implemented. Whereas some allies still harbour concerns with regard to
Moscow’s intentions, others seem to believe that cooperation with Russia could
democratise or domesticate Russian policy. These ideas of a ‘change by cooperation’ ignore that Russia (legitimately) pursues its own national interests, which
only partly overlap with those of NATO. Hence cooperation with Russia has to be
guided more by political realities and less by wishful thinking. The already lurking
debates on missile defence give a ﬂavour of how diﬃcult the relations with Russia
might become.
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Whither NATO?
So, what’s the conclusion? All problems solved? Of course not. This is hardly possible
in an alliance of 28 members with diﬀerent histories, geographies and cultures. At
least NATO has dared to admit that there are diﬀerent interests within NATO that
have to be harmonised time and again. Therefore, the new strategy is not the end of a
debate but rather the beginning. Topics like arms control, missile defence or nuclear
deterrence have to be further elaborated in the coming months and years. This will
not always be harmonious and might lead to disputes and heated arguments. As a
result, there will be those who predict a transatlantic divorce or the end of NATO.
However, the explanation for upcoming arguments is much simpler: NATO is about
more than Afghanistan and remains a pretty agile and lively institution.
Still, NATO’s Litmus test will come in late spring 2011 when the ﬁrst results of the
Lisbon agenda have to be presented. Obviously, notwithstanding the strict deadlines given by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, there will be no ﬁnal
consensus on all open questions. The positions among the Allies are too disparate
and some of the issues too hazy to be discussed for that. For instance, whether or not
the Obama administration will be able to build up its missile defence project in the
foreseen manner is increasingly dependent on the budgetary developments in the
United States. The issue of nuclear arms control and the future of nuclear weapons
will be crucially aﬀected by nuclear developments in Iran and North Korea – both
currently unpredictable. The NATO–Russia relationship will always remain a function of the US–Russia relationship, which in turn will be aﬀected by the domestic
debate within the United States.
Despite these uncertainties though, NATO will have to present to the foreign and
defence ministers a work in progress that shows that the Alliance has taken on the
critical issues without trying to dodge the divisive questions or to escape by burying itself in communiqué language. If the Alliance manages to present serious steps
forward – albeit not fully ﬂeshed out - it will rebut its critics and will conﬁrm the
position it already claims: that of the most successful political–military alliance
in history.
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NATO’s Strategic Concept – Active Engagement,
Modern Defence

Preface
We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined
that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our
common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase
in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world,
against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:
• It reconﬁrms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack,
including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.
• It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conﬂicts and stabilize postconﬂict situations, including by working more closely with our international
partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.
• It oﬀers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they
contribute.
• It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without
nuclear weapons – but reconﬁrms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in
the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.
• It restates our ﬁrm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement
contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
• It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more eﬀective, eﬃcient and
ﬂexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they
invest in defence.
The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy
robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help
promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world
is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the
Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and
shared values.
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Core Tasks and Principles
1. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and
security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance
remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.
2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the
principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
The Alliance is ﬁrmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which aﬃrms the primary
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace
and security.
3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been
forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link
remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace
and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic
is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity,
shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.
4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges
to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their
security, the Alliance must and will continue fulﬁlling eﬀectively three essential
core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always
in accordance with international law:
a. Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack,
in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment
remains ﬁrm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat
of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten
the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.
b. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and
military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during
and after conﬂicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those
political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the
potential to aﬀect Alliance security, before they escalate into conﬂicts;
to stop ongoing conﬂicts where they aﬀect Alliance security; and to help
consolidate stability in post-conﬂict situations where that contributes to
Euro-Atlantic security.
c. Cooperative security. The Alliance is aﬀected by, and can aﬀect, political
and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage
actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant
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countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to
arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door
to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet
NATO’s standards.
NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on
all matters that aﬀect the territorial integrity, political independence and security
of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue
of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information,
exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.
In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as eﬀectively and eﬃciently
as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and
transformation.
The Security Environment
7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack
against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided
NATO for more than half a century.
8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries
around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military
capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic
security that are diﬃcult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic
missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.
9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and
their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability
and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some
of the world’s most volatile regions.
10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries,
and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups
continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and
modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks,
in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.
11. Instability or conﬂict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance
security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal
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activities such as traﬃcking in arms, narcotics and people.
12. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the
damage that they inﬂict on government administrations, businesses, economies
and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic
prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services,
organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of
such attacks.
13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and
transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend.
They require greater international eﬀorts to ensure their resilience against attack
or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign
energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution
networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.
14. A number of signiﬁcant technology-related trends – including the development
of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space
– appear poised to have major global eﬀects that will impact on NATO military
planning and operations.
15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change,
water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security
environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to signiﬁcantly
aﬀect NATO planning and operations.
Defence and Deterrence
16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory
and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However,
no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were
to be threatened.
17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities,
remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any
use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As
long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.
18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic
nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have
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a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of
the Allies.
19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter
and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations.
Therefore, we will:
◆ maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
◆ maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several
smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
◆ develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to
carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary
operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
◆ carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional
and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance
and reinforcement for all Allies;
◆ ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command,
control and consultation arrangements;
◆ develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic
missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to
the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on
missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
◆ further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
◆ develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from
cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and
coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under
centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness,
warning and response with member nations;
◆ enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our
partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including
to help train local forces to ﬁght terrorism themselves;
◆ develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection
of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with
partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments
and contingency planning;
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◆ ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of
emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats
into account;
◆ sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are
suﬃciently resourced;
◆ continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against
the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the
evolving international security environment.
Security through Crisis Management
20. Crises and conﬂicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security
of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conﬂict
situations and support reconstruction.
21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and
the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and
military approach is necessary for eﬀective crisis management. The Alliance
will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after
crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities
on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and eﬀectiveness of the overall
international eﬀort.
22. The best way to manage conﬂicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO
will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate
crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming
larger conﬂicts.
23. Where conﬂict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and
capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conﬂict management
capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust
military forces in the ﬁeld. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conﬂict management
eﬀorts.
24. Even when conﬂict comes to an end, the international community must often
provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO
will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction,
in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant
international actors.
25. To be eﬀective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:
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◆ enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might
occur, and how they can best be prevented;
◆ further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations,
including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
◆ form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more eﬀectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned
from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ
and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those
responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
◆ enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum,
◆ develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that
local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without
international assistance;
◆ identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for
rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our
military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;
◆ broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before,
during and after.
Promoting International Security through Cooperation, Arms
Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation
26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and
should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue
to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of
both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as nonproliferation eﬀorts:
◆ We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a
world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and
is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
◆ With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War,
we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in
Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek
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to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.
◆ In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to
increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these
weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must
take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of shortrange nuclear weapons.
◆ We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability,
transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for
stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in
Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.
◆ We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international eﬀorts to ﬁght proliferation.
◆ National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an
impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on
these issues.
Open Door
27. NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies;
the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have
advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free,
and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of
all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.
◆ The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume
the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can
contribute to common security and stability.
Partnerships
28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network
of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These
partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s
fundamental tasks.
29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to
enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance
is based, to NATO’s operations, and to preparing interested nations for member182
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ship of NATO. These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual beneﬁt
and mutual respect.
30. We will enhance our partnerships through ﬂexible formats that bring NATO
and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks:
◆ We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with
any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest
in peaceful international relations.
◆ We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues
of common concern.
◆ We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and
decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.
◆ We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their speciﬁcity.
31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance
aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set
out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:
◆ enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
◆ more regular political consultation; and
◆ enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations
are engaged.
32. An active and eﬀective European Union contributes to the overall security of
the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for
NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members
of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance
of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the
EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a
signiﬁcant contribution to these eﬀorts. For the strategic partnership between
NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these eﬀorts is essential. NATO
and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles
in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our
contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:
◆ fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy
and institutional integrity of both organisations;
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◆ enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum,
from coordinated planning to mutual support in the ﬁeld;
◆ broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern,
in order to share assessments and perspectives;
◆ cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and
maximise cost-eﬀectiveness.
33. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating
a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO
and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from
Russia.
34. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially
regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence
and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding
diﬀerences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO
and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on
mutual conﬁdence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security.
We are determined to:
◆ enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in
areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counternarcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
◆ use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.
35. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central
to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are ﬁrmly committed to
the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the
Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in
the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf
region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative. We will aim to:
◆ enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
◆ continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the
NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic
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orientation or aspiration of each of the countries;
◆ facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim
to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;
◆ deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue
and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries
of the region;
◆ develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready
to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
Reform and Transformation
36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that ﬁelds military forces able
to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere
through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its disposal
core capabilities that few Allies could aﬀord individually.
37. NATO must have suﬃcient resources – ﬁnancial, military and human – to carry
out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and
territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most eﬃcient and eﬀective way possible. We will:
◆ maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the ﬁeld, including by undertaking focused eﬀorts to meet NATO’s
usability targets;
◆ ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary
duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;
◆ develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-eﬀectiveness and
as a manifestation of solidarity;
◆ preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and
funding that bind us together;
◆ engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve
working methods and maximise eﬃciency.
An Alliance for the 21st Century
38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our
Alliance so that it is ﬁt for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are ﬁrmly committed to preserve its eﬀectiveness as the globe’s most
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successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope
because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human
rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and
objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them
through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.
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